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This dissertation studies the macro-level impact of market-oriented reforms in 
education. Specifically, it evaluates the intended and unintended consequences of the 
introduction of competition and the high-stakes accountability program in Chile. 
Competition and high-stakes accountability systems in education are neoliberal, market-
oriented policies implemented by lawmakers with the stated goal of improving the quality 
of education. Performance on standardized tests is a key marker of quality in this 
system—schools are ranked based on student scores. Funding opportunities are also 
attached to performance. Thus, advocates argue that if schools compete with each other 
and parents have the freedom and information to choose their children’s schools, the 
education system would react to these pressures and lead schools with lower performance 
on standardized tests to eventually close due to low enrollment. Therefore, the overall 
quality of education would improve.  
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Influenced by economist Milton Friedman and under the military regimen of 
August Pinochet, Chile implemented a universal education voucher program in 1981. In 
2015, more than half of Chilean students in primary and secondary education are enrolled 
in private-voucher schools. Furthermore, and as part of its neoliberal agenda, the Chilean 
government also implemented a high-stakes accountability program as way to make 
teachers and school administrators responsible for student performance on standardized 
test. 
I use a mixed methods research approach to explore the intended and unintended 
consequences of the introduction of competition and the high-stakes accountability 
system. The results show competition has had a negative impact on quality of education 
at the national level, while families and students from Santiago, the capital, have 
benefited from competition. Furthermore, in those schools that participate in the high-
stakes accountability system, contrary to the expected outcome, teachers are not 
increasing their use of academic strategies, such as spending more time with students, 
finding new learning methods, or giving students more homework or assignments in 
order to improve their performance on standardized tests. Instead, teachers and schools 
are increasingly using non-academic strategies, such as excluding low-performing 
students from the test-taking pool, as a way to improve scores. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
Around the world, education is overwhelmingly conducted in the public sector 
and one of the central debates among governments is how to improve the quality of 
public schools (Kremer & Sarychev, 2000). Politicians and policymakers have proposed 
incorporating the private sector and market rules into the educational arena as a way to 
improve the quality of public education. Market-oriented reform in education combines 
competition, free choice, and accountability as complements to one another. It is assumed 
that if schools compete with each other and if parents have the freedom to choose their 
children’s school, the educational system will react to these pressures and quality will 
improve. Parents would be inclined to choose schools with the best quality of education 
for their children, which would lead those schools with lower quality to eventually close 
due to low enrollment. Moreover, proponents of school choice argue that in the 
traditional educational system, principals and teachers do not face strong enough 
consequences for the poor performance of their schools or students (Betebenner, Howe, 
& Foster, 2005). They believe the lack of competition and information about the quality 
of the education a school provides means that schools have few incentives to boost their 
performance. Instead, an educational system that incorporates competition among schools 
and in which teachers who are responsible for students’ performance on standardized 
tests is viewed as more likely to improve social mobility and equalize the quality of 
education among families of different socio-economic backgrounds (Haertel & Herman, 
2005; Hamilton, Stecher, & Klein, 2002; Hursh, 2007; Wall, 2000; West, 1997). 
However, while the privatization of education is widely advocated from a 
neoliberal standpoint, hardly any empirical evidence exists in support of this position, at 
least not at the macro level. In fact, discussions on such reforms are mostly based on 
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ideological beliefs (D. E. Campbell, West, & Peterson, 2005; Levin, 1998). To fill this 
lacuna in the research, this study assesses the outcomes of market-oriented reform in 
education, especially the macro-level impact of the introduction of competition and 
accountability systems. It does so by analyzing the case of Chile, where a large-scale, 
universal educational voucher system was implemented during the 1980’s and a high-
stakes accountability program in 2008.  
I apply a mixed-methods research approach that draws heavily on a quantitative 
analysis of nation-wide education and standardized test data, and incorporates semi-
structured interviews to meet three objectives. The first objective explores the 
relationship between school competition and student achievement in the period between 
2002 and 2013. During this period, the Chilean educational system experienced an 
important increase in students enrolled in private-voucher schools—the percentage of 
students in primary and secondary education enrolled in private-voucher schools 
increased from 36.4 percent in 2000 to 55.5 percent in 2013. To meet this objective, I 
evaluate the neoliberal hypothesis that in a competitive educational system parents will 
choose the best school for their children based on objective information that standardized 
tests provide on school quality. Schools with poorer standardized test scores would lose 
students and eventually disappear from the market and the whole system would improve 
as a result of that, ultimately improving the quality of the education in general. 
Furthermore, in a competitive educational system, the quality of schools should improve 
regardless of their location and under what conditions they exist because the whole 
system would be improved by market-based reform. Thus, my exploration of this 
hypothesis is guided by the following sub-questions: (1.1) how does competition affect 
students’ achievement? (1.2) does competition have similar impacts on the performance 
of students who are educated in the capital city, Santiago, and outside of it?  
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A second objective of this research is to understand the intended and unintended 
consequences of the introduction of the accountability system in Chile, and in particular 
what are teachers’ responses to the implementation of the high-stakes accountability 
system and what incentives exist to game the system or improve students’ leaning. A 
second wave of market-oriented policies in education in Chile, after the introduction of 
competition through private-voucher schools in 1981, was the implementation of a high-
stakes accountability system in 2008. Previous studies have shown that those schools that 
participate in the high-stakes accountability program have increased student test scores 
(Correa, Parro, Reyes, & Ugarte, 2012; Mineduc, 2012; Mizala & Torche, 2013; 
Perticara, Román, & Selman, 2013; Villarroel, 2012). However, these studies do not 
reveal what schools did in order to improve their performance.  Schools can increase 
students’ scores in several positive or negative ways, including “gaming the system” or 
by improving student learning, both strategies better scores. In evaluating this hypothesis, 
this study asks: (2.1) have teachers increased the use of academic strategies as a way to 
improve students’ performance on standardized tests after the implementation of the 
high-stakes accountability system in 2008?; (2.2) what are the difficulties and constraints 
that the Chilean educational system imposes on teachers and school administrators in 
order to increase the use of academic strategies under the high-stakes accountability 
system? 
The third objective of this dissertation analyzes the unintended responses of 
teachers under the implementation of high-stakes accountability program. In particular, I 
study the aftermath of the implementation of the high-stakes accountability system in 
2008 and whether or not low-achieving students are more likely to be excluded from the 
test taking pool. Another goal is to establish whether or not the new accountability 
system had a meaningful impact on the schools’ ranking due to the exclusion of low-
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achieving students.  I draw upon Campbell’s law, which points out that “the more any 
quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making, the more subject it will be 
to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social process 
it is intended to monitor” (Campbell, 1979).  I use Campbell’s law to study the impact of 
using a standardized test, as a single indicator, to measure the quality of education before 
and after the implementation of the high-stakes accountability system in Chile. In 
particular, I ask the following questions: (3.1) are schools that participate in the high-
stakes accountability program more likely to exclude low-performing students from the 
test-taking pool in order to improve their overall scores on standardized tests? (3.2) how 
do the schools’ rankings based on standardized tests change if the students excluded from 
the test-taking pool were able to take the standardized test?  
SIGNIFICANCE 
The privatization of educational systems remains an understudied topic largely 
due to measurement problems and a lack of data. While school choice programs are fairly 
common, they have been implemented in unique contexts with very different geographic 
and socioeconomic characteristics. Moreover, in the cases where data are available, 
scholars have focused on comparing the performance difference between public and 
voucher schools at the school or student level, and have not devoted as much attention to 
the effects of voucher school programs at the macro level (Torche, 2005). The Chilean 
case provides a rich opportunity for research because its voucher system has operated 
nationwide, almost unaltered, for more than thirty years, and Chile’s extensive database 
offers an ideal platform for analyzing the impact of private-voucher school systems 
(Carnoy & McEwan, 2000). In addition, the Chilean case is interesting because many 
other Latin American countries implemented neoliberal policies, such as voucher school 
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programs, during the 1990s. As such, the Chilean experience can offer valuable lessons to 
countries in the region and the topic is a high priority for the Chilean government since 
the student movement (2011 & 2012) demanded regulation of the market-driven Chilean 
educational system and the strengthening of public education.  
There is virtually no evidence at the aggregate level of the effects of privatization 
reform resulting from large-scale voucher programs (Nechyba, 2000). As such, given that 
the question is still relevant, U.S. researchers and policymakers should consider the 
evidence from large-scale programs in other countries such as Chile and New Zealand 
more carefully (Ladd, 2002). In this sense, there are lessons to be learned from the 
Chilean experience, not only for countries in Latin America, but also for policymakers in 
the U.S. As a result, policymakers, scholars and practitioners all stand to benefit from an 
in-depth, systematic assessment of its actual impact on educational outcomes.  
  This study also makes a contribution to the current research on Chile in terms of 
data and the methodology used. First, the data analyzed is qualitatively better than the 
data utilized in previous research because the period analyzed is longer and incorporates 
a richer level of information on students, students’ family characteristics, teachers, 
schools and school districts. Moreover, the data includes all 345 municipalities, whereas 
in most studies, small school districts are excluded or underrepresented in the national 
studies, even though they educate the most disadvantaged populations. Second, to 
estimate the relationship between competition and student achievement rather than use 
instrumental variables to deal with endogeneity problems with competition and test 
scores, I used a fixed effects model at municipality level. In this way a municipality is 
compared with itself through time and it is possible to obtain unbiased estimation of the 
effect of competition on students’ achievement.  
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Finally, in order to study how teachers respond  after the implementation of a 
high-stakes accountability program previous studies in Chile have used qualitative 
methodologies (Falabella, 2013), but do not examine what type of municipalities, 
schools, labor conditions, or leadership help to develop academic or non-academic 
strategies to improve students’ scores on standardized tests. In this sense, this dissertation 
offers fundamental information to policy-makers in Chile about the intended and 
unintended consequences of market-oriented policies implemented in Chile, in particular 
the impact of competition and high-stakes accountability system on student achievement. 
This information is crucial because until 2014 the high-stakes program was voluntary, but 
most likely in 2015 the program will become mandatory for all schools and will be 
implemented nationwide. Thus, the results of the dissertation will help inform the 
Ministry of Education’s efforts to either reduce or ameliorate the unintended 
consequences of this type of program and reinforce the intended effect of this public 
policy.  
BACKGROUND  
This study focuses on the Chilean case due to that country’s long-standing 
implementation of market-based reforms to its education system.  Under the military 
regime of Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990), the Chilean educational system underwent one 
of the most radical changes of its history as part of a market-orientated transformation 
undertaken during the 1980’s (Torche, 2005). Influenced by the economist Milton 
Friedman’s ideas, Chilean policy-makers advocated for a reduction in the government’s 
role in education arguing that free market competitors replace the government monopoly, 
Chile became one of the first countries in the world to implement such reforms. Even 
though the democratic government, which took office in 1990, disagreed with a number 
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of the military regime’s educational policies, it did not introduce substantive changes to 
the private-voucher model. The Chilean educational system continues to be almost the 
same as the one that Pinochet implemented in 1981. The reform of the educational 
system that took place during the Pinochet dictatorship had two main components: (1) the 
decentralization of education and (2) the creation of a universal educational voucher 
system. 
Decentralization of Education  
Traditionally in Chile, the Ministry of Education centrally controlled all public 
schools and was responsible for all aspects of their operation, such as teacher pay, facility 
maintenance, and curriculum design. Pinochet’s regime transferred all public schools, 
which were under the administration of the Ministry of Education, to the municipalities. 
With the reform, school control was transferred to municipalities and the reform strongly 
decreased the national government’s role and expenditures with respect to education. For 
example, state funding for education was reduced from 7.2 percent of the GDP in 1972 to 
2.4 percent in 1990 (Claro, 2005).  
Private-Voucher Schools 
Another key component of the privatization reform was the introduction of a 
universal educational voucher system. Within this system, a subsidy is paid to public and 
private non-voucher schools on the basis of student enrollment, and parents/legal 
guardians are free to choose which school they would like their children to attend 
(Torche, 2005). For example, if a student is absent three days during the month, this 
money is discounted from the government’s monthly payment to the school. According 
to the free market reforms implemented during the eighties in Chile, private schools can 
decide to increase their tuition according to their own interests and priorities. Therefore, 
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vouchers only cover a certain percentage of tuition, and parents need to pay extra money 
to register their children in these schools. Moreover, the schools can select their students 
through entrance exams, according to their own criteria. The government does not 
intervene to control the tuition rates of private-voucher schools or in the process of 
selection. 
In this sense, it is important to note that the Chilean voucher system differs 
significantly from the Wisconsin, New York or Florida system: the Chilean government 
does not give a tuition certificate to the family but, rather, pays the subsidy directly to the 
school that the student or parent chooses. Thus, the Chilean voucher model is known as a 
“funds follow the student” system (Mizala & Romaguera, 2000), where the government 
pays each school a specific amount of resources for each student that successfully attends 
classes. Each school’s revenue is determined on a month-to-month basis as a function of 
the schools’ total enrollment (Carnoy & McEwan, 2000). Some of the schools that 
emerged after the privatization reform were managed by religious and non-profit 
organizations, but the majority of them were run by private agents that capitalized on 
education as a profitable business (Hsieh & Urquiola, 2002). 
Public and private-voucher schools compete to enroll as many students as they 
can. The Ministry of Education prescribes a national curriculum, establishes set standards 
for school infrastructure, and supervises school operations for public, private-voucher 
schools. On the other hand, the public and private-voucher schools have the freedom to 
make their own decisions, operate schools, and establish their own school policies such 
as innovation in the curriculum and other areas that they consider will make them more 
attractive to their customers (Gauri, 1998). 
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Accountability System  
One of the central components of the Chilean educational system is the notion of 
free choice, in which parents would be able to obtain more efficient educational services 
so long as they had the possibility of choosing between schools, that schools, in return, 
would compete for students (Fontaine & Eyzaguirre, 2001). Thus the information 
provided by standardized test is intended to inform parents so they are able to make 
knowledgeable decisions when choosing schools for their children.  
Chile is one of the pioneers in Latin America in terms of its incorporation of 
standardized tests as a measurement of the country's quality of education, which is 
classified as one of the best in the region (Crouch, 2005; Manzi, 2014; Meckes, 2007). 
The current system of evaluation of quality of education was put into place in 1988, when 
the Chilean government implemented the Sistema Nacional de Evaluación de Calidad de 
la Educación (Educational Quality Measurement System, SIMCE), which is used to 
measure student achievement. In 1990, an education law (Ley Orgánica Constitucional de 
Enseñanza, LOCE) provided the legal foundation and operational details of the SIMCE, 
currently operated by the Ministry of Education, which is responsible for its 
development, implementation, and diffusion (Taut, Cortés, Sebastian, & Preiss, 2009). 
The SIMCE test has two main objectives; one is to obtain information about whether or 
not students are achieving the minimum standard of learning established by the central 
government and to determine the quality of education that schools are providing 
(Fontaine & Eyzaguirre, 2001). 
From low-stakes to high-stakes accountability systems 
Chile has been collecting and disseminating student performance data for more 
than 20 years, the purpose of this has been to provide information to parents about school 
quality. In fact, until 2007 the SIMCE test scores had created little in the way of 
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incentives or consequences for teachers or school administrators (Mizala & Urquiola, 
2007). However, in 2008 the Chilean congress approved the implementation of the 
Subvención Escolar Preferencial (preferential voucher program) also known as SEP. 
This law increased the voucher for those students of low socioeconomic status, and it also 
gave additional resources to schools in proportion to the number of low-income students 
enrolled. Public and private-voucher schools participate voluntarily in this program, but 
in so doing they commit to improving certain academic and management goals 
established and reinforced by the Chilean government (Mizala & Torche, 2013) Even 
though SEP is voluntary, in 2011, after 3 years of its implementation, 99 percent of the 
public schools and 73 percent of the private-voucher schools participated in SEP program 
(Mineduc, 2012). In order to evaluate whether or not schools were achieving the goals in 
their contracts, the SEP program ranks schools according to students’ performance on 
standardized tests, the socioeconomic status of the student body, and other indicators of 
the quality of education. If schools do not accomplish the benchmarks established by the 
SEP program, schools could be sanctioned and in the worst case, closed (Elacqua, Santos, 
Martinez, & Urbina, 2011). The Chilean government had invested around $1,300 million 
dollars on this program (Mineduc, 2012). 
With the implementation of the SEP program, Chile has started a new type of 
educational reform centered on the use of mechanisms of pressure and accountability 
(Carrasco & San Martin, 2012). In fact, in 2015 the Chilean government will implement a 
nationwide high-stakes accountability system approved in 2011 by the Chilean congress 
(Mineduc, 2011), in which all schools will be required to participate. In summary, this 
study analyzes the main elements of the market-oriented policies in the Chilean 
education. I study the effect of the introduction of competition and student achievement 
as well as explore the teachers’ responses to the system—academic and non-academic 
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strategies — during the period before and after the implementation of the SEP program. 
This information is fundamental for policy-makers as the implementation of the 
nationwide high-stakes accountability system in 2015 approaches and the educational 
reform that the current government is planning to implement.  
STRUCTURE, METHODS AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1, the introduction, is 
followed by the Chapter 2, the literature review which introduces the central ideas and 
assumptions concerning competition, free choice, and accountability in education and the 
main problems that researchers face in evaluating the impact of these reforms.  
Chapter 3, “The Winner Takes it All: Competition and Student Achievement,” 
relates to the first objective of this research, and explains the two main approaches to 
understanding the macro level effects of competition in education. While the neoliberal 
perspective suggests that the whole system would benefit from an increase of 
competition, critical theory argues that the potential benefits of competition would be 
“canceled out” by the negative effect of an increase in socioeconomic and class 
segregation.  
This chapter asks whether competition has an impact on student achievement and 
whether or not the impacts of competition are uniform across the country. In order to 
answer these questions I analyze data from the Sistema Nacional de Evaluación de 
Calidad de la Educación (Educational Quality Measurement System, SIMCE) to measure 
student achievement in reading and math. The SIMCE test is administered to all students 
in the country, in all of the educational establishments, including public, private-voucher 
and private-paid schools. The SIMCE test is administrated every year in 4
th
 grade and 
every two years in 8
th
 grade. Information about students’ grades is provided by the 
 12 
Chilean Ministry of Education, from a database called Rendimiento por Estudiante. The 
data encompasses the individual level and informs on the student’s final grade obtained, 
rate of attendance, and whether or not the student passed or failed his/her grade. 
I use ordinary least square (OLS) models with fixed effects at the municipality 
level as a way to address the endogeneity problem of competition and test scores. I use 
the percentage of students enrolled in 4th grade in private-voucher schools per 
municipality as a measurement of competition. The results of the regression models show 
that competition has a negative effect on student achievement at the national level. For 
example, for a one percent increase in competition, student achievement decreases by 
0.06 points on the reading test and 0.08 points on the math test. However, the coefficient 
of competition for the metropolitan region, where the capital city is localized, is positive 
and statistically significant, but relatively small compared with the standard of deviation 
of the SIMCE test, which is 50 points. For example, a one percent increase in competition 
implies only a 0.15 point increase on the reading test and a 0.1 point increase on the math 
test in 4
th
 grade. In summary, this chapter offers empirical evidence that runs contrary to 
assumptions made by advocates of market-oriented reform in education, those who 
hypothesized that the breakdown of the government’s educational monopoly and the 
introduction of competition and free choice in the system would improve the overall 
quality of the system in the long run. Instead, the introduction of the private-voucher 
schools only reproduces the differences already existing in the country. 
In Chapter 4, “Under Pressure: Teachers’ Responses to the High-stakes 
Accountability Program,” corresponds to the second objective of this dissertation, which 
is to understand how teachers respond to the accountability system. It asks whether 
teachers have increased the use of academic strategies as a way to improve students’ 
performance on standardized tests and what difficulties and constraints the Chilean 
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educational system imposes on teachers and school administrators in order to increase the 
use of academic strategies under the high-stakes accountability system. The chapter 
draws on the categorization developed by Daniel Koretz (2008) regarding how teachers 
respond to high-stakes accountability systems. In particular, it explores whether or not 
teachers who work in schools that voluntarily enroll in the high-stakes program have 
increased the use of academic strategies after the implementation of the program. The 
data analyzed comes from the Cuestionario Docentes (teacher questionnaire). This 
questionnaire is administrated by the Ministry of Education and is answered by each 
teacher whose students will be evaluated by the SIMCE tests, which inquires about his or 
her professional training and the contents that were taught during the school year, among 
others. The majority of the questionnaires were answered by one teacher who taught the 
three classes tested by SIMCE: math, reading, and sciences.  





 grade before and after the implementation of the high-stakes program in 2008 to find 
if they are using academic strategies to improve student learning. Furthermore, I 
complement the findings from the teacher questionnaires with the content analysis of 
semi-structured interviews that I conducted in Chile with 23 academics, policy-makers 
and teachers. The results of this chapter indicate that schools that participate in the high-
stakes accountability systems have not developed a set of academic strategies, such as 
working harder, working more or finding better methods of teaching to improve student 
learning. I argue that this is because the Chilean government is pushing schools to 
produce outcomes in the short term with measurable results, and academic strategies do 
not necessarily offer these results.   
Chapter 5, “The Invisible Children: What Standardized Tests Left Behind” 
connects to the third objective of this dissertation and focuses on the unintended 
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responses of teachers under the high-stakes accountability system. I use Campbell’s law 
to explore the use of non-academic strategies after the implementation of the high-stakes 
program. In particular, this chapter investigates whether or not low-achieving students are 
more likely to be excluded from the test taking pool and how this could impact in 







 grades from 2002 to 2013 and parent questionnaire. The 
parent questionnaire is a survey that all families need to answer if their children take the 
SIMCE test. It provides information about family income, the education level of mother 
and father, among other variables and it is administrated by the Ministry of Education.    
I use a logistic regression with fixed effects at the school level to explore whether 
or not low-achieving students are more likely to be excluded from the test-taking pool 
after the implementation of the high-stakes accountability system in 2008. In order to 
estimate how the schools’ rankings based on standardized tests change if the students 
excluded from the test-taking pool would be able to take the standardized test. I use 






 grades to impute the missing values of 
those students who did not take the standardized tests and I use the values imputed, 
previously excluded, to recalculate the classification of schools and explore whether or 
not it is possible to observe any difference including those students who did not take the 
standardized test. 
The main findings of this chapter show that after the implementation of the high-
stakes accountability system in 2008, students who obtained a grade of B- or lower were 
27.3 percent more likely to have not taken the reading test and in math 35.7 percent more 
likely. Using multiple imputed data, I have recalculated schools’ rankings by using the 
imputed values of those students who did not take the SIMCE test, and the number of 
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schools classified as “insufficient” increases as well as those classified as “intermediate.” 





Chapter 6 concludes the main findings of each chapter, providing the policy 
implication of the results in the context the educational reform propose by the current 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
A generalized concern among both developed and developing countries is the 
quality of education, and how to improve it (Chapman, Wesley, & Jr, 2000; Figlio & 
Getzler, 2002). One common solution implemented in many English-speaking Western 
nations, such as England, North Ireland and Wales in the late 1980s and in the early 
1990s in the United States has been the introduction of market–oriented policies into the 
educational arena (Betebenner et al., 2005; Hursh, 2007). 
Of late, this topic has received more attention in Latin America because at least 
12 countries have introduced diverse school choice programs and accountability regimes 
into their education systems – reforms largely based on models championed by policy 
makers in the United States. One recent example is the educational reform passed in 2012 
in Mexico, which included the creation of a national agency overseeing evaluations and 
plans to increase the accountability of teachers (Andere, 2012). Policy-makers assume 
that competition among schools and the free choice of parents could improve the quality 
of education, while standardized tests are viewed as a way to provide a “quality 
indicator” to the consumer (parents) and an “objective assessment” of student 
achievement within the educational market (Hursh, 2007; Robertson, 2000).  This 
approach combines both “free choice” and “accountability” as complements to one 
another. In this sense, test-based accountability systems could help parents to choose by 
providing information about the quality of educational services, and school choice 
facilitates accountability by promoting competition for enrollment (Betebenner et al., 
2005). 
Diverse studies have shown that test-based accountability systems might create 
incentives for teachers and school administrators to use non-academic strategies, such as 
 20 
coaching students to take standardized tests, or excluding low-performing students from 
the test-taking pool, as a way to improve schools’ performance in standardized tests 
(Koretz, 2008b). However, it is hard to evaluate how extensive these negative effects are 
and how they could impact schools and students (Stecher & Barron, 2001). In the case of 
Chile, some studies have analyzed the use of non-academic strategies under the Chilean 
high-stakes accountability system.  These researches have used a descriptive approach, 
however, and it is therefore not possible to know how extensive and significant the use of 
these strategies is. In this sense, the present research is a contribution to the current 
literature as it not only quantifies the extension of the use of non-academic strategies over 
time, but it also determines how significant of an impact these strategies have on schools’ 
ranking.  
In the next section, I will introduce the central assumptions behind competition, 
free choice, and accountability in education and the main problems that researchers face 
in evaluating the impact of these reforms.  
MARKET-ORIENTED POLICIES IN EDUCATION: COMPETITION, FREE CHOICE, AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN EDUCATION  
In his book Capitalism and Freedom (1962), Milton Friedman examines the 
contemporary debate about the role of markets and governments in education. Friedman 
assumed that the private sector is superior to the public sector in terms of providing 
quality and efficiency, and therefore argued that fostering competition among schools, 
could improve the quality of education (Friedman, 1962). Friedman proposed a type of 
“educational marketplace,” not only to provide for choice, especially among poor 
students without the option to attend a private school, but also to create incentives to 
improve efficiency in the delivery of educational services and innovation in education 
(Levin, 2002). In the “educational marketplace” model of education, resources for 
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schools are not guaranteed, and as such schools compete for financial resources while 
parents choose the schools that provide a better education for their children.  As a result, 
schools with poorer performance would lose students and eventually disappear from the 
market. For example, a large-scale voucher plan might "permit competition to develop," 
thus leading to the development and improvement of all schools" (Friedman, 1962).  
Friedman suggests that most funding should be directed to students themselves through a 
voucher mechanism: “The subsidization of institutions rather than people has led to an 
indiscriminate subsidization of all activities appropriate for such institutions, rather than 
of activities appropriate for the state to subsidize” (Friedman, 1962). He argued that the 
change from institutional to individual funding would increase the competition between 
schools and promote quality, efficiency, differentiation, and innovation among 
educational institutions. 
In an educational system, which allows to parents to choose the school for their 
children will create competition, incentives for innovations, and differentiation among 
schools, accountability, and an overall improvement of the system. The assumption is 
that individuals are the basic maximizing units, and therefore an educational system that 
provides options such as public (magnet schools) and private school (voucher/charter) 
would imply maximized actions for parents and students. A system designed to offer 
options has a direct effect on customers (parents and students) because it allows them to 
maximize their own goals. Also, when individuals pursue a particular objective, the 
collective good likewise benefits, because if every member of a certain group is better 
off, then the entire community is better off as well. Proponents argue that efficiency and 
equity can only be achieve by an increase in “free choice” (Betebenner et al., 2005; 
Robertson, 2000) as parents choose the best school for their children based on academic 
performance, values, and the quality of the schools. They are trying to maximize the 
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return on their investment in the long run, calculating the cost and benefits of choosing 
certain types of schools. Parents, particularly those who are in the most disadvantaged 
socioeconomic group, would thus benefit from the creation of “competition” among 
schools and “free choice” (Betts & Loveless, 2005). 
As the neoliberal approach has gained popularity in the educational arena, test-
based accountability systems have been seen as a necessary condition for improving the 
quality of education. In recent decades, policy efforts in the United States have been 
focused on implementing these types of programs (Chapman et al., 2000; Cullen & 
Reback, 2006; Figlio & Getzler, 2002; Hamilton et al., 2002; E. Hanushek & Raymond, 
2005; Jacob, 2007; Kim, 2004; Neal & Schanzenbach, 2010; Stecher & Barron, 2001). 
The assumption of those who advocate for the implementation of a standardized test-
based accountability system is that the mechanism of rewards and sanctions created by 
test-based accountability systems will encourage teachers and school administrators to 
become better at their jobs and maximize students learning, as a result. In line with this 
perspective, raising expectations and standards should promote better opportunities for 
students and narrow the academic achievement gap between low and high-performing 
students (Haertel & Herman, 2005). 
PROBLEMS TO EVALUATE MARKET-ORIENTED POLICY IN EDUCATION  
This section presents the main difficulties that researchers face in testing the 
hypothetical benefits of competition, free choice, and test-based accountability in 
education.  
Competition: Omitted variable bias and endogeneity issues  
One of the fundamental arguments in support of school choice is that increased 
competition will lead to an improvement in the quality of the education (Dee, 1998; 
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Hsieh & Urquiola, 2003) However, testing this hypothesis is difficult due to omitted 
variable bias and issues of endogeneity.  
The problem of omitted variables occurs when factors that confound the 
relationship between public and private-voucher schools are omitted from the analysis. 
For example, the equilibrium demand for private schools is significantly affected by 
several dimensions of socioeconomic status (Gemello & Osman, 1984; Lankford & 
Wyckoff, 1992) , and it is also well known that the socioeconomic characteristics of 
families are related to students’ academic achievement  (E. A. Hanushek, 1986; Haveman 
& Wolfe, 1995). Another source of omitted variables could come from “ability bias,” 
where private-voucher schools select the best students by way of a selection test or, in 
effect, by implementing higher tuition rates, a practice that reduces the average ability 
and educational outcomes in public schools (Belfield & Levin, 2002a). If an empirical 
model does not adequately incorporate omitted variables (explained above), the 
conclusions drawn between competition and quality of education could lead to 
misleading inferences (Dee, 1998). 
Endogeneity issues arise when, in a school district where public schools provide 
low quality of education, the demand for private-voucher schools rise and create a 
negative relationship between public school quality and private schooling enrollment 
(Dee, 1998). This is a problem if researchers try to estimate the effects of competition 
and quality of education in school districts with bad public schools, mainly because the 
low quality of education creates incentives to offer alternatives such as voucher schools, 
and it can appear that voucher schools cause this low quality of education, instead of the 
other way around (C. Hoxby, 2003) 
Additional, problems arise with the way that competition is defined. Typically, 
competition is measured using the Herfindahl Index (HI), which is defined as the sum of 
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the squares of per-unit enrollments over total enrollments, bounded between 0 (full 
competition) and 1 (monopoly) (Borland & Howsen, 1992). Most empirical studies that 
use the HI as a continuous variable have found that competition has only weak or null 
effects on students’ performance. On the other hand, studies that have used the HI to 
classify school districts according to high or low levels of competition have found more 
statistically significant results (Belfield & Levin, 2002a). Another measure of 
competition is the private schooling enrollment share, which is the percentage of students 
enrolled in private-voucher schools in a given school district  (Dee, 1998; E. A. 
Hanushek & Rivkin, 2003; C. Hoxby, 1994) 
The endogeneity problem involving competition and quality and the omitted 
variable bias has different implications. First, the existence of simultaneity suggests that 
Ordinary Least Squares could underestimate the effect of competition on students’ 
academic achievement because families in school districts with poor-quality public 
schools are more likely to request private-voucher schools as an alternative, and private-
voucher schools may draw “good” students away from public schools. Second, the 
existence of omitted variable bias implies that OLS could overestimate the true effect of 
competition on students’ academic achievement due to the fact that this relationship is 
influenced by important, but unobserved, determinants of student achievement (Dee, 
1998). 
One of the fundamental arguments in favor of private-voucher schools is the idea 
that public schools will become more effective due to increased competition, but as noted 
above, testing the effects of competition has proven to give elusive results (Carnoy & 
McEwan, 2003). 
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Free choice: Selection bias and innovation  
Proponents of market-oriented reform argue that quality education can only be 
achieved if parents are able to choose freely among the schools available to their 
children. The assumption is that parents would choose the best schools for their children, 
and therefore “bad” schools (poor quality, low achievement, etc.) would close because 
they will not have enough students to keep the school running and the overall quality of 
the educational system would improve as a result of parental choice (Betts & Loveless, 
2005) However, also it is hypothesized that school choice will exacerbate educational 
inequalities among schools because students’ academic achievement is influenced by 
their peers as well as the students’ socioeconomic status (Kremer & Sarychev, 2000; 
Levin, 1998) 
The implementation of a large-scale private-voucher program is likely to increase 
the racial and socioeconomic stratification of schools because many parents use the social 
and ethnic composition of a school to judge school quality. Moreover, low-income 
families are in a less favorable position to choose the best school for their children than 
higher-income families because low-income families have less access to information and 
they cannot pay for transportation when private-voucher schools are located far from the 
poorest neighborhoods. Moreover, because private-voucher schools are allowed to select 
their students, they will most likely pick students of medium or high socioeconomic 
status, as they are easier and less costly to educate (Ladd, 2002). 
As a consequence, comparing public vs. private-voucher school students could be 
unfair and lead to biased conclusions because students are not fully comparable (Carnoy, 
2001; Levin, 1998). The findings on students’ achievement from public vs. private-
voucher schools will be contaminated by selection bias. Students in private-voucher 
schools may come from higher socioeconomic statuses and may have unobserved 
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characteristics—abilities, motivated families, etc.—that could increase the likelihood of 
the student obtaining a higher score on achievement test, regardless of the schools they 
attend (Greene, Peterson, & Du, 1998). 
Under the Chilean school choice system, families who are of medium or high 
socioeconomic status may be more likely to take advantage of the free choice than those 
who come from the lowest socioeconomic strata of society. This is mainly because 
wealthier families have better access to information, greater ability to afford 
transportation, and more experience with choices and alternatives (Levin, 1998). It has 
been argued that private-voucher schools would lead families with the most resources, 
and thus a greater ability to improve the public schools, to exit the public system and opt 
for private-voucher schools, rather than exercise their voice and create pressure that could 
lead to the improvement of public education (D. E. Campbell et al., 2005; Hirschman, 
1970). Furthermore, unlike public schools, private-voucher schools can select their 
students through selection tests and they are able to decide to increase their tuition 
depending according to their own interests and priorities. Therefore, vouchers only cover 
a certain percentage of the tuition, and parents need to pay extra money to register their 
children in these schools. Thus, private-voucher schools can improve the average ability 
level of their student body, and create “brain drain” from public schools that would lead 
to and increase existing segregation based on the socioeconomic status of the students 
(Hsieh & Urquiola, 2003; Levin, 1998; P. J. McEwan, 2000a; Neal, 2011). 
Another argument that advocates of “free choice” employ claims that under a 
system that allows parents to choose schools for their children, schools should also 
increase the diversity of education models, such as curricula and educational innovation 
and, therefore, further increase the choices available to parents. However, Rawls (2001) 
points out that even if private-voucher schools are not found to be a state actor, in order 
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to avoid the government’s bureaucracy, they will still be subject to state regulations 
through the acceptance of the voucher package. For example, every sovereign has an 
obvious interest in education; this interest is intensified when education is funded by 
taxpayer money in the form of a voucher. Therefore, schools that accept vouchers are not 
sufficiently private to maintain independence from state influence, and they must accept 
the regulations and restrictions imposed by the government. In brief, it is almost 
impossible for private-voucher schools to exist outside the constraints of government 
rules while maintaining the freedom of allowing individuals to choose and implement 
their own education system (Rawls, 2001). 
Furthermore, Brown (1992) argues that schools provide services that can be 
divided into two categories.  Primary services are those that affect the labor market 
characteristic of students, and include instruction in traditional subjects such as 
mathematics, biology, and history, as well as workplace socialization such as vocational 
training, athletics activities, music, etc. Secondary services can be provided outside of 
school or not provided at all without having an effect on the students’ labor market 
options. The most common secondary service is related to religious instruction. All 
schools provide a full range of primary services, and private and public schools try to 
differentiate themselves in the services supplied in order to be more attractive for parents 
or students. However, private-voucher schools have difficulties finding an empty niche in 
the schooling market, except by differentiating themselves on a secondary dimension. In 
fact, they tend to look like public schools, quite independent of the institutional form. 
Brown points out that risk aversion among clients (parents) and the ability of the schools 
to mitigate that uncertainty by providing equal opportunity are powerful forces that serve 
to make schools look the same.  
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In fact, private-voucher and public schools organize themselves in a way that 
allows parents to make value judgments about the quality of education that their children 
will receive in these institutions. This is particularly the case with families who are 
concerned with the future of their children and with how education can improve their 
opportunities in the labor market. Parents take as few risks as possible, as they know  
little about the impact of one curriculum or another, of one teaching method or another; 
they will be  conservative about the school they choose for their children.  If parents 
observe that a school differs radically from the traditional ones, it increases the risk that 
parents will make the wrong decision about the best school for their children. Therefore, 
public and private non-voucher schools need to adapt according to their customers’ 
requirements, and parents will push the schools that their children attend to behave like 
other schools (Brown, 1992). 
At the earliest grade levels, schools know little about the students' abilities. 
Therefore, we can observe the greatest similarities in what is taught and how it is taught 
to different students as a market response to uncertainty concerning student ability at this 
point. An example of this is a school’s use of whole classroom instruction and significant 
levels of uniformity in curriculum. Rather than creating innovations, private-voucher 
schools tend to be more conservative and closer to traditional schools than Friedman and 
other scholars have suggested (Benveniste, Carnoy, & Rothstein, 2003). 
Accountability: Non-behavioral and behavioral issues.  
 The difficulties in evaluating the impact of the accountability system in education 
can be categorized as non-behavioral and behavioral. The non-behavioral issues are 
related to test reliability and even though large-scale tests are a relatively objective way 
to measure the most valued aspect of students achievement, they are neither perfect nor 
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comprehensive measures (Hout & Stuart, 2011). On the other hand, behavioral issues are 
those that relate to how behavioral responses to testing modify or affect test validity 
(Koretz, 2008a) 
Non-Behavioral Issues  
One of the main concerns in psychometrics is related to measurement error, which 
in the case of standardized tests is focused on inconsistencies across different 
measurements of a single student, due to a variation from the items that being tested or 
from fluctuation in a given individual’s performance over time (Koretz, 2008a).  For 
example, standardized test are constructed using certain type of questions and are focused 
on specific contents. As a consequence, the tests only measure a subset of the area being 
tested (sample), and test scores will differ from one period to another, even though the 
test is taken by the same individual (Hout & Stuart, 2011). The way that standardized 
tests are reported also creates fluctuations in the students' or schools’ performance. For 
example, Linn (2007) analyzed The National Assessment of Educational Progress 
(NAEP) data on the achievement gap between minority and majority groups in order to 
show how relevant these distortions can be. In 4th grade and 8th grade, the gap between 
white versus Hispanics and black students decreased from 1996 to 2005. However, by 
using the “percent above basic” and “percent above proficient” statistics, the author 
demonstrated contradictory results: some comparisons indicate the gap between groups 
reduced over time, while others appeared to show an upward trend (Linn, 2007). 
Finally, test-based accountability systems require choosing a metric that will be 
used to summarize the results. Different metrics commonly categorize schools very 
differently; for example, students’ performance can be compared using “cohort to cohort 
models” and “valued added models.” Cohort to cohort is the principal model used in the 
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United States (Koretz, 2008a), and in this model students’ performance are analyzed by 
successive cohorts in a particular grade, to observe if the students’ performance in that 
grade is improving over time (Hout & Stuart, 2011). However, each cohort is not 
necessarily comparable to another, and therefore some variations in the test scores may 
be explained by the characteristics of students in each cohort, rather than by teachers or 
schools. In order to address this problem, value-added models have been developed. This 
type of model analyzes the growth paths of students’ performance using longitudinal data 
that includes different observations of each individual student over time (Raudenbush, 
2004). Value-added models try to control for differences across individuals in order to 
quantify the percentage of student growth that could be accurately explained by schools 
or teachers (Hout & Stuart, 2011).  This type of model seems to be fairer, as it compares 
the effectiveness of different schools and teachers, but studies have shown that curricular 
differentiation becomes a serious issue with this type of model. For example, in middle 
school mathematics, a standardized test that has been designed for general use will most 
likely offer weak coverage of focus areas for teachers of high achieving students. As a 
consequence, valued-added models may incorrectly categorize these teachers as 
“inefficient” (Mccaffrey, Lockwood, Koretz, & Hamilton, 2003) 
Behavioral Issues  
This category refers to how teachers or school administrator responses to testing 
could affect test validity. For example, if a particular school shows an improvement in 
standardized tests, it is difficult to know what teachers or schools have done in order to 
increase the students’ performance. There are different strategies that teachers and 
schools can use to improve students’ achievement; including the implementation of test-
based accountability systems. For example, teachers could seek out better teaching 
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methods or they could spend more time with their students, which can lead to improved 
student learning and therefore an improvement in their performance on standardized tests. 
However, there are other strategies that also can improve student achievement, but they 
are not the type of skills or actions that are encouraged by the implementation of test-
based accountability systems. These practices include “teaching to the test,” which is the 
practice of coaching students with similar questions and settings as are present in the real 
standardized test. Teachers and school administrators could also identify low-performing 
students and simply exclude them from the test-taking pool.  
Koretz (2008) presents seven typologies to describe the responses of teacher to 
high-stakes accountability systems.  
Table 2-1: Response of Teachers to High-Stakes Accountability System 
Teacher 
responses 
Actions Outcomes Strategy  
(1) Working 
More Effectively 
Finding better methods of teaching Good Academic 
(2) Teaching 
More 
Spending more time overall Good Academic 
(3) Working 
Harder 
Giving more HW or harder assignments Good Academic 
(4) Reallocation Shifting resources, including time, to 
emphasize the subjects and type of 
questions on the test 
Ambiguous Ambiguous 
(5) Alignment Matching the curriculum more closely 




Preparing students using old tests Bad Non 
Academic 
(7) Cheating Exclusion of students, classification of 




Source: Measuring Up: What Educational Testing Really Tells Us, Daniel Koretz (2008)  
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As Table 2-1 shows, in the first group of responses, teachers work more 
effectively, teach more, and work harder to produce meaningful gains in test scores. That 
means, these three strategies could produce higher levels of achievement on substantive 
areas of the test, which suggest that students have   improved in the intended area (Koretz 
& McCaffrey, 2001). 
In the second group of responses, where teachers shift resources (reallocation) or 
match their curriculum more closely to the material covered on the test (alienation), the 
results are ambiguous.  This is because if the test is a good measurement of the contents 
taught in the grade’s curriculum, students could benefit from these types of strategies. 
But if the test does not appropriately address the main aspects of the curriculum, the 
students’ learning could be negatively affected by these types of strategies (Kamenetz, 
2014) Studies have found that teachers have few incentives to place attention on those 
students who are already proficient or that have a lower chance of passing the 
standardized test (Neal & Schanzenbach, 2010) and, therefore, pay more attention and 
spend more time on those students who could likely pass the standardized test (Booher-
Jennings, 2005; Dworkin, 2005; Hursh, 2007). Furthermore, schools and teachers could 
respond to the pressure to raise test scores by decreasing time spent on subjects that are 
not part of or are less emphasized on the exams. Thus, students could spend more time 
working on math or reading while reducing the time allotted to the sciences, history, arts, 
foreign languages, or writing because they are not topics that will be tested. This can lead 
to the narrowing and oversimplification of the curriculum (E. Baker et al., 2010; Carnoy, 
Loeb, & Smith, 2000; Hamilton et al., 2002; Stecher & Barron, 2001; Winters, Trivitt, & 
Greene, 2010). 
Alignment between curriculum and standardized test might be seen as a practice 
that protects against score inflation, because it would focus teachers’ instruction on the 
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areas and elements that are relevant and valuable for those who designed the test-based 
accountability system.  As a consequence, because the teacher’s instruction and test 
content are coherent, assuming that the test scores provide a good measure of students’ 
learning, an increase in students’ performance is meaningful, not inflated. However, 
another point of view argues that the definition of a particular set of standards is arbitrary, 
as well as the claim that student learning can be extracted from the tests, is uncertain 
(Koretz & McCaffrey, 2001). 
The third group of teachers’ responses to the high-stakes accountability system 
has negative consequences on student learning, and these are not the skills or strategies 
that policy makers try to incentivize in schools through the implementation of test-based 
accountability systems.  Coaching or “teaching to the test” refers to many types of tests 
preparation. Coaching can be focused on elements of the test that are entirely non-
substantive. For example, students can take preparation tests every week in the same 
format as the original test, or teachers can figure out that the standardized test always 
includes regular quadrilaterals and triangles in area and perimeters problems, and 
therefore teachers can make the decision do not teach about irregular polygons or figures 
with more than four sides in his or her class anymore (Koretz, 2003). Cheating implies 
many types of actions such as providing answers to students, correcting students’ 
responses, allowing them use external material during testing, violating test 
administration procedures, or excluding low-performing student from the test-taking 
pool, among others. However, cheating, unlike coaching, cannot increase the validity of 
scores (Koretz & McCaffrey, 2001). 
The problems associated with cheating are not in and of themselves an argument 
against the test-based accountability system. However, they do indicate a need for the 
careful interpretation of gains in standardized tests, because incentives can create a 
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variety of responses from schools or teachers, and some of them are clearly illegitimate 
and do not improve the students’ learning (Koretz, 2002). 
INCENTIVES IN TEST-BASED ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS 
Test-based accountability systems are based on the assumption that if a particular 
outcome or result is rewarded, this outcome will increase the likelihood of being 
observed because it is going to be reinforced by the incentive. However, the difficulty is 
that teachers’ performance measures are necessarily focused on the areas of the job that 
are more easily quantified, while they neglect the qualitative aspects of the job that are 
more difficult to measure (Hout & Stuart, 2011). For example, if surgeons are penalized 
for the mortality rates of their patients, they will accept cases with less risk of death; if a 
company rewards its workers for the company’s earnings, the workers might manipulate 
the company’s earnings report in order to gain the rewards (Rothstein, 2008). 
In the educational arena, schools are responsible for diverse aspects of the 
students’ education: civic participation, cognitive, emotional and physical development, 
among others. Furthermore, under a test-based accountability system, schools are 
responsible for the students’ performance and tasked with ensuring that all students either 
pass the minimum standards or meet very high ones. In this context, where schools need 
to meet different and diverse goals for the students’ education and there are limited 
resources to do so, schools are obligated to make difficult tradeoffs among these multiple 
goals (Dixit, 2002). Thus, economic theory points out that when complex jobs involve 
many tasks and workers’ performance is evaluated based on one objective measure, 
workers most likely shift their effort among the various tasks to be focused on the most 
easily observable aspects of a multi-dimensional task. Thus, the measurement by itself 
will create incentives to narrow multiple objectives of the job to those that are actually 
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measured, disregarding the overall mission of the organization (G. Baker, 1992; Feltham 
& Xie, 1994; Holmstrom & Milgron, 1991). According to Baker, Jensen and Murphy 
(1998) one of the major disadvantages of measuring a job with multi-dimensional tasks, 
using an objective system, is that employees will “game the system” by optimizing their 
performance on the task that is evaluated or measured (G. Baker, Jensen, & Murphy, 
1988). 
From a psychological point of view, studies in this area have shown that the 
external rewards have mixed responses among individuals (Deci, Ryan, & Koestner, 
1999). For example, receiving a reward could have the significant effect of enhancing 
subsequent motivation, although sometimes it seems to have the effect of diminishing 
subsequent motivation, and in cases it appears to have no effect. Studies have shown that 
the differences are related to the degree to which individuals perceive the rewards as 
external pressure, or if it is something under his or her control. If they think the reward 
limits their autonomy because they do not have control over it, the result of this incentive 
tends to be negative. However, if the reward is not perceived as an external pressure, but 
instead as something that simply signifies competence, this type of reward will most 
likely have a positive effect (Harackiewicz, Abrahams, & Wageman, 1987). 
Madaus & Clarke argue that test-based accountability systems could create 
incentives that result in diverse and even unintended negative consequences (Madaus & 
Clarke, 2001). Social psychologist, Donald Campbell, corroborates this with his 
eponymous law to explain the same phenomena: When social decision-making is focused 
on a single quantitative indicator, he suggests that “the more any quantitative social 
indicator is used for social decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption 
pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social process it is intended 
to monitor” (D. Campbell, 1979). In this sense, test-based accountability systems in 
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education provide an excellent example of Campbell’s law, as standardized tests are 
essentially the sole indicator used to evaluate quality of education and they carry heavy 
consequences for schools. Teachers and school administrators could, therefore, be 
incentivized to use non-academics strategies to ensure that the test scores give them 
favorable results (Brian & Levitt, 2003; Nichols & Berliner, 2007). Even though the 
studies are not conclusive, the overall tendency shows that test-based accountability 
programs, which are focused on high-stakes testing, might have important negative 
consequences for schools and students (Volante, 2007).  
Non-academic strategies include the exclusion of low achieving students from the 
test-pool and their reclassification as special education students, suspending them or 
encouraging them to stay home during the testing window (Booher-Jennings, 2005; E. 
Hanushek & Raymond, 2005; Kane & Staiger, 2002). In the test-based accountability 
system, schools and teachers face great pressure to raise test scores and therefore it is 
logical for schools to leave some students, especially those who do not perform well, out 
of the test-taking pool. And rather than improving the overall achievement of all students, 
which is the main objective of the implementation of test-based accountability systems, 
schools and teachers may simply find diverse strategies that allow them to exclude the 
“weak” students from the test-taking pool (Hursh, 2007). If students do not take reading, 
math or science tests, the student score is reported as a missing value and, therefore, this 
student’s score does not count in the calculation the school’s average. In some cases, if a 
student does not take any of these standardized tests his or her scores will not be reported 
as a missing value; instead, this student could be excluded from the dataset.  Figlio 
(2003) shows that during the testing window, low-achieving students are most likely to 
receive longer suspensions than high-performing students who have committed similar 
violations, and students who received long suspensions are much more likely to miss the 
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standardized test (Figlio, 2003). Moreover, studies have shown that schools classify low-
achieving students as special education in order to exclude them from the test-taking pool 
(Figlio & Getzler, 2002; Haney, 2000; Jacob, 2005).  
This study will test Campbell’s law in the context of test-based accountability 
systems in Chile, and will explore whether or not it is possible to observe some degree of 
alteration or distortion before and after the implementation of high-stakes accountability 
systems in Chile. Numerous studies have shown that high-stakes testing could artificially 
inflate students’ academic achievement. Particularly when the stakes are too high, 
teachers and schools could have incentives to act fraudulently or to cheat (Heckman, 
Heinrich, & Smith, 2002; Kane & Staiger, 2002) In fact, the findings indicate that school 
administrators and teachers are inclined to create the appearance of the improvement of 
students’ scores on standardized tests by using a collection of non-academic practices 
and, as such, gaming the system (Dworkin, 2005; Wall, 2000). However, there are no 
studies in Chile that quantify the extension and the effect of the use of non-academic 
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Chapter 3 
The Winner Takes it All: Competition and Student Achievement 
There are two approaches that explain the macro-level effect of the 
implementation of large-scale private-voucher programs in education. The first one 
comes from a neoliberal perspective and suggests that whole system would benefit from 
increased competition in education, as schools would have incentives to improve their 
performance in order to attract students and, therefore, the quality of education would 
dramatically improve if parents were allowed to choose freely between schools (Hsieh & 
Urquiola, 2003). A second approach comes from critical theory and argues that the 
potential benefits of competition would be “cancelled out” by the negative effect of 
increasing socioeconomic and class segregation among students that would be promoted 
by school choice programs (Bellei, 2007). 
From a neoliberal approach, in the “educational marketplace” model of education, 
resources for schools are not guaranteed, and as such schools compete for financial 
resources, parents choose the schools that provide a better education for their children. As 
a result, schools with poorer performance would lose students and eventually disappear 
from the market. For example, a large-scale voucher plan might "permit competition to 
develop… and improvement of all schools” (Friedman, 1962). On the other hand, critical 
theory suggests that the implementation of a large-scale private-voucher program will not 
have the expected effect mainly because private-voucher schools would most likely select 
students from a medium or high socioeconomic status because they are easier and less 
costly to educate – this effect is called “cream skimming” (Ladd, 2002). The evidence 
suggests that the effects of cream skimming for targeted programs are relative small, but 
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they could pose a serious problem for universal voucher programs (Altonji, Huang, & 
Taber, 2005). 
The effect of increased choice on many of the relevant empirical issues 
surrounding school choice programs are still controversial (Nechyba, 2003). Most 
researchers in Chile have focused on the relationship between privatization reform and 
social segregation (Bellei, 2012; Elacqua, 2006; Flores, 2008; F. Torche, 2005; 
Valenzuela, Bellei, & De Los Rios, 2008). The impact of competition on student 
achievement in Chile has received less attention in the literature; in fact, there are no 
articles published in peer-reviewed journals about this issue.   
One of the main problems in establishing a causal relationship between 
competition and student achievement comes from the idea that the degree of competition 
in a school district could be endogenous to student performance (Ahlin, 2003). That is, if 
a school district provides a low quality of education, private-voucher schools could have 
incentives to open and compete with public schools. Using a traditional, ordinary least 
squares model, researchers could erroneously conclude that an increase in competition 
would decrease students’ achievement. Previous studies that explore the relationship 
between competition and student achievement in Chile have tried to avoid the 
endogeneity problem by using instrumental variables on two-stage least square models 
(Auguste & Valenzuela, 2004; F. A. Gallego, 2002; Hsieh & Urquiola, 2003). However, 
the instrumental variables such as the numbers of priests per municipality, urbanization 
rates, population per municipality, and the distance to the closest big city have been 
criticized as valid instruments (Bellei, 2007). Furthermore, the period used by these 
studies is limited. For example, Auguste & Valenzuela and Gallego only used one year of 
observation, while Hsieh & Urquiola's data is not comparable and includes less than half 
of the municipalities in Chile.  
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In this sense, this study makes a contribution to the previous literature in Chile in 
two ways. First, I improve the quality and the period of observations used in previous 
studies, as I use longitudinal data at student level from the 4
th
 grade from the whole 
country during the period of 2002-2013, provided by The National Assessment of 
Mathematics and Spanish Achievement, known as the Sistema Nacional de Evaluación 
de Calidad de la Educación (Educational Quality Measurement System, SIMCE). 
Second, I used a fixed effects model at the municipal level to deal with the endogeneity 
problem that previous studies tried to solve using an instrumental variable. This is 
possible because the data that I have collected allows me to compare the same 
municipality through time for more than 10 years.  
In this chapter, I explore two hypotheses that advocates of neoliberal policies 
have argued in support of competition in education. Namely, that the introduction of 
private-voucher schools will increase competition in the system and that as a result of 
that, the quality of education will improve. Moreover, I test the assumption that 
competition would benefit the whole educational system, especially low-income families 
or minority groups, as they will be able to exercise their free choice to select the best 
schools for their children (Friedman, 1962). I explore these hypotheses guided by the 
following research questions: how does competition affect students’ achievement? Does 
competition have similar impacts on the performance of students who are educated in the 
capital city, Santiago, and outside of it? In the next section I explain the theoretical 
foundation behind the introduction of competition education and the main effect that 
competition has had on student achievement and social segregation in Chile.    
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 THE MACRO-LEVEL EFFECT OF PRIVATE SECTOR EXPANSION IN EDUCATION 
A central argument used by advocates of school choice programs is that the 
competition that is generated between schools would improve quality of education under 
the assumption that the private sector is superior to the public sector in terms of providing 
quality and efficiency (Friedman, 1962). While resources for the students are not 
guaranteed, schools must compete for financial resources, and parents choose those 
schools that provide a better education for their children. As a result, those schools with 
poor performance would lose students and eventually disappear from the market (Flores, 
2008). 
The school choice system assumes that competition among schools to obtain 
student vouchers will develop strong incentives not only to satisfy student and parent 
requirements, but also to improve educational productivity, reducing dropout rates, 
increasing enrollment, etc. In fact, an educational marketplace is not only creating a 
choice, especially among poor students without the option to attend a private school, but 
also creating incentives to improve efficiency in the delivery of educational services and 
innovation across the system. Competition would lead to a greater range of choices and 
increased efficiency and innovation in education, as schools have financial incentives to 
attract and retain their enrolled students ((Levin, 2002). In summary, a large-scale 
voucher plan might "permit competition to develop," thus leading to the "development 
and improvement of all schools" (Friedman, 1962). 
On the other hand, opponents of voucher school programs argue that the 
implementation of a large-scale private-voucher program is likely to increase the racial 
and socioeconomic stratification of schools because a lot of parents use the social and 
ethnic composition of a school to judge school quality (Ladd, 2002). 
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 Moreover, low-income families are in a less favorable position to choose the best 
school for their children than higher income families, given that low-income families 
have less access to information and that they cannot pay for transportation when private-
voucher schools are located far from the poorest neighborhoods. Moreover, if private-
voucher schools are allowed to select their students, they will most likely pick students 
from a medium or high socioeconomic status because they are easier and less costly to 
educate (Ladd, 2002). 
The Impact of School Competition in Chile 
The empirical evidence available suggests that there is not a clear and unique 
answer as to the impact of the expansion of the private-voucher sector in Chile. Some 
claim that if competition has been found to have an impact on student achievement, it is 
irrelevant and not widely observed at a national level. At the same time, diverse studies 
suggest that the introduction of choice and competition into the system could cause 
increased socioeconomic segregation and an achievement gap among students (Bellei, 
2012)  
One widely accepted hypothesis that explains the relationship between 
competition, segregation, and the achievement gap is called the “cream skimming” effect. 
This suggests that the potential benefits of competition would be “canceled out” by the 
negative effects of increasing socioeconomic and class segregation among students 
promoted by school choice programs. While public schools need to accept all types of 
students, private-voucher schools might have different mechanisms by which they select 
their student body, a process that increases the likelihood of enrolling students with good 
academic performance. As a result, students with higher socioeconomic status benefit 
from the “peer effect” of attending private-voucher schools, as these are sites with higher 
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accumulation of economic, social, and cultural capital. Instead, students of low 
socioeconomic status are concentrated in public schools, segregated and socially isolated.  
The existing evidence suggests that the cream skimming effect for targeted programs is 
relatively small, but could be a serious problem for universal voucher programs (Altonji 
et al., 2005). 
In the case of Chile, it is possible to observe the “cream skimming” effect, due to 
the fact that under the educational system implemented in 1981, public schools cannot 
select students through admission tests or interviews. This is because public schools have 
a “public function,” and cannot discriminate against students based on test performance 
or socioeconomic status. Private-voucher schools, however, can select students according 
to their own criteria. Therefore, the private-voucher schools select their students from the 
advantaged (middle class). These students are “easier” to educate and their families 
contribute their own financial and political resources to the private-voucher schools. 
Historically, the wealthiest group has been educated in private non-voucher schools that 
receive no government funding, while the lower–middle and middle-income sectors are 
educated in private-voucher schools, and the poorest sector in public schools. In fact, 
while students from low-income families are more likely to attend public schools, 
students from a medium or medium-high socioeconomic status tend to enroll in private-
voucher schools, and those students from high socioeconomic status are most likely to 
attend private schools (Elacqua, 2006; González, Mizala, & Romaguera, 2004). For a 
visual representation of this data, the next figure shows the distribution of types of 
schools attended by income decile in 2000. As is evident in the figure 3-1, different 
income deciles attend different types of school, as explained above. 
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Figure 3-1: Type of Schools Attended by Income Decile; 2000  
 
Source: González, Mizala & Romaguera’s calculations (2004) based on the 2000 CASEN survey (Chilean 
Ministry of Planning) 
In the case of competition, which is defined as the number of students enrolled in 
primary and secondary private-voucher schools, the field was relatively stable from 1990 
to 2000. But since 2000, schools faced a stronger degree of competition and, as a result of 
that, the number of students enrolled in private-voucher schools surpassed public schools 
in 2013. As Figure 3-2 illustrates, almost 78 percent of Chilean students attended public 
schools in 1981, and 15 percent attended private-voucher schools. However, after more 
than 30 years of privatization reform, public school enrollment decreased to 37.5 percent, 



































Figure 3-2: Primary and Secondary Enrollment from 1981 to 2013 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Estadísticas Educacionales, Ministry of Education Chile (1990 - 
2013). 
It is important to clarify that private-voucher schools can be divided into two 
groups: for-profit and non-profit schools. Non-profit schools are part of religious 
institutions (usually Catholic or Evangelical churches) and for-profit schools belong to a 
private owner or anonymous society. The growth of private-voucher school from the 90s 
can be explained mainly by for-profit schools. In fact, for-profit private-voucher schools 
grew 81 percent from 1990 to 2008. In contrast, the number of non-profit private-voucher 
schools only increased by 16 percent during the same period (Corvalan, Elacqua, & 
Salazar, 2009). The growth of the per capita income of families, demographic changes, 
and the different rules of financing between public and private-voucher schools could 
explain the growth of private-voucher schools since the 90s (Paredes & Pinto, 2009). 
Particularly, in 1993 the Chilean government created a new regulation about the way that 
schools could be financed; it is called financiamiento compartido (shared funding). This 
































according to their own interests and priorities. Therefore, vouchers only cover a certain 
percentage of the tuition, and parents need to pay extra money to register their children at 
these schools. In contrast, public schools only can use “shared funding” on high school 
education and with more restrictions than private-voucher schools. The new finance 
system created conditions for the proliferation the private-voucher schools, particularly 
those that were for-profit (Corvalan et al., 2009; Paredes & Pinto, 2009). 
How does this increase in competition affect student achievement? In order to 
establish a causal relationship between competition and student achievement, one must 
first address a major problem: the degree of competition in any school district could be 
endogenous to student performance (Ahlin, 2003). As I explained in Chapter 2, the 
existence of simultaneity implies that Ordinary Least Square (OLS) may underestimate or 
overestimate the effect of private-voucher schools on student achievement in public 
schools because high quality public schools can draw students away from private-
voucher schools (Dee, 1998). As a result, studies that use private schooling to measure 
competition typically use two-stage least square (2SLS) or instrumental variable (IV) 
approaches (Belfield & Levin, 2002b). Some studies have used the extent of scale 
decentralization as a proxy for competition (Hoxby, 2000; Urquiola, 2000) whereas 
others have used the concentration of Catholics or number of Catholic priests in school 
districts as an instrumental variable (Dee, 1998). Finally, other researchers have 
employed a combination of variables, for example, the degree of privatization of elderly 
care, the degree of privatization of infrastructure, the degree of privatization of social 
services, the average population distance from schools, and the average cost per pupil 
(Ahlin, 2003).   
The evidence on the impact of competition on student achievement in Chile 
shows the following findings using ordinary least square (OLS) and panel data at the 
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school level from more than 15 years from the 1980s to the mid-1990s, Carnoy and 
McEwan (1999) use private enrollment as a measure of inter-school competition, and 
they found that an increase in competition has a small, but positive effect on the SIMCE 
test given to lower middle-class students who attend one large group of public schools in 
Santiago. However, for the rest of the schools located in the capital city, the effect on of 
increased competition was not statistically significant, and for the rest of Chile, the 
impact of increasing competition on test scores for students who attend public schools 
was slightly negative, but statistically significant. Finally, the study did not find 
significant results on the overall test scores for public and private-voucher schools in 
those school districts where the number of students enrolled in private-voucher schools 
had increased more rapidly (P. McEwan & Carnoy, 1999). 
Hsieh and Urquiola (2003) use a two-stage least square model (2SLS) and panel 
data for about 150 municipalities, at the school level, to evaluate the relationship between 
competition and student achievement, competition is defined as the proportion of students 
who attend private school at the municipal level. In order to address problems of 
endogeneity, the researchers use three instrumental variables. The first two variables 
were urbanization rates and the population of a municipality in 1982, and the third 
instrument is the inter-quartile range in years of schooling, observed among adults. The 
study found no evidence that an increase in competition among private-voucher schools 
and public schools had improved student academic performance, declined repetition 
rates, and increased years of schooling. Hsieh and Urquiola found that the average 
SIMCE test score did not rise any faster in municipalities where the private-voucher 
schools made greater inroads, and the grade repetition average and grades by age 
measures had worsened in these communities. The overall findings of this study would 
suggest that school choice did not improve educational outcomes in Chile (Hsieh & 
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Urquiola, 2003). However, these findings have be criticized because the information 
available before the introduction of private-voucher schools is very limited, and it is 
difficult to establish a causal relationship using this data (Bellei, 2007). 
Similarly, Gallego (2004) using the number of Catholic priests by municipality as 
an instrumental variable in a two-stage least square model, looked at 280 municipalities 
(across 345 municipalities) and the metropolitan region (where the capital city is located) 
as proxies for local educational markets and where competition is defined as the share of 
total enrollment in private school in each municipality. The capital city (Santiago) was 
excluded from the study, student performance was measured by the SIMCE test in 2002 
(for 4th grade), and the unit of analysis is at the student level. The study found that 
Chilean students have received significant benefits from competition, but the effect of 
competition on student performance is smaller for students who attend public school than 
for those who attend private-voucher schools (F. A. Gallego, 2004). Finally, the use of 
the number of Catholic priests per municipality has been criticized as valid instrument 
because religious schools (non-profit) only represent a small proportion of the private-
voucher schools (one third) and religious congregations are more involved with private 
non-voucher schools (Bellei, 2007). 
Using a similar approach to that of Gallego, in order to avoid endogeneity 
problems and selection bias, Auguste and Valenzuela (2004) used a two-stage least 
square model, but with different types of instrumental variables: the municipality’s 
population, as a measure of market size, and the distance to the closest big city, as a 
measure of entry costs as instrumental variables. They analyzed data from 8
th
 grade 
classrooms in 2000, at the student level, but the data was aggregated at the municipal 
level, with the exception of the capital city, which pooled together several neighboring 
municipalities. They defined competition as the private sector market share, that is, the 
 55 
ratio of private-voucher and private-paid school enrollment to total enrollment at the 
municipal level. The authors concluded that competition has had a positive but moderate 
effect on student achievement, an increase of one standard deviation in competition is 
linked with an increase for 0.4 standard deviations on average test scores at the 
municipality level, and also the increase of competition was associated with higher levels 
of segregation (Auguste & Valenzuela, 2004). Table 3-1 summarizes the main studies 
conducted in Chile on the relationship between competition and student achievement.  
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In summary, the evidence available in Chile does not allow for conclusive results 
as to the systematic effects of the implementation and expansion of private-voucher 
schools (Bellei, 2007). 
Competition and Geographical Location of Schools  
The level of competition varies across municipalities, where municipality size and 
socioeconomic characteristics are central in explaining the effect of competition on 
students achievement (Auguste & Valenzuela, 2004). This study uses this finding to 
explore the different effects of the introduction of private-voucher schools between the 
wealthiest region (Metropolitan) versus the poorest region (Araucanía) in Chile, 
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exploring whether or not the effects of competition on students achievement are 
dissimilar, according to the conditions in which schools are located.  
The metropolitan region, where the capital city is located, is the wealthiest region 
in Chile, and it is also home to the main private industries and state institutions, such as 
universities, enterprises, services, hospitals, and government institutions. The 
Metropolitan region’s contribution to GDP is the highest among Chile’s 13 regions. For 
example, in 2012 its contribution was 44.4 percent (Banco-Central, 2015). The 
Metropolitan region also presents the highest household income level (Casen, 2013). In 
the educational arena, the illiteracy rate is 1.8 percent in the Metropolitan region, versus 
the national average of 3.3 percent Also, the average years of schooling in this region is 
higher than the national average, 11.3 years for the Metropolitan region versus 10.6 years 
at the national level (Casen, 2011b). In contrast, the contribution to national GDP for the 
Araucanía region was only 2 percent in 2012 (Banco-Central, 2015). The illiteracy rate is 
more than 2 percentage points above the national average, 5.4 percent for the Araucanía 
versus 3.3 percent at the national level. While the years of schooling in this region is 
lower than the national average – 9.3 years for the Araucanía region versus 10.6 years at 
the national level (Casen, 2011a). 
Figure 3-3 shows the evolution of poverty in the Metropolitan and Araucanía 
region from 1990 to 2011. Araucanía region is the poorest region in Chile, with 23 
percent of its population living below the poverty threshold. The national average poverty 
level is 14.4 percent. Instead, the Metropolitan region has 12 percent of its population 
living in poverty, which is below the national average. Furthermore, the Araucanía region 
is not only the poorest region, but a high percentage of its population is also indigenous 
and rural (Casen, 2009). In terms of development indicators, an official report from the 
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Chilean government estimates that the Araucanía region is more or less 20 years behind 
of the rest of Chile (Gobierno de Chile, 2011). 
 
Figure 3-3: Percentage of Poverty in Metropolitan and Araucanía Regions from 1990 to 
2011 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Casen 1990-2013 
Even though there are clear differences in terms of human development indexes 
between the Metropolitan and Araucanía region, as I explained above, both regions share 
the same pattern in terms of the participation of private-voucher schools, as Figure 3-4 
shows – the percent of students enrolled in private-voucher schools increased 7 percent 
from 2005 to 2013 in the Metropolitan region and 8 percent in the Araucanía region over 
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Figure 3-4: Percentage of Primary Education Students Enrolled in Private-Voucher 
Schools in Metropolitan and Araucanía Regions from 2005 to 2013  
 
Source: Author’s calculations using the dataset “Matricula por estudiante” Centro de Estudios (2015) 
I use these differences in terms of human development and similarities in relation 
to the participation of private-voucher schools between regions to analyze the impact of 
competition on student achievement. I hypothesized that competition could have different 
outcomes depending of the conditions where it is implemented. For example, since the 
Metropolitan region has comparative advantages in terms of human and social capital 
over other regions in Chile, I argue that in these conditions the introduction of 
competition among schools could have a positive impact on student achievement. 
Instead, when schools compete the Araucanía region, which is 20 years behind the rest of 
Chile in terms of human development indexes, I hypothesized that in disadvantaged 
conditions, competition can be negative and may have unintended consequences on 
student achievement.  
  This is relevant from a public policy prospective, as the same policy could have 
a different impact based on the place that it is implemented and, therefore, national 
policies need to take into account regional differences in order to ensure to achieve the 
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METHODS AND DATA  
I use two different data sets on the Chilean educational system. Since the data 
come from different sources, the following section explains the information and sources 
contained in the data set in more detail: 
 (a) Sistema Nacional de Evaluación de Calidad de la Educación (Educational 
Quality Measurement System, SIMCE). The SIMCE test is administered to all students in 
the country, in all of the educational establishments, including public, private-voucher 
and private non-voucher schools. Testing takes place in the fourth, eighth, and twelfth 
grades, in different years (Mizala & Romaguera, 2000), and since 2012 it has been 
applied yearly to the second grade. SIMCE scores report the performance of schools in 
different subject areas (math, reading, and sciences) in comparison to previous years, 
other schools, and other grade levels within the same school. This research relies on data 
from the standardized SIMCE test applied to 4th grades from 2002 to 2013 (see Table 3-
2); the unit of analysis is student-level. SIMCE not only measures the academic 
performance of students, but also the socioeconomic characteristics of their families and 
teachers (Contreras, Bustos, & Sepulveda, 2010).   
The variables included in the SIMCE test have three levels: 1) the student level, 
which includes information such as math and verbal scores, gender, and whether or not 
the student attended preschool; 2) parent questionnaire, that includes individual family 
characteristics such as family type, the educational level of the student’s parents, the 
income of the family, etc. and; 3) the school level, which includes information such as 
private-voucher, public or private school, the location, and the socioeconomic status of 
the students who attend this school. The data set from students and parents are merged 
using a unique student ID, and the schools’ datasets are merged with student and parent 
data using the unique ID of the school.  
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2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
4
th 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
# cases 269,863 254,287 247,090 242,919 238,903 223,908 232,107 219,239 239,243 226,005 
b) The second data source comes from the Centro de Estudios (Department of 
Research of Chilean Ministry of Education) and is called rendimiento del estudiante 
(student achievement). The data encompasses individual-level achievement and offers the 
final grade obtained by a student, their rate of attendance, and whether or not the student 
passed or failed during the period between 2002 and 2012. Furthermore, it provides a 
student identification number that can be used to merge with data from the National 
Assessment of Mathematics and Spanish Achievement (SIMCE).  
Problems of endogeneity arise in an attempt to estimate the impact of competition 
on student achievement (Dee, 1998), if researchers try to estimate the effects of 
competition and quality of education in a municipality with bad public schools, mainly 
because low quality of education creates incentives to offer alternatives such as private-
voucher schools,  it can appear that private-voucher schools cause low quality education, 
instead of the other way around (C. Hoxby, 2003). 
In order to avoid the endogeneity problem, I use a regression model with fixed 
effects at the municipal level, in which each municipality is compared with itself across 
time. This prevents underestimates or overestimates of the effect that competition has had 
on student achievement. Moreover, students in Chile are allowed to attend schools 
outside to their own municipality. Using the data from the parent questionnaire, I have 
estimated that around 20 percent of students attend schools outside their municipality in 
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the capital city (Metropolitan region), and in those municipalities that are located outside 
of the capital city, around 8 percent of students attend schools outside to their 
municipality (Simce, 2012). In order to address this situation, I use a dummy variable to 
identify those students who attend schools outside their municipality, but these data is 
only available from 2008 to 2012.  
An additional problem arises with the way in which competition is defined. 
Typically, competition is measured using the Herfindahl Index (HI), defined as the sum 
of the squares of per unit enrollments over total enrollments, bounded between 0 (full 
competition) and 1 (monopoly) (Borland & Howsen, 1992). Another measure of 
competition is the private schooling enrollment share, which is the percentage of students 
enrolled in private-voucher schools in a school district (Dee, 1998; E. A. Hanushek & 
Rivkin, 2003; C. Hoxby, 1994). In order to make the findings comparable with previous 
studies in Chile, I use the percentage of students enrolled in 4th grade in private-voucher 
schools per municipality as a measurement of competition. Moreover, as independent 
variables I use the student’s final grade in his or her class, family income, father’s 
education, mother’s education, a dummy variable for years, and a fixed effects at the 










Table 3-3: Variables Included in the Fixed-Effects Model  
 Source Measured 
Dependent variables    
Mathematics 
achievement test score  













Students variables   
Gender SIMCE test Student’s gender: (1) male (0) female 
 
Transfer 
Parent survey If student enrolls in school outside of their 
municipality (1) outside and (0) same  
Grades MINEDUC 5 categories: (1) B- (2) B (3) B+(4) A- (5) A  
Family Variables   
Family Income Parent survey  5 categories: from the lowest to the highest  
income 
Father Education Parent survey 3 categories: (1) primary education, (2) 
secondary education and (3) college  
Mother Education Parent survey 3 categories: (1) primary education, (2) 
secondary education and (3) college 
School Variables   
Type of school MINEDUC (1) Public, (2) Private Voucher  (3) Private 
Geographical Location  MINEDUC 13 categories:  13 regions and each region is 
a dummy variable 
Urban MINEDUC (1) Urban and (0) Rural 
SES of students body MINEDUC 5 categories:  
From (1) Lowest SES to (5) Highest SES 
Municipality   
Percentage of students 
enroll in private-
voucher schools 
SIMCE test Percent of students enroll in private-vouchers 
school per municipality in 4
th
 grade 
I run two different fixed-effects models using a student’s score on the math and 
reading test considering as independent the percentage of students that enroll in private-
voucher schools in the Metropolitan and Araucanía regions.  
In the next section, I present the main results of the fixed-effects models to 
estimate the impact of competition on student achievement. The first part presents the 
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output of the fixed-effects model at the national level and the second section shows the 
results disaggregated according to the Metropolitan region (capital city) and the 
Araucanía region. 
RESULTS  
 Table 3-4 shows the output of the fixed-effects model at the municipal level from 
2002 (baseline) to 2013, for reading and math.  The results point out that the coefficients 
for competition on reading test, defined as the percentage of 4
th
 grade students enrolled in 
private-voucher schools per municipality, moves from positive but not statistically 
significant to negative and statistically significant after controlling for the additional 
covariantes. A one percent increase in students enrolling in private-voucher school 
implies a reduction of the students’ performance on the reading test by an average of 0.06 
points, after controlling for the rest of the independent variables. In the case of the math 
test, the results show that a one percent increase in competition decreases student 
achievement on the math test by an average of 0.08 points. Even though the coefficient 
for competition is significant, its impact on students achievement is very small in terms 
of the standard deviation of the SIMCE test scores (50 points). The fixed-effects model 
also shows that male students obtain on average 3.2 points less than female students on 
the reading test. On the math test, however, male students achieve on average 10.7 points 
more than female students, after controlling for independent variables. Both coefficients 






Table 3-4: Fixed-Effects Model for 4
th
 Grade Reading and Math Tests at National Level 
Variable reading reading math math  
competition 0.01 -0.06*** -0.03*** -0.08*** 
year         
2005 4.07*** 4.14*** 0.29* 0.29** 
2006 1.81*** 1.97*** 0.36** 0.76*** 
2007 3.06*** 4.13*** -1.40*** 0.04 
2008 8.98*** 9.86*** -0.14 0.97*** 
2009 10.46*** 11.14*** 5.83*** 6.92*** 
2010 19.31*** 19.87*** 5.79*** 6.50*** 
2011 15.27*** 16.02*** 11.79*** 12.62*** 
2012 16.21*** 17.07*** 14.69*** 15.56*** 
2013 12.22*** 12.12*** 8.90*** 8.95*** 
student's gender   -3.17***   10.75*** 
student's grades         
                       B     17.78***   19.01*** 
B+   39.48***   41.54*** 
A-   65.32***   69.27*** 
                       A     90.47***   97.71*** 
Father education         
High School   2.97***   2.73*** 
College   6.34***   5.99*** 
Mother education         
High School   2.55***   3.13*** 
College   5.59***   6.01*** 
Income of family (Monthly)         
US $401-1,000   1.71***   1.83*** 
US $1,001-2,000   2.26***   2.87*** 
US $2001-2,300   2.27***   3.81*** 
More than US $2,300   1.53***   4.66*** 
School type         
Private-voucher   4.53***   3.60*** 
Private-paid   1.19***   0.2 
Urban   -1.34***   0.83*** 
School's SES         
Medium low   5.34***   7.16*** 
Medium   15.69***   18.94*** 
Medium high   23.81***   28.82*** 
High   29.15***   36.67*** 
Cons 251.26*** 189.87*** 248.67*** 171.60*** 
N  2,287,091   1,829,632   2,287,369   1,835,275  
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As I expected, as students increase their grades, the mother’s education, father’s 
education, the income of their families and school’s SES, student scores on the SIMCE 
test also increase. All of the coefficients are statistically significant at a 0.05 alpha level. 
Finally, the coefficients by year shows that test scores have been increasing since 2002; 
there is a clear jump after the implementation of the high-stakes accountability system in 
2008. I argue that some of this upward trend can be explained by the implementation of 
the accountability system  
The next section compares regional differences in the impact that competition has 
had on student SIMCE test scores.  As I explained above, I have chosen to compare the 
Metropolitan region where the capital city (Santiago) is located —the wealthiest and most 
developed region in Chile — to the Araucanía region, Chile’s poorest region and the one 
with the largest indigenous and rural populations. In this section, I explore the differing 
impact of competition under these two divergent realities.  
Table 3-5 presents the main results of the fixed-effects model at the municipal 
level across the Metropolitan region. Here the coefficients of the impact of competition 
on reading and math are positive, which means that for a ten percent increase in student 
enrollment in private-voucher schools, student scores on the reading test go up by 1.5 
points and 1 point on the math test – both coefficients are statistically significant.  
As the previous model shows, if students increase their grades, mother’s 
education, father’s education and income of their families, student scores on the SIMCE 
test also increase. All of these impacts are statistically significant. In the case of student 
gender, the model shows that male students scores, on average, 2.6 points lower than 
female students on the reading test. In contrast, male students achieve on average almost 
12 points more than female students on the math test. 
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Table 3-5:Fixed-Effects Model of 4
th
 Grade Reading & Math Test in MR 
Variable reading reading math math  
competition        0.14*** 0.15*** 0.06*** 0.10*** 
year         
2005 4.75*** 4.46*** 1.73*** 1.31*** 
2006 -0.62** -0.28 1.00*** 1.49*** 
2007 1.26*** 2.42*** -0.86*** 0.73*** 
2008 7.20*** 8.39*** 0.96*** 2.22*** 
2009 7.77*** 9.27*** 5.47*** 7.39*** 
2010 16.77*** 17.97*** 5.24*** 6.65*** 
2011 11.58*** 13.25*** 9.42*** 10.96*** 
2012 12.90*** 14.56*** 12.35*** 13.88*** 
2013 8.95*** 9.48*** 7.32*** 7.84*** 
student's gender   -2.63***   11.59*** 
student's grades         
B    18.47***   19.55*** 
B+   40.74***   42.58*** 
A-   66.91***   70.38*** 
A     90.88***   97.44*** 
Father education         
High School   3.17***   2.42*** 
College   5.88***   5.18*** 
Mother education         
High School   3.11***   3.11*** 
College   5.93***   5.64*** 
Income of family (Monthly)         
US $401-1,000   2.36***   2.50*** 
US $1,001-2,000   3.08***   3.87*** 
US $2001-2,300   3.35***   5.61*** 
More than US $2,300   2.81***   6.97*** 
School type         
Private-voucher   7.01***   6.17*** 
Private-paid   1.57***   0.39 
Urban   -2.45***   -1.31*** 
School's SES         
Medium low   6.62***   7.79*** 
Medium   18.58***   20.86*** 
Medium high   26.61***   30.87*** 
High   30.52***   36.39*** 
Cons 247.91*** 176.21*** 248.13*** 161.77*** 
N    907,250     694,499     907,870     696,631  
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Furthermore, in relation to the year-specific impacts, we observe an upward trend 
after the implementation of the SEP program in 2008 (high-stakes accountability), but 
also a decline in 2013, with the exception of one coefficient for 2006, the rest are 
statistically significant.  
Table 3-6 shows that for the case of the Araucanía region – in contrast to Santiago 
(in the Metropolitan region) – the coefficients for competition are negative for both 
reading and math tests. This means that a ten percent increase in competition reduces the 
student achievement on the reading test by an average of 2.3 points and by 2.7 points on 
the math test after controlling for the rest of the independent variables. Both coefficients 
are statistically significant. Similar to the capital city (Metropolitan region), the results 
for Araucanía region show that for those students with higher grades, as well as higher 
scores on mother’s education, father’s education, family’s income, and the school’s SES, 
obtain higher scores on SIMCE tests. However, the education of the student’s father and 
mother has a greater effect in Araucanía region than in the Metropolitan region. The 
impact of family income of the family is also lower in the Metropolitan region, and only 
statistically significant up to the monthly income category between US $1,001 - $2,000. 
Finally, the student’s gender predicts the same pattern found in the case of Santiago, 
where male students obtain lower scores on the reading test than female students, while 
and the opposite is observed in the case of the math test, where male students obtain 
higher scores.     
As I mentioned before, unlike the United States, Chilean students are allowed to 
enroll in schools outside those in their own municipal school district, and according to the 
parent questionnaire in 2012 in the capital city, around 20 percent of students in 4
th
 grade 
enroll in schools outside of the municipality where they live. In the Araucanía region, that 
percentage decreases to 8 percent.  
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Table 3-6: Fixed-Effects Model of 4
th
 Grade Reading & Math Test in of Araucanía  
Variable reading reading math math  
competition -0.30*** -0.23*** -0.37*** -0.27***   
year         
2005 4.26*** 3.86*** -0.86 -0.95 
2006 7.54*** 5.47*** 0.69 -0.19 
2007 8.58*** 8.10*** -0.51 0.68 
2008 14.75*** 13.19*** 1.65** 1.15*     
2009 17.46*** 14.04*** 10.72*** 8.01***   
2010 28.75*** 24.55*** 13.85*** 10.03***   
2011 26.93*** 22.86*** 21.20*** 17.73***   
2012 26.62*** 21.85*** 23.81*** 19.32***   
2013 22.05*** 16.75*** 16.21*** 11.53***   
student's gender   -2.86***   11.42***   
student's grades         
B     17.27***   18.21***   
 B+   38.99***   40.63***   
A-   65.01***   69.16***   
                             A     89.37***   97.93***   
Father education         
High School   3.45***   3.62***   
College   7.45***   7.85***   
Mother education         
High School   2.45***   3.75***   
College   5.33***   7.21***   
Income of family (Monthly)         
US $401-1,000   1.50***   1.34***   
US $1,001-2,000   1.40**   2.63***   
US $2001-2,300   -0.31   1.11 
More than US $2,300   -1.99*   1 
School type         
Private-voucher   -1.27***   -1.62***   
Private-paid   2.69   4.48**    
Urban   2.85***   7.33***   
School's SES         
Medium low   7.83***   10.08***   
Medium   16.34***   20.01***   
Medium high   21.73***   28.90***   
High   27.15***   38.05***   
_cons 259.61*** 199.19*** 257.04*** 176.35***   
N     126,340       99,677  126,166           99,968  
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I use this information to create a dummy variable for those students who study 
outside of their municipality, but the limitation is that the data is only available from 
2008 to 2012 and I use the same independent variables in Tables 3-4, 3-5, and 3-6. Table 
3-7 presents the most relevant results, showing that even though the period analyzed is 
shorter than previous models, the results between both models are almost identical (see 
full table Appendix A-2).  In fact, at the national level, the coefficients of competition are 
very similar; the coefficients for reading and math are both statistically significant and 
only increase by 0.01 points. In the case of the Metropolitan region, the coefficients are 
similar to the results in Table 3-5; both are positive and statistically significant.  
 
Table 3-7: Summary of the Main Coefficients of the Fixed-Effects Model that Include 
Dummy Variable for Those Students Who Attend Schools Outside to Their 
Municipality 
 National Metropolitan region  Araucanía region 
 Reading Math Reading Math Reading Math 
Competition -0.07*** -0.09*** 0.14*** 0.15*** -0.14* -0.24*** 
Enroll outside 0.88*** 0.55*** 0.89*** 0.92*** 0.61 -0.59 
2008 baseline baseline baseline baseline baseline baseline 
2009 1.36*** 5.95*** 0.99*** 4.54*** 0.91 9.20*** 
2010 10.06*** 5.93*** 9.67*** 4.31*** 11.10*** 12.43*** 
2011 6.23*** 11.90*** 5.01*** 8.51*** 9.53*** 19.79*** 
2012 7.32*** 14.78*** 6.36*** 11.41*** 8.26*** 22.45*** 
# Cases 885,113 887,987 349,662 350,684 46,908 47,051 
For example, the coefficient for competition decreases only 0.01 points in the 
model for reading and increases 0.05 in the model for math. The coefficients of 
competition for the Araucanía region are both negative and statistically significant, but 
the effect of competition on student achievement on the reading test decreases from -0.23 
(Table 3-6) to -0.14 points in the current model, and it is only statistically significant at 
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0.1 alpha level. In the case of math, the coefficient of competition decreases only 0.03 
points and is still significant at a 0.01 alpha level.  
Finally, at the national level and in the Metropolitan region, the coefficients for 
those students who enroll in schools outside their municipalities increase their reading 
scores on average by 0.88 points (national) and 0.92 points (metropolitan region). This is 
also true for math scores, which increased for those students who attend schools outside 
to their municipality by 0.55 points (national) and 0.92 points (metropolitan region). All 
the coefficients are statistically significant. In contrast, the Araucanía region shows that if 
a student attends a school outside to the municipality where he or she lives, this does not 
have an effect on his or her performance on either the reading or math tests, since both 
coefficients are not statistically significant.  
DISCUSSION  
One of the main assumptions about the implementation of the privatization reform 
introduced in 1981 was that if parents could exercise their free choice, they would choose 
the best schools for their children and, therefore, schools would be forced to improve the 
quality of the education in order to enroll students. However, are Chilean families 
choosing schools mainly because them provide a good quality of education? To explore 
this question, the parent questionnaire from 2012 asked parents to choose the three most 
important variables that they consider in order to choose a school for their children, the 
questionnaire provided 14 options that parents could select. The questionnaire was a 
census for 4th grade parents, and 38.4 percent of them reported that the primary variable 
they take in account in choosing a school is “school proximity” to their home. In 
addition, 14.3 percent of parents listed that the second most relevant variable they 
consider in choosing a schools is “school quality and results on SIMCE tests”. However, 
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depending of the socioeconomic status of families, parents found some variables more or 
less relevant in their decision making process.  
 
Table 3-8: The Three Main Variables that Parents Consider when Choosing a School, by 
Socioeconomic Status of Families with Students in 4
th
 Grade, 2012 
 Family’s SES 
1
st
 most important 2
nd
 most important 3
rd
 most important 
School proximity Results of SIMCE tests School’s discipline 
Low 63.0% 5.5% 9.6% 
Medium Low 55.6% 9.1% 11.9% 
Medium 32.5% 19.4% 20.3% 
Medium High 20.1% 26.8% 18.9% 
High 11.7% 24.0% 8.5% 
Table 3-8 shows that as the socioeconomic status of the families increase, “school 
proximity” become a less relevant variable, while the opposite happens to school quality. 
As the socioeconomic status of families increase, the “school’s quality and results in 
SIMCE test” becomes more important. And finally, for the middle class the “school’s 
order and discipline” appears to be more relevant.  
Moreover, Figure 3-5 shows the relationship between type of school and SES of 
4th grade families in in 2013. As is observed, most of the low-income families enrolled 
their children in public schools, while middle class families enrolled in private-voucher 







Figure 3-5: Type of Schools Attended in 4
th
 grade by Socioeconomic Status of Families 
in 4
th
 grade 2013 
 
Source: Author’s calculation using data from 2013 parent questionnaire  
In this scenario, the most important aspect of a school for parents is the “school 
proximity”, which is especially relevant for low-income families as well as students that 
are segregated by the income of their family. This is because unlike public schools, 
private-voucher schools can select their students through selection tests and they can 
decide to increase their tuition depending on their own interests and priorities. Therefore, 
vouchers only cover a certain percentage of the tuition, and parents need to pay extra 
money to register their children in these schools. Thus, private-voucher schools can 
improve the average ability level of their student body and create “brain drain” from 
public schools that would lead to an increase in segregation based on the socioeconomic 
status of the students (Hsieh & Urquiola, 2002; Levin, 1998; P. J. McEwan, 2000b; Neal, 
2011). 
As a consequence, the increase of competition does not necessarily mean an 























“cancelled out,” due to the increased segregation of the system. In this sense, we have 
identified an explanation for the negative relationship between competition and student 
achievement at the national level.   
In term of regional differences, I hypothesized that competition has dissimilar 
effects, dependent upon the conditions where it is implemented.  The fixed-effects model 
for the capital city (Santiago) shows that competition has a modest but positive effect on 
student achievement. In other words, when the percentage of students enrolled in private-
voucher schools in the capital city increases, the reading and math scores of the students 
also increase.  The opposite effect is observed in the Araucanía region, the poorest region 
of Chile. In this case, when the percentage of students enrolled in private-voucher schools 
in the municipalities increase, student math and reading test scores decrease. The 
question that arises is: Why does competition have a different effect depending where it 
is implemented? To answer, I will focus on one aspect that I think is central to 
understanding the negative effect of competition in the Araucanía region, and that is the 
way that rural schools are financed. In particular, I analyze how the way that rural 
schools are financed has created incentives for private-voucher schools in non-urban 
areas and how, therefore, the region has observed an increase in competition, but that this 
has not necessarily meant an improvement in the quality of education.  
The Chilean educational finance system is based on the idea that schools need to 
compete for students and, therefore, it was set up in a way so that public or private-
voucher schools received a fixed amount of money for each student (a voucher) 
according to the student's monthly attendance rate. That means, schools compete for 
students in order to receive more money and create incentives for schools to encourage 
students to attend classes. The system was designed more for urban schools, rather than 
for rural schools, which are usually smaller and also have lower attendance rate due to 
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geographic conditions and problems associated with transportation. As a consequence, 
many rural schools were unable to generate enough money to be profitable. With this in 
mind, in 1998 the Chilean government established a special kind of financial aid for rural 
schools, called Piso rural (rural threshold), which stated that those rural schools with 17 
students or fewer would receive a fixed amount of money that will ensure that they have 
the economic resources to keep the school in operation and that this money would not 
depend on student attendance rate (Gobierno de Chile, 1998).  
This new financial support was beneficial for many under-financed rural schools, 
but it also create unintended consequences for the proliferation of small private-voucher 
schools in rural areas. In this sense, even though the competition in the Araucanía region 
has increased, in a rate similar to that of the Metropolitan region, this is because there are 
now more private-voucher schools and students enrolled in them. It does not mean the 
quality of the education has improved. Since the implementation of the rural threshold, 
owners of private-voucher schools in rural areas prefer to have two schools close to one 
another, with 15 students each one, rather than open one school with 30 students, because 
small schools are more profitable.  
Chile is divided into 12 regions, with region 1 in the northern part of Chile along 
the border with Peru and Bolivia, region 12 in the southern region of Chile, with part of 
its territory in the Chilean Antarctic, and the Metropolitan region (the city of Santiago) 
located in the central part of the country. The distribution of urban and rural schools is 
uneven based on the regions; Table 3-9 shows the number of rural primary education 
schools by region in 2013  
Table 3-9: The Percentage of Rural Primary Education Schools by Region in 2013  
Region 1 2 3 4 5 MR 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Urban 64% 87% 69% 42% 78% 93% 47% 37% 49% 31% 28% 54% 74% 
Rural 36% 13% 31% 58% 22% 7% 53% 63% 51% 69% 72% 46% 26% 
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 The Araucanía (9) and Lakes (10) regions have the highest percentage of rural 
primary education schools, at 69 percent and 72 percent in 2013, respectively. One 
important difference between these two regions is that in 2013, among those rural schools 
with 17 or fewer students that could receive financial support from rural threshold, only 
20 percent of them were private-voucher schools in the Lakes region. Instead, 40 percent 
of the rural schools with 17 or less students in 2013 in the Araucanía region were private-
voucher schools (Mineduc, 2013b). In brief, the Araucanía region has 50 percent more 
private-voucher schools in rural areas with less than 17 students than its next door 
neighbor, the Lakes region.  
In one of my interviews with an education specialist in the Araucanía region, I 
asked why private-voucher schools decided to open in rural areas of the Araucanía 
region? His answer was:  
 
There is a lot of money, there is a special financial aid called piso rural (rural 
threshold)… school receive a fixed amount of money, which is around CH $1.5 
million pesos. If a school has one kid, one teacher, this school will receive CH 
$1.5 million pesos. Therefore, what happened is that it was better to have 20 
schools with 10 students each than one with 200 students, because small schools 
were more profitable.  The owners of private-voucher schools considered this and 
decided to open a school here, here, here, and there and they can obtain CH $ 6 
millions having four schools and this is better business than having one school 
with 100 students. 
Furthermore, rural schools can receive additional funding if they have jornada 
escolar completa (a full day school) or if a school usually runs until 4 PM. Schools could 
receive an increase in resources, depending on where the schools are located – different 
regions and municipalities have a different “zone index” which establishes a percent 
increase in money that schools will receive (Mineduc, 2007b). Finally, even though rural 
schools have more than 17 students and they cannot receive the “rural threshold,” these 
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schools obtain special financial support depending on how many students attend; the 
maximum number of students that a school may have to apply for subvención rural (rural 
funding) is 90 students. As a consequence, there are multiple ways that those private-
voucher schools can make a profit in rural areas and, as a consequence of that there have 
been a proliferation of private-voucher schools in the Araucanía region (see Figure A-1), 
which does not mean an increase in student achievement, as the fixed-effects  model for 
this region shows. 
In the Araucanía region, the number of schools in rural areas that closed between 
the period of 2005 to 2013 was only 32 private-voucher schools versus 127 public 
schools (Mineduc, 2005, 2013c). Public schools in rural areas face more difficulties in 
remaining open than private-voucher schools: teachers in the public sector are most 
costly (Mizala & Romaguera, 2001) and municipalities that are in charge of public 
schools see them as a problem, given the high cost implied in keeping them open. One 
extreme example comes from the municipality called Padres Las Casas in the Araucanía 
region, which closed almost all of its public schools – in fact, 92 percent of urban schools 
and 79 percent of rural schools were private-voucher in 2013 (Mineduc, 2013c). 
In the case of the Metropolitan region, 93 percent of the primary education 
schools are urban and only 7 percent are rural (Mineduc, 2013c). As a result, competition 
among schools, in contrast to the Araucanía region, exists among schools in the urban 
district of the capital city, where parents have more options, where they can exercise their 
“free choice,” and where schools feel pressure to provide a better quality of education in 
order to attract students. However, despite though all the conditions and advantages that 
the capital city has, competition has had a very modest contribution to student 
achievement in terms of the expectations publicly announced by the Pinochet’s regimen 
with the implementation of the education reform in 1981.   
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CONCLUSIONS  
 This chapter explored the hypothesis that increased competition, defined as the 
percentage of students enrolled in 4
th
 grade private-voucher schools per municipality, 
would result in an improvement in the quality of the education system as a whole. I used 
longitudinal data from the 4
th
 grade at the student level from 2002 to 2013 to test this 
hypothesis, and I analyzed the data using a fixed-effects model at the municipal level to 
avoid endogeneity problems between competition and student achievement.  
At the national level, the relationship between competition and student 
achievement is negative. For example, for a one percent increase in competition, student 
achievement decreases by 0.06 points on the reading test and 0.08 points on the math test. 
In fact, these findings are the opposite of what advocates of the implementation of 
private-vouchers schools have argued. I explain that this effect came about because under 
the Chilean school choice system, parents identified the most relevant variable in 
choosing a school to be “school proximity,” rather than “quality of education or results in 
SIMCE test.” In fact, the relevancy of “school proximity” is more than 50 percent more 
relevant than “quality of education” for parents with children in the 4
th
 grade, also 
private-voucher schools have a mechanism by which they select their student body that 
not only discriminates against them according to the socioeconomic status of their 
families, but also according to cognitive abilities. As a consequence, the positive effect of 
competition and free choice are “cancelled out” by an increase in the socioeconomic 
segregation of the educational system and freedom that private-voucher schools have to 
select their student body by income or academic abilities.  
Furthermore, this chapter explores the diverse effects of competition on two 
different regions with dissimilar socioeconomic and demographic conditions. In 
particular, it compared the Metropolitan region, where the capital city is located, and the 
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Araucanía region, which is the poorest area of Chile.  This study shows that when the 
percentage of 4
th
 grade students enrolled in private-voucher schools increases in the 
Metropolitan region, student scores on reading and math tests also increase. This finding 
provides evidence that in the urban district of the capital city, where families have greater 
economic advantages than those in the rest of the country, parents can exercise free 
choice and schools compete to provide a better quality of education.  Even though the 
coefficient of competition is positive and statistically significant, the impact of 
competition on student achievement is relatively small. For example, a one percent 
increase in competition implies only a 0.15 point increase on the reading test and a 0.1 
point increase on the math test in 4
th
 grade.  
 In contrast to the urban district of Santiago (Metropolitan region), the coefficient 
for competition in the Araucanía region, the poorest region with the largest indigenous 
and rural population, is negative and statistically significant. For example, a one-percent 
increase in 4
th
 grade students enrolled in private-voucher schools has resulted in a 
decrease of 0.23 points on the reading test and 0.27 on the math test. I explain this 
negative relationship between competition and students achievement as due to the 
negative externalities created by the financial system for rural schools, which creates 
incentives for private-voucher schools to open in rural areas, but only because they can 
get more resources from the Chilean government, not because they are competing with 
others schools.  
These findings point to a need for policy makers to take geographical, 
socioeconomic, and demographic differences into account in the design of public 
policies. Mainly, because the same public policy could have different effects depending 
on where it is implemented – if it is with a population that is already better off, the output 
probably will be positive, but if the implementation takes place in a region where the 
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population has fared worse than the rest of the country, the expected results are likely 
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The Use of Academic Strategies by Teachers under the High-Stakes 
Accountability System in Chile  
Diverse studies have found a positive effect of the implementation of high-stakes 
accountability system implemented in Chile in 2008, the so-called Subvención Escolar 
Preferencial (Preferential Voucher Program, SEP), and a resulting improvement of the 
quality of education (Correa et al., 2012; Mineduc, 2012; Mizala & Torche, 2013; 
Perticara et al., 2013; Villarroel, 2012). In others words, schools that voluntarily enter the 
Preferential Voucher Program (SEP) have shown an increase in students’ performance in 
the Sistema Nacional de Evaluación de Calidad de la Educación (Educational Quality 
Measurement System, SIMCE), but it is not possible to know from these studies how or 
what schools did in order to improve their performance. As Koretz (2008) points out, 
teachers respond differently to the high-stakes accountability system; some of them 
develop strategies that are desirable and expected from the implementation of an 
accountability system, such as so-called academic strategies. For example, it is expected 
that teachers spend more time with students, find new learning methods, or give students 
more homework or assignments, and as a results of that students improve their 
performance on the standardized test. However, there are other strategies (non-academics 
strategies), such as teaching to the test or excluding low-performing students from the 
test-taking pool, which also serve to improve students’ scores on the standardized tests, 
but these non-academic strategies are not the type of actions that the accountability 
system is expecting from teachers.  
This chapter analyzes the use of academic strategies following the implementation 
of the high-stakes accountability system in Chile; academic strategies are those that that 
teachers or schools are expected to develop as a way to improve the students’ learning 
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and, as a result, to observe better performance by students on standardized tests. These 
strategies are (a) teachers work more effectively: for example, they find better methods of 
teaching, (b) teachers teach more: teachers spend more time overall in school, and (c) 
teachers work harder: for example, they give more homework or harder assignments to 
their students (Koretz, 2008a). These three strategies produce higher levels of 
achievement in substantive areas of the test and an unambiguously meaningful gain in 
scores (Koretz & McCaffrey, 2001). 
From the current literature is impossible to quantify how extensive or significant 
the use of academic strategies are under the SEP accountability system. It is not possible 
to know what type of municipalities, schools, labor conditions, or which characteristics of 
principals help to develop these types of strategies to improve students’ learning and, 
therefore, their performance on standardized tests. In this sense, this study is a 
contribution to the literature, but it also offers fundamental information to policy-makers 
in Chile about the design and implementation of the nationwide high-stakes 
accountability system that the Chilean government would put into place in 2015.  
This chapter explores the following research questions: after the implementation 
of the high-stakes accountability in Chile in 2008, have teachers increased the use of 
academic strategies as a way to improve students’ performance on standardized tests? 
And what are the difficulties and constraints that the Chilean educational system imposes 
on teachers and school administrators in order to increase the use of academic strategies 
under the high-stakes accountability system? 
In the next sections, I introduce an overview of how incentives are understood in 
economics and psychology, and how these theoretical notions were introduced and used 
to implement the high-stakes accountability system in Chile in 2008.   
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THEORY OF INCENTIVES: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 
APPROACHES 
In past decades, economists and psychologists have studied the complex 
relationship between incentives and human behavior (Hout & Stuart, 2011). The field of 
economics is based on incentives and its strength comes from being able to predict how 
human beings modify their behavior in response to changing incentives, but economics 
are also more inclined to constrain their attention to narrow and empirically-verifiable 
aspects of human motivation (Fehr & Falk, 2002). While psychology tries to explain the 
motivation behind people’s actions, economics tries to explain human motivation and 
how individuals perceive incentives such as rewards or sanctions could modify their 
behavior (Benware & Deci, 1984).   
How to design institutions in order to provide good incentives for individuals is a 
fundamental question in economics. Neoclassical economics argues that individuals 
behave rationally in the market, trying to maximize their utilities and minimize their cost. 
In this sense, the pressure of competitive markets solves the problem of incentives for 
cost minimization because in a perfect competitive market, consumers faced with 
exogenous prices have the proper incentives for maximizing their utilities levels. As a 
consequence, an understanding about how prices are formed in competitive markets is 
achieved without worrying about incentives. The problem is, when firms are analyzed as 
a black box, it is difficult to understand how and why some owners of firms succeed in 
aligning their workers, supervisors and managers with profit maximization. When 
economists become more interested in understanding how firms work, incentives arise as 
a central aspect of this analysis (Laffont & Martimort, 2001).   
In order to develop a theory of incentives, it is necessary to address the problem 
of delegating a task to an agent with private information, where one party (the principal) 
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tries to influence the behavior of another (the agent) by using incentives. In this case, 
there are two types of private information: The first one, called a “moral hazard,” is a 
situation in which the agent’s actions affect the principal’s payoff, even though the action 
is not directly observable to the principal. The second one is called “adverse selection,” 
which corresponds to a case of information asymmetry where the agent has private 
information that is ignored by the principal (Dixit, 2002).  One of the critiques of this 
approach is related with the notion of human behavior; the principal-agent relationship 
has been developed based on the notion that agents are fully rational maximizers. 
However, in some cases, agents could fail to optimize their outcome and display some 
irrational behavior (Laffont & Martimort, 2001).  
Does the optimal structure of incentives in the public sector differ from those in 
the private sector? One of the main characteristics of the public sector is that agents work 
for many principals, and to create incentives in this context is more complex. 
Additionally, the principals are usually interested in some but not all dimensions, and 
those interests are not necessarily aligned as well, as most of those employed in the 
public sector perform several tasks (Burgess & Ratto, 2003; Dixit, 2002). In this context, 
negative externalities appear, as the different principals expect different outcomes from 
the agents, and each principal only rewards or sanctions those outcomes in which he or 
she is interested. Therefore, the agents will be more willing to put more effort and time 
into satisfying those outcomes that have a higher reward for them and, therefore, will 
tend to disregard the rest of the tasks associated with their job (Dixit, 1997).   
In the case of public education, the system presents multiple goals. For example, 
schools need to teach basic skills of mathematics, sciences, arts, reading, reasoning and 
calculation; foster physical and emotional growth of children; teach students ideal of 
citizenship and responsibility; provide an environment free of drugs and violence. 
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Furthermore, public education has several principals such as parents, teacher unions, 
taxpayers, and society as a whole, and teachers and school administrators (agents) need to 
work to satisfy them. Another feature of the system is that teachers have long careers, 
which means that teachers can be more focused on the long-term goals of their career 
rather than incentives based on short-term performance (Dixit, 2002).  In summary, these 
characteristics of public education, which is multi-task, multi-principal, and multi-period, 
creates almost a monopoly organization with difficult observable outcomes and it is 
difficult to apply a single solutions as the theory of incentives would propose (Burgess & 
Ratto, 2003). 
An additional theoretical source that explores the relationship between incentives 
and behavior comes from the field of psychology. This approach reveals and underlines 
the importance of the desire to reciprocate or the desire to avoid social disproval in 
human behavior.  In disregarding these motives, economist could fail to fully understand 
the levels and changes in human actions (Fehr & Falk, 2002). From this approach, to 
understand the effect of incentives is central in considering the interpretation of the 
rewards or sanctions that the recipients are attaching to the incentives. Particularly, the 
recipient’s perception of the incentives in relation to their own feeling of self-
determination (Deci et al., 1999). A person’s interpretation of the causes of behavior are 
hypothesized to have an important impact on future motivation and performance 
(Cameron & Pierce, 1994).  
According to cognitive evaluation theory, all incentives and constraints have two 
functional aspects: a controlling aspect and an informational aspect (Deci, Schwartz, 
Sheinman, & Ryan, 1981). The controlling aspect is referred to as how the locus of 
causality is perceived.  For example, when individuals are intrinsically motivated to do an 
activity, they perceive that locus of causality as internal and therefore people feel self-
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determined. In contrast, if people are extrinsically motivated, they interpret that locus of 
causality as external and feel less self-determining. The informational aspect refers to the 
idea that intrinsic motivation can be influenced by the way people perceive their own 
competence. If people perceive that they have high levels of competence, their intrinsic 
motivation will increase under situations that require them to meet certain goals or 
standards. The opposite happens if people’s interpretations or feelings of competence are 
diminished: their intrinsic motivation will also will decrease (Deci, Nezlek, & Sheinman, 
1981).    
Cognitive evaluation theory understands intrinsic motivation as the psychological 
needs for autonomy and competence, and therefore, the influence of an event such as a 
reward depend on how the individual perceives it, and how they perceive their own self-
determination and competence.  Intrinsically, motivation includes behaviors associated 
with exploration, spontaneity, enjoyment, and excitement. In contrast, extrinsic 
motivation involves performing activities with the goal of receiving a reward, avoiding 
sanction, or gaining approval. Those actions that are extrinsically motivated would be 
less spontaneous and because this type of behavior is focused on reaching an objective, 
the behavior is instrumental (Deci, Ryan, & Williams, 1996). According this theory 
predicts that when an interpersonal style of administering performance-contingent 
rewards is relatively pressuring, the rewards are most likely perceived as more 
controlling, and therefore leading to a reduction of intrinsic motivation. On the other 
hand, when the interpersonal style is not controlling, the rewards tend to be experienced 
as more informal, and could lead to an increase of intrinsic motivation (Deci et al., 1999; 
Deci, Schwartz, et al., 1981). 
I argue that under the high-stakes accountability system implemented in Chile 
(2008), teachers will respond using academic and non-academic strategies based on their 
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perception of self-determination and competence. In others words, if teachers perceive 
the goals defined by the accountability system as beyond their capabilities, as cognitive 
evaluation theory predicts, they will develop instrumental behavior (extrinsic motivation) 
to achieve the goals established by the accountability system. I hypothesize that they will 
be most likely to develop non-academic strategies to improve students’ performance in 
standardized tests. On the other hand, if teachers perceive the objective defined by the 
accountability system as something they can achieve (intrinsic motivation), they will 
most likely develop academic strategies to improve the students learning and, therefore, 
students’ performance on standardized tests. Moreover, I argue that the way teachers 
perceive their competence is determined by their skills and the school's previous 
performance on the SIMCE tests. That is, if a teacher possesses a good set of skills and 
the school has had good performance on the SIMCE test (lower pressure for results), 
most likely this teacher will be intrinsically motivated and prone to use academic 
strategies. In contrast, if a teacher has low skills and the school has obtained low scores 
on SIMCE test (higher pressure for results), most likely teachers will be extrinsically 
motivated to obtain results and inclined to use non-academic strategies.  
The High-Stakes Accountability System in Chile 
The use of standardized tests is understood as a necessary aspect of improving the 
quality of education. With this in mind, in recent decades in the United States, the efforts 
of federal and state governments have been focused on implementing accountability 
systems in education (Chapman et al., 2000; Cullen & Reback, 2006; Figlio & Getzler, 
2002; Hamilton et al., 2002; E. Hanushek & Raymond, 2005; Jacob, 2007; Kim, 2004; 
Neal & Schanzenbach, 2010; Stecher & Barron, 2001). It is assumed that the 
implementation of the standardized test as a mechanism of rewards and sanction would 
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be a source of motivation for teachers and schools administrators to improve their work 
and maximize the students’ learning. From this prospective, an increase in expectations 
and learning standards should promote better opportunities for students and reduce the 
academic achievement gap among students (Haertel & Herman, 2005).   
While the U.S. educational system has a lower degree of competition among 
schools (measured as the percentage of students enrolled in voucher and charter schools 
in school districts), some states have implemented a high-stakes test-based accountability 
system. In contrast, Chile had a high level of competition among schools paired with the 
use of low-stakes testing up to 2007. More than half of students attend private-voucher 
schools, but standardized tests and their results are mainly employed to help inform 
parents about school quality, and they have no direct consequences for teachers or school 
administrators (Mizala & Urquiola, 2007). However, this situation changed in 2008, 
when the Chilean government implemented the Preferential Voucher Program, also 
known as SEP.  The original voucher program, implemented in 1981 under the military 
regime, established a flat voucher for all students, disregarding the fact that students from 
low-income families would require additional resources to achieve similar results that 
their peers from high-income families (Mizala, 2007). To solve this problem, the Chilean 
government created the Preferential Voucher Program, which gives additional resources 
to schools by increasing the number vouchers for students from low-income families, but 
also established a high-stakes accountability system in which schools must achieve 
certain goals as defined by standardized tests (Romaguera & Gallegos, 2010). Even 
though SEP is voluntary, in 2011, three years after its implementation, 99 percent of the 
public schools and 73 percent of the private-voucher schools participated in SEP program 
and the Chilean government had invested around $1,300 million dollars on this program 
(Mineduc, 2012).   
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Various studies have evaluated the impact of the Preferential Voucher Program 
(SEP) on students’ achievement in SIMCE tests. Scholars have used different techniques, 
such as propensity matching scores or difference in difference (Correa et al., 2012; 
Mineduc, 2012; Villarroel, 2012).  The problem of using these techniques is that schools 
were not chosen to participate in the program; instead, schools voluntarily entered the 
program (Perticara et al., 2013). As a consequence, it could be the case that those schools 
with better students and parents who are more motivated would be more likely to 
participate in the SEP program and, therefore, if SEP schools (treatment group) are 
compared with those that do not participate in the program (control group), researchers 
could find a positive effect that would erroneously be attributed to the Preferential 
Voucher Program (SEP).  On the other hand, if schools with more disadvantaged students 
and less motivated parents were most likely to join the program, researchers who 
compare SEP schools versus non-SEP schools would conclude that the high-stake 
accountability system has a negative impact on the students’ performance on the 
standardized tests, even though the differences are related with the composition of the 
student body (Mizala & Torche, 2013). Because of the problems described above, 
another other group of researchers has chosen to use a fixed effects to evaluate the effect 
of the high-stakes accountability system over the test-scores model (Mizala & Torche, 
2013; Perticara et al., 2013). These studies compare schools against themselves over 
time, including observations before and after the implementation of the SEP program.  
Even though studies have used different approaches to explore the effect of the 
Preferential Voucher Program, they have obtained similar conclusions. Those schools 
that have participated in the SEP program have increased student performance on 
standardized tests (Correa et al., 2012; Mineduc, 2012; Mizala & Torche, 2013; Perticara 
et al., 2013; Villarroel, 2012).  However, it is unclear how or what schools did in order to 
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improve their test scores, given that I have explained previously how teachers can use 
academic and non-academic strategies in order to improve student’s scores on 
standardized tests. Academic strategies include finding new learning methodologies to 
teach, spending more time with students, or giving more homework or assignments to 
students. On the contrary, non-academic strategies include coaching or teaching to the 
test, selecting students or excluding low-achievement students from the test-taking pool 
(Koretz, 2008b).   
This chapter explores whether or not teachers use mostly academic strategies to 
improve student performance on standardized test, as the theory assumes. Previous 
researches have analyzed this question. For example, in 1999 Eyzaguirre and Fontaine 
pointed out that the accountability system could have positive and also negative 
consequences (Eyzaguirre & Fontaine, 1999). Moreover, Roman argued that one of the 
challenges was to control the negatives effects of the Chilean accountability system (low-
stakes), such as the selection and exclusion of the low-achievement students (Roman, 
1999). In 2003, the Minister of Education created a commission to study the impacts of 
the low-stakes accountability system implemented in Chile in the 1990s. The commission 
found evidence of reallocation, or that schools tended to concentrate their efforts on those 
grades that will take the standardized tests, while teachers became more focused on 
teaching math and reading, disregarding the rest of the subjects. Moreover, the report 
showed that schools put their best teachers in charge of the grades that would take the 
standardized tests and that they would align the curriculum with the topics that the 
standardized test would be covering (Mineduc, 2003).  
After the implementation of the high-stakes accountability system in 2008, some 
studies have used qualitative methods to discover that schools are matching curriculum 
more closely to the material covered on the test (alignment) while also teaching to the test 
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(Falabella, 2014; Waissbluth, 2013). However, it is unclear from these studies how 
extensive and significant these practices are or whether it could be the case that academic 
strategies have also increased following the implementation of the high-stakes 
accountability system. This study tests the hypothesis that advocates of accountability 
favor: that under the pressure and objectives set up by the high-stakes accountability 
system, teachers will increase the use of academics strategies as a way to improve student 
performance on standardized tests.   
METHODS AND DATA  
I use census data from a questionnaire given to 4th and 8th grade teachers. This 
data is restricted and it is necessary to apply to and be authorized by, the Ministry of 
Education in order to have access to it. The teacher of each class answered the 
questionnaire, which inquires about his or her professional training and the contents that 
were taught during the school year, among others. The majority of the questionnaires 
were answered by one teacher who taught the three classes tested by SIMCE: math, 
reading, and sciences (Mineduc, 2008).   
As table 4-1 shows, there is information available from the 4th grade over 10 
periods from 2002 and 2005-2013 and from 8th grade over three periods in 2007, 2011 
and 2013. Each teacher’s questionnaire has a unique ID, which I have used to merge the 
information about a teacher’s schools. When both datasets are merged, I can see whether 
or not a particular teacher is working in a SEP or non-SEP school, what class he or she is 
teaching, the socioeconomic status of students in his or her school, the geographical 
location of his or her school, the type of school (public, private-voucher or private-paid) 









 Grade Teachers who Answered the 
Questionnaires from 2002 to 2013 
 2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
4th 
grade 
9,061 10,560 10,526 10,732 10,607 9,890 10,600 9,981 10,190 10,064 
8th 
grade 
   18,055    16,682  14,982 
Furthermore, I analyzed 23 semi-structured interviews with academics, policy-
makers and teachers in Chile. These interviews were conducted in two periods: from 
September to December of 2013 and in August, 2014. The first groups of interviews 
conducted in 2013 was focused on describing the main problems that the Chilean 
educational system has faced since the implementation of the private-voucher reform 
under the dictatorship of Pinochet in 1981, and what challenges it faced after the 
implementation of the high-stakes accountability system in 2008. The second round of 
interviews conducted on August 2014 focused on exploring the use of academic and non-
academic strategies for SEP schools and the difficulties they face in utilizing academic 
strategies to improve students’ learning. I use descriptive statistics such as frequency 
diagrams and contingency tables to analyze the teacher questionnaires, and in the case of 
the semi-structured interviews, I use content analysis. 
RESULTS  
This section explores teachers’ responses to high-stakes accountability system, 
based on the typology created by Daniel Koretz (2008). In particular, I analyze whether 
or not academic strategies are taking place after the implementation of the SEP program 
in Chile. I use the teacher questionnaires to explore three expected actions that teachers 
could develop under the accountability system: (1) working more effectively, (2) teaching 
more, and (3) working harder. These three types of responses can produce higher scores 
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on standardized tests and ensure the inference that students have improved their 
understanding or learning of the intended domain (Koretz & McCaffrey, 2001). 
 Finally, I analyze 23 semi-structured interviews conducted in Chile from October 
to December 2013 and from August 2014 with the goal of understanding the constraints 
in the Chilean system that make it difficult for schools to choose academic strategies as a 
way to improve their student performance on standardized tests.  
Working More Effectively 
This type of teacher responds to the high-stakes accountability system by finding 
better methods of teaching or by adopting a better curriculum (Koretz & McCaffrey, 
2001). I use the 8th grade teacher questionnaire to see if teachers who work in SEP 
schools have increased the diversity of evaluations, feedback, or methods of teaching 
their students since the implementation of the SEP program. As I mentioned before, it is 
important to clarify that SEP and non-SEP schools are not comparable, because the SEP 
program is not a mandatory program; because schools choose whether or not to 
participate in this program and are not randomly assigned to be either an SEP or non-SEP 
school, the groups are not comparable. However, I use SEP and non-SEP schools to 
observe whether or not they are following the global national trend, or if SEP schools are 
developing their own trajectory after the implementation of the high-stakes accountability 
system in 2008.     
In order to explore the type of evaluation that schools are using after the 
implementation of the high-stakes accountability system, Tables 4-2 and 4-3 show the 
proportion of written and multiple choices tests given in 8th grade prior to and following 
the implementation of the SEP program. I use these two types of evaluations because I 
hypothesize that SEP schools will reduce the use of multiple-choice tests. Otherwise, it is 
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possible to suspect that there could be evidence of coaching, as students could be 
receiving training as to how to answer questions in a format similar to that of the SIMCE 
tests. Moreover, I expect to observe some increase in the use of written tests in SEP 
schools, because if SEP schools are seeking to improve the learning process and not just 
prepare their students to take standardized tests, then written tests are a better evaluation 
of whether or not students comprehend tests questions, the use of abstract thought, and 
analysis in their answers. For example, using tests with multiple choice items, students 
who don't know the answer know that they can find the correct response they by using 
information in neighboring items (Pyrczak, 1972). 
I use the years before of the SEP program implementation (2008) as a baseline 
and I compare the four years after the implementation of the high-stakes accountability 
system. Table 4-2 shows answers from 8th grade teachers that use multiple-choice tests. 
The results demonstrate that SEP schools have decreased the percentage of teachers who 
are evaluating their students using multiple-choices tests, which is what I hypothesized 
previously, but also that non-SEP schools reduced the use of multiple-choice testing after 
the implementation of the high-stakes accountability system. In fact, the percentage of 
teachers that report to “always” use multiple choice tests decreased on average around 7.7 
percent between 2007 and 2011 among SEP schools, but non-SEP schools increased by 
0.9 percent in the same period. Moreover, the percentages of teachers that say “never” 
use multiple-choice tests in reading class decreased by 2.2 percent for SEP schools and 





 Table 4-2: In Reference to this Class (8th Grade), How often do you use Tests with 
Multiple-Choices or True & False Items in Reading? 
  Always Never 
 SEP NON SEP SEP NON SEP 
2007 43.1% 40.5% 3.3% 9.7% 
2011 35.4% 39.6% 1.1% 2.2% 
Difference -7.7% -0.9% -2.2% -7.5% 
In the case of tests where students need to write their answers, Table 4-3 shows 
that SEP and non-SEP schools follow similar trends. In both cases, the percentage of 
teachers that “always” use written tests decreased 4.5 percent in SEP schools and 5.2 
percent for non-SEP schools after the implementation of the accountability system.  
 
Table 4-3: In Reference to this Class (8
th
 Grade), How often do you use Tests where 
Students Need to Write their Answers or Solve Problems in Reading? 
 
  Always Never 
  SEP NON SEP SEP NON SEP 
2007 43.1% 50.9% 1.3% 1.3% 
2011 38.6% 45.7% 0.3% 0.2% 
Difference -4.5% -5.2% -1.1% -1.1% 
In summary, the type of evaluations that schools are using four years after the 
implementation of the high-stakes accountability system show that SEP schools have 
reduced multiple-choice tests as a way to measure students’ learning, which is the 
outcome I had hypothesized. But the percentage of teachers that reported to “always” 
evaluate their students using written tests also decreased after the implementation of SEP 
program, what is the opposite of what I was expecting from an SEP school. Moreover, 
non-SEP schools have followed the same pattern as SEP schools after the implementation 
of high-stakes accountability system.  
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 Another element that I explore in this section is the idea that whether or not SEP 
schools are intensifying the feedback that teachers are giving to students, as a way to 
improve and accelerate students’ learning (Nicol & Macfarlane-Dick, 2006). There is no 
data available before 2008 and I therefore used 4
th
 grade data from the period between 
2009 and 2013 to explore whether or not teachers from SEP schools have increase the 
frequency of feedback they give to their students. Table 4-4 shows that SEP schools have 
increased the percentage of feedback given to students on study guides, with homework, 
and that their feedback on tests decreased  
 
Table 4-4: Percentage of Teachers in 4
th
 Grade from SEP & Non-SEP Schools that 
“Always” or “Never” Give Feedback to their Students in 2009 and 2013.  
 
    Always Never 
    SEP NON SEP SEP NON SEP 
Study guides 
  
2009 58.9% 67.4% 0.1% 0.1% 
2013 71.9% 72.7% 0.2% 0.2% 
Difference 13.0% 5.4% 0.04% 0.2% 
Homework 
  
2009 53.6% 57.3% 1.0% 0.8% 
2013 66.5% 59.2% 0.4% 0.8% 
Difference 12.9% 2.0% -0.65% 0.0% 
Tests  
  
2009 59.6% 67.4% 0.2% 0.1% 
2013 47.0% 52.6% 1.6% 3.4% 
Difference -12.6% -14.8% 1.43% 3.3% 
For example, in 4th grade classrooms where teachers who work in SEP schools 
reported that “always” give feedback to students based on study guides represented 59 
percent in 2009 and 72 percent in 2013, showing an increase of 13 percent. In contrast, 
teachers in non-SEP schools increased by only 6 percent from 67 percent in 2009 to 73 
percent in 2013.  Moreover, the percentage of teachers from SEP schools that “always” 
give feedback to student about their homework was 54 percent in 2009 and 66 percent in 
2013, which represent an increase of 12 percent. On the other hand, the percentage 
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increase of among non-SEP schools was only 2 percent, from 57 percent in 2009 and 59 
percent in 2013. Finally, both SEP and non-SEP schools have seen a reduction in the 
percentage of teachers that “always” give feedback to their students on tests, with SEP 
schools shifting from 60 percent in 2009 to 47 percent in 2013 while non-SEP schools 
moved from 67 percent in 2009 to 53 percent in 2013.  
In summary, even though SEP and non-SEP schools follow similar trends in 
relation to the feedback that students receive, SEP schools show a higher increase in the 
percentage of teacher that “always” give feedback to their students in study guides and 
homework. In fact, in 2013 SEP schools show a higher percentage of teachers that give 
feedback in homework to their students: 66 percent of SEP schools and 59 percent of 
non-SEP schools. They had similar percentages in terms of teachers that “always” gave 
feedback about study guides to their students: 72 percent for both types of schools.  
In relation of the use of different methods of teaching, if SEP schools are more 
focused on students learning rather than preparing them to take standardized tests, it 
could be expected that one would observe an increase in the percentage of teachers that 
report the use of more personalized work with students, such as methods of teaching 
focused on individual and group work. Table 4-5 compares the percentage of teachers 
that “always” used different methods of teaching before the implementation of SEP 
program (2007) to those six years after the SEP reform (2013). The results show that SEP 
and non-SEP schools follow similar trends, with the percentage of teachers that report to 
“always” use the eight methods of teaching present in Table 4-4 declining after the 
implementation of SEP program in 2008. The most important declines can be attributed 
to methods that involve group or individual work with students. For example, teachers 
from SEP schools that “always” do group work was 21 percent in 2007 and 7 percent in 
2013, which is a decline of 14 percentage points. On the other hand, non-SEP schools 
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show a 9 percentage points reduction in group work over the same period, from 15 
percent in 2007 to 6 percent in 2013.  
 
Table 4-5: The Percentage of Teachers from SEP & Non-SEP Schools who Report that 
they “Always” Use Different Methods of Teaching in 8
th
 Grade, in 2007 & 2011    
 
    Always  
Methodology    SEP NON SEP 
Group activities  
2007 20.6% 14.6% 
2013 7.0% 6.2% 
Difference -13.6% -8.4% 
Individual with students  
2007 37.4% 40.1% 
2013 17.4% 18.1% 
Difference -20.0% -21.9% 
Lecture of teacher 
2007 23.6% 24.0% 
2013 20.3% 21.2% 
Difference -3.3% -2.8% 
Questions & Answers 
2007 28.8% 29.7% 
2013 26.9% 25.0% 
Difference -1.9% -4.7% 
Student presentations 
2007 13.3% 6.9% 
2013 7.5% 5.0% 
Difference -5.8% -1.9% 
Debate among students 
2007 10.6% 5.7% 
2013 4.7% 4.6% 
Difference -6.0% -1.1% 
External activities (parks, museums, 
etc.) 
2007 5.4% 3.7% 
2013 3.5% 2.7% 
Difference -1.9% -1.1% 
Students need to present a final project  
2007 1.8% 1.0% 
2013 1.2% 0.6% 
Difference -0.6% -0.4% 
 
Furthermore, teachers from SEP and Non SEP schools report a decline of almost 
16 percent in the use of individual work with students, when comparing the years 2007 
and 2013. For example, 37 percent of teachers in SEP schools indicated that they 
“always” did individual work with students in the classroom in 2007 versus 17 percent in 
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2013. On the other hand, 40 percent of teachers in non-SEP schools reported that they 
“always” did individual work with students in 2007 and 18 percent did in 2013.  
Moreover, Table 4-5 shows that the use of teaching methods that include lecture, 
activities focus on question and answer, exposition, debate, external activities and final 
project has decreased after the implementation.  
Table 4-5 has shown that teachers are not using clear methods of teaching in their 
classes, based on the finding that teachers who selected  “always” decreased from 2007 to 
2013, and those selecting “sometimes” increased after the implementation of the high-
stakes accountability system. This could be positive, as it could show that teachers are 
more flexible in using different methods to teach their students, but also it could mean 
that there is no clear guidelines about what methods of teaching at the SEP schools 
should be used in order to ensure better and deeper learning among their students. A 
study conducted by the Catholic University of Chile (PUC) in 2014 showed that 
principals determine the rotation of teachers, which means that teachers do not stay for a 
long period of time in the same school, a factor that could explain the use of different 
methods of teaching (Manzi, Bogolasky, Grau, Guitiérrez, & Volante, 2014). 
In an interview with a teacher who works in a private-voucher school, he made 
the following comments with regards to the labor market of teachers: 
 
I’ve been in a school for up to two years, but in the second year they don’t rehire you 
because in the second year, by law, they would have to give you a permanent contract. 
And the permanent contract doesn’t give the owner liberty to fire you, because they 
would have to compensate you. This labor instability is for all teacher who work in 
private-voucher schools.  
Since the educational reform implemented under the dictatorship, rules and norms 
that govern a teacher in the public and private sector are different.  Teachers who work in 
private-voucher schools lose their condition as a public employee and are instead 
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regulated under the private labor code (código del trabajo) that governs the private sector 
in Chile. In this system, there are no considerations for how the salaries or a teacher's 
career should be regulated in the private sector (Mizala & Romaguera, 2001). In this 
sense, private-voucher schools behave much as private company would. They are 
allowed to contract teachers using a temporary contract of a maximum of two years, after 
which time they must shift to a permanent contract that would require them to pay 
teachers' vacations and include other benefits. As a consequence, private-voucher schools 
try to avoid these extra costs by firing teachers after two years and hiring new ones. This 
element could partially explain the relative fluctuations in methods of teaching observed 
in Table 4-5, while also it is important to note that private-voucher schools educate more 
than half of Chilean students. For example, in 2013 private-voucher schools enrolled 55 
percent of students in primary and secondary education (Mineduc, 2013b)  
Teaching More: Spending more time overall 
A second type of response that teachers can develop under a high-stakes 
accountability system, according to Koretz, is spending more overall time working with 
their students. I used the teacher questionnaires from the years 2006, 2009, and 2010 to 
explore whether or not teachers form SEP schools spend more time preparing their 
classes than they used to before the implementation of the SEP program. Table 4-6 shows 
the average time (hours) spent by teachers preparing their classes before (2006) and after 
the implementation of the SEP program (2009-2010).  
Table 4-6:  4
th
 Grade, Average Hours that Teachers Spent on Class Preparation per Week 
 SEP NON SEP 
2006 5.49 5.87 
2009 6.87 7.75 
2010 7.28 7.74 
Diff 2006-2010 1.79 1.87 
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The results show, as advocates of accountability systems would expect, an 
average increase of 1.79 hours between the years 2006 and 2010 in terms of the time 
teachers spend preparing classes. However, Table 4-6 also shows the same trend for non-
SEP schools, where in 2006 teachers spent 5.87 hours on average preparing class and 
where in 2010, they spent on average 7.74 hours, which represents an increase of 1.87 
hours.  
Working Harder: Giving more Homework 
 A third type of response that teachers develop under high-stakes accountability 
systems is that they give their students more homework or harder assignments. There is 
no information available prior to the implementation of the SEP program; the only data 
available is for the period between 2011 and 2013. Table 4-7 shows the results for 4th 
grade.  
Table 4-7:  4
th
 Grade, How often do you Give Math Homework this Class?  
  Always Usually Sometimes Never 












2011 2.2% 3.7% 40.3% 44.4% 43.1% 40.2% 14.4% 11.7% 
2013 2.2% 5.1% 45.6% 51.9% 40.3% 33.8% 11.9% 9.3% 
2013-2011 0.0% 1.4% 5.3% 7.5% -2.8% -6.4% -2.5% -2.5% 
One can observe that SEP schools have the same percentage (2.2%) of teachers 
reporting that they “always” give homework to their students in 2011 and 2013. In 
contrast, the percentage of teachers reported that they “always” give homework to their 
students increased by 1.4 percent in non-SEP schools between 2011 and 2013. 
Furthermore, the percentage of teachers who “always” give homework to their students is 
higher for non-SEP schools than SEP schools in 2013.   
In 2002, the teacher questionnaire also asked how often teachers gave homework 
to their students. But the Likert scale is different than the scale offered in 2011 or 2013 
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and, therefore, it is not possible to compare schools from before and after the 
implementation of the SEP program. However, the teacher questionnaire in 2002 includes 
the option of “never” as a response when teachers are asked if they give homework to 
their students. This answer can be compared to similar answers given in 2011 and 2013.  
 
Table 4-8: 4th Grade, Percentage of Teachers that “Never” Give Homework to their 
Students  
 Never 
Years SEP NON SEP 
2002 1.9% 4.2% 
2011 14.4% 11.7% 
2012 14% 10.2% 
2013 11.9% 9.3% 
Diff 2002-2013 10% 5.1% 
Table 4-8 shows that in 2002, the percentage of teachers who indicated that they 
“never” gave homework to their students was 1.9 percent while teachers in non-SEP 
schools reported 4.2 percent. After the implementation of the SEP program in 2008, the 
percentage of teachers who “never” gave homework to their students in SEP schools was 
11.9 percent and 9.3 percent for teachers in non-SEP schools in 2013. In brief, in 2002 
the percentage of teachers from SEP schools that “never” gave homework was less than 
half that of non-SEP schools, but in 2013, SEP schools exceeded non-SEP schools by 
more than 2 percent. After the implementation of the high-stakes accountability system in 
Chile, the opposite would be expected: that under the pressure to improve student 
learning, teachers would give more homework to their students. The opposite is observed 
in Table 4-7 and Table 4-8.  
In conclusion, using the administrative data provided by the Chilean government, 
it is not clear that teachers are more commonly using academic strategies following the 
implementation of the SEP program. In the next section, I use 23 semi-structured 
interviews with academics, policy makers, and teachers to explore the difficulties and 
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constraints that schools face in using academic strategies as a way to improve student 
learning.  
Semi-structured interviews 
I interviewed a top-level politician in charge of the implementation of the high-
stakes accountability system in his downtown office at the Ministry of Education in the 
city of Santiago. He explained the government's expectation as to how the new 
accountability system will impact methods of teaching and student learning. 
 
We need to develop the capacity of the system to allow schools to use the information 
provides from the SIMCE tests to be used as powerful instruments that can be used by 
teachers to reflect on the pedagogical strategies, and pedagogical practices.  
 
In fact, the assumptions and expectations under the accountability system 
implemented in Chile are that ranking schools and making public these ranking would 
help schools. This has been part of the narrative of the neoliberal prospective (Fontaine & 
Eyzaguirre, 2001). However, these assumptions have been criticized even by actors who 
have advocated for the introduction of an accountability system in the Chilean education. 
For example, the education director of Fundación Chile, an important think tank in Chile, 
she explained that they support and promote the implementation of neoliberal policies:  
 
The Chilean government has assumed that standardized tests are going to improve 
quality; they suppose that the information itself is what is going to generate the 
improvement. And what it improves the quality is the processes: processes of evaluation, 
of accountability…  
 
As is pointed out above, one of the important critiques of Chilean accountability 
is that the system puts pressure on the outcome of standardized tests but does not apply 
enough effort or attention to the way that schools and school administrators use the 
results of standardized tests as a way of improving their methods of teaching, educational 
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projects, etc. In fact, based on the responses of teachers to the 4th grade teacher 
questionnaire, in 2012 only 86 percent of the 4th grade teachers said they had access to a 
report submitted by the Ministry of Education about the school’s performance on SIMCE 
tests. To this, the education director of Fundación Chile said:  
 
In my opinion, when one starts to operationalize the information, like the SIMCE does, 
but doesn’t allow it to trickle down [to the teachers], it doesn’t go back to the instrument 
so it can be an effective input in a decision-making process. 
 
The way that the accountability system is structured in Chile does not allow to 
schools to use the information from SIMCE tests as a means of improving their work. 
Instead, the central government is focused on increasing pressure on schools with the 
expectation that this pressure and possible sanctions will motivate schools to improve the 
quality of their education. In this sense, this could be one reason why it is unclear in the 
teacher questionnaire that SEP schools are using more academic strategies than before the 
implementation of the high-stakes accountability system.  
Furthermore, I interviewed the director of the school of education of Universidad 
de Concepción. I was interested to know whether or not teachers from different 
geographical locations would have a different perception of the high-stakes 
accountability system, in particular how schools are responding to the pressure of 
showing better results on standardized test:  
 
The improvement plans are associated with making schools produce [results] through 
standardized tests. The problem is that the test doesn’t reveal what students have learned, 
but rather it focuses on the results of a test. It’s a measure that serves us, standardized 
tests are of interest to us, but they are just one aspect of the work done at a school. 
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Many people that were interviewed mentioned that even though the Ministry of 
Education is using cognitive and non-cognitive elements to create the schools rankings. 
Schools know that what really matters to the Ministry of Education is student 
performance on the SIMCE test; the rest of the elements are less relevant or secondary. In 
an interview, a principal from a religious private-voucher school explained that they 
enroll students from low-income families in Santiago and do not select their student 
body, which is the case with many other religious private-voucher schools in Chile. I 
asked him how they navigate the requirements of high-stakes accountability system and 
the values promoted by religious schools.  
 
The Adventist schools arise as an answer to the concern about principles; the Christian 
ideals. As such, they are strong with respect to values, because they teach respect, 
obedience, and they teach a lot of things that are not measured in the SIMCE. The 
SIMCE only measures academic results, so then in this sense we are impaired. It might 
be true that our scores have been better, they have been rising, but it also means that we 
have to give up doing several other things in order to achieve this.  
 
As the principal pointed out, under the high-stakes accountability system, schools 
need to be focused on elements that are directly related to standardized tests while 
everything else seems to be secondary because if schools do not meet the standards 
requested by the central government, they can receive economic sanctions or eventually 
be closed. However, the feedback that schools receive is not a tool that can be used by 
schools to review and improve their work, as was mentioned above. In this scenario, this 
is how a 4th grade teacher responded when asked 'What do you think would happen when 
the high-stake accountability system is mandatory at all schools?': 
 
I believe that in this scenario the issue is going to be more complex, they are going to be 
under pressure to raise their sores but they also will be threatened with closure. So, they 
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are going to try to get results if the students are capable of doing so or not. It is not 
possible that the goals will be achieved only through a legal way. 
 
The teacher’s answer addressed one of the main concerns with the 
implementation of high-stakes accountability system: that schools may take a different 
path – different than those expected from advocates of accountability system – to 
improve standardized test scores without necessarily improving student learning. These 
behaviors have been described by Koretz (2008) as coaching, also known as “teaching to 
the test” or cheating. Another known behavior implies the exclusion of students or the 
classification of students with special needs, disciplinary sanctions, etc. These are types 
of behaviors that in theory the Chilean Ministry of Education should try to avoid, but the 
high-stakes accountability system is set up in such a way that these responses, which 
should be promoted as academic strategies to improve students learning, are disregarded 
under the strong pressure for results and the weak support and feedback that schools 
receive from the central government.  
In Chapter 5, I will analyzed whether or not the exclusion of low-achievement 
students increased after the implementation of the high-stakes accountability system as a 
way for schools to inflate SIMCE test scores.  However, as the work of Koretz has 
shown, there are additional strategies that schools could use, such as reallocation and 
alignment that would improve students’ performance on standardized tests. Reallocation 
refers to shifting resources, including time, to emphasize the subjects and type of 
questions that will appear on the test, while alignment consists of matching the 
curriculum more closely to the material covered on the test (Koretz, 2003). In an 
interview with an elementary teacher about whether or not schools are using reallocation 
and alignment under the accountability system, he said:  
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Schools invest all their money in tutoring classes, it is a outsourced service; teachers from 
the outside work with the students after their classes, sometimes on Saturday, even during 
the winter vacations students received some tutoring classes.  All these topics that are not 
math or reading are irrelevant. For example, the social sciences, art or music -- they don’t 
give tutoring for these subjects.   
 
This answer is consistent with many others that I have heard during my 
interviews; reallocation seems to be a common practice among schools, while the 
intensity levels vary. Even so using data provided by the Chilean government, it is not 
possible to quantify whether or not its use or intensity increased after the implementation 
of the accountability system. However, using the teacher questionnaire, I am able to 
identify some patterns of alignment after the implementation of SEP program (2008). 
Using data from 2006 and 2010, I compared three items in math curriculum that are not 
directly related to those items ask in the SIMCE tests. The teacher questionnaire asked to 
math teachers in 4th grade how often they review these items in their math class, and the 
results are displayed in Table 4-9. 
 
Table 4-9:  Percentage of Teachers that Reviewed Items in their Math Classes that are not 
Measured in the Math SIMCE Test, Before and After the Implementation of 
SEP Program.   
    Yes No 
  






Item 1: Communication of procedures used to 
solve problems and the results obtained 
2006 29.8% 33.0% 0.2% 0.0% 
2010 27.4% 41.8% 0.4% 0.7% 
Item 2: Decision-making processes in relation 
to how a problem is solved, developed or 
modified in case the solution is not correct 
2006 18.6% 28.7% 1.8% 1.3% 
2010 16.8% 28.7% 1.2% 1.0% 
Item 3: Review whether or not a result obtained 
is correct in relation to the context of the 
problem 
2006 24.3% 27.6% 0.5% 0.2% 
 
2010 20.4% 30.8% 1.3% 0.8% 
Table 4-9 shows a reduction in the percentage of teachers in SEP schools that 
reported to cover items not related with SIMCE test. Thus, in 2006 29.8 percent of 
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teachers said they “completely” taught Item 1, and the percentage decreased to a 27.4 
percent in 2010. In contrast, in non-SEP schools the percent of teachers who reported that 
they “completely” taught Item1 increased from 33 percent in 2006 to 42 percent in 2010. 
In relation to Item 2, SEP schools reduced the percentage of teachers who reviewed Item 
2 with their students from 18.6 percent in 2006 to 16.8 in 2010 and non-SEP schools did 
not show any fluctuation (28.7 percent). Finally, teachers from SEP schools reduced the 
percentage of teachers that “completely” reviewed Item 3 from 24.3 percent (2006) to 
20.3 percent (2010). In contrast, non-SEP schools increased from 27.6 percent in 2006 to 
30.8 percent in 2010. In summary, Table 4-9 shows the opposite trends for SEP and non-
SEP schools: while SEP schools reduced the percentage of teachers who reported to 
review in their classes those items on the math curriculum that are not measure directly 
by math SIMCE test, non-SEP schools did the opposite. I argue that this data presents 
some evidence of alignment among SEP schools due to the necessity of focusing on those 
items that will be tested by SIMCE tests.  
 Another aspect that remains consistent throughout all the interviews is the 
notion that teachers are more stressed after the implementation of the high-stakes 
accountability system. This mainly occurs, as teachers explained, because they need to 
deal with increasing levels of pressure and control from the Ministry of Education. For 
example, one teacher said: “Taking the SIMCE test is stressful for the majority of 
teachers, because school is measured based on test scores”. Teachers are more conscious 
of the relevance of the standardized tests under the new regime, and there is an upward 
trend from 2000 to 2010 in terms of the relevance of the SIMCE test for teachers. For 
example, the percentage of teachers who give high importance to the test increased from 
11 percent in 2000 to 35 percent in 2010 (CIDE, 2010). I interviewed a high-level policy 
maker and academic who acted as an auditor of previous Chilean governments in the area 
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of education, and when I asked about the problems he identified under the new 
accountability system, he said:  
 
The major problem is that you want to transform the system and at the same time help 
teachers using market-based instruments. The system collapses because the rules of the 
market oblige a school to use a group of strategies that aren’t necessarily the best from a 
pedagogical standpoint. Because there’s money involved, the schools aren’t competing 
purely on their honor—they’re competing for their survival, and the teachers are 
competing for their salary. 
As is presented above, schools are evaluated through standardized tests that 
provide them with information about students learning, and they can use this information 
to improve their methods of teaching, school management, etc. But at the same time, the 
standardized tests also provide information that serve the control and regulation of the 
central government, which in worst case scenarios could close schools based on poor 
SIMCE tests performance.   
 One of the questions that I have tried to address in this chapter is how 
schools deal with this dual aspect of the accountability system, when standardized tests 
can be a source of information used to improve a school's work, but also the main input 
used to punish schools. In this sense, when I asked a professor from Universidad de 
Concepción of school of education, how schools respond to the pressure to achieve 
certain standard and thresholds on the SIMCE tests, he said:  
 
At the end of the day people fake results, schools are more worried about what they’re 
going to look like in the picture and the picture is the SIMCE test. Schools show the 
government that they are doing things. The principals are astute and know the system and 
at the end of the day they are more worried about following the model [do what the 
government expected from schools] than from the schools by itself.  
 
As this professor point out, because schools are under pressure for results, they 
learn how to game the system, and teachers and principals learn to give the Ministry of 
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Education what they are asking for. Falabella and Opazo (2014) conducted a qualitative 
study about the impact of the high-stakes accountability system on the school 
administration and found that the accountability system gives higher levels of structure 
and formalization to the school management and that teaching work under such a system 
is “driven toward goals.” But at the same time, the accountability system creates 
incentives for an instrumental rationality in schools that prioritizes the achievement of 
goals and satisfies the formal requirements put forth by the Ministry of Education while 
disregarding or relegating to a second priority an autonomous professional analysis about 
the schools’ needs and a decision-making process, contextualized in the reality of 
schools, that could serve to improve their work (Falabella & Opazo, 2014).   
I explain that because teachers and schools administrators are not necessarily 
prepared to deal with a system that pushes them, because teachers do not necessarily have 
the skills to do what the accountability system is asking of them. In this sense, an 
academic told me: 
 
The high stakes accountability system is going to create tension among teachers, and 
there is a weakness here because they do not do what they need to do. The challenge is a 
pedagogical one, and it is how to teach. In consequence, there are capabilities that must 
be developed, integrated group of work, decision-making process. It is not simple; 
creating learning communities, what teachers mostly ask for is space to work with their 
colleagues. 
I use the data reported in the 4th grade teacher questionnaire in (2010) to explore the 
differences between teachers from SEP and non-SEP schools in terms of their training.  
Table 4-10: What Type of Institution 4
th
 Grade Teachers Attended 
  University Part-Time  e-learning  
  SEP NON SEP SEP NON SEP SEP NON SEP 
2010 86.7% 95.3% 11.1% 3.4% 2.2% 1.4% 
Table 4-10 shows that around 13 percent of teachers from SEP schools have been 
educated under special programs, in which students need to attend intensive classes 
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during the weekend, usually on Saturday, or by way of e-leaning or distance programs in 
which students use internet to access their classes and materials. These programs do not 
require an admissions test and generally offer low levels of quality (Ruffinelli & Rojas, 
2007). 
Another consideration is that the majority of the teachers who are being educated 
under part-time or e-learning programs are working in public schools, which concentrate 
students from low-income and the most disadvantaged families. In fact, according to the 
teacher questionnaire from 2010, 4th grade teachers who studied in part-time or e-
learning programs represent 15 percent of the teaching body in public schools, while they 
represent only 8 percent in private-voucher schools. 
One new requirement under the accountability system that has been a challenge 
for schools is the development of cooperative work among teachers and the development 
of learning communities within schools. A math teacher commented that under the 
increasing pressure to achieve better test scores, stress among teachers and principals 
makes it difficult for them to work cooperatively with their colleges 
 
Many of them are pressured [teachers], the SIMCE creates anxiety and stress. It is an 
unhealthy thing within schools, because it creates a division among teachers; you have 
teachers on one side and principals on the other, attacking each other. There isn’t spirit of 
unity to work together toward the same objective.  
 
The teacher questionnaire in 2002 and 2012 asked 4th grade teachers if they 
would like to move to a different school, 12.3 percent of teachers (1,117 over 9,061) said 
“yes” in 2002 and ten years later, after the implementation of high-stakes accountability 
system, 18.2 percent (1,855 of 10,064) said they would like to work in a different school. 
It is hard to know why more teachers are unsatisfied in their current job, but I argue – 
based on my conversation with teachers and academics – that although the Chilean 
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educational system has become increasingly demanding, it does not give teachers and 
schools administrations the additional resources or support to achieve the goals imposed 
by the central government.  
It is important to point out that the SEP program not only significantly increases 
resources but also school autonomy in spending. However, there exists strong criticism 
among academics about the way schools and principals are spending the resources 
provided by SEP program, as much of the spending is not necessarily linked with the goal 
of improving the quality of education of their student body. I interviewed an assistant 
dean of the school of education of Pontificia Universidad Católica (PUC), one of the 
most important universities in Chile; he has also worked for the Ministry of Education in 
related positions. I asked for his opinion about how principals are using resources given 
by the SEP program preferential voucher. He said:  
 
There’s a lot of money for schools [SEP schools], but they don’t budget well how they 
use it - it’s like a cash register that the school uses for very important things or to hire 
teachers. So then the objective was that the spending [of the resources from SEP 
program] was associated to improvement on quality, but this objective is not being 
achieved. It is very disperse [spending] and that affects the impact of the SEP program 
because it would be different if the money were to be spent in a more systematic way, 
with planning, monitoring in relation to the education plan of improvement of schools.  
But this is not happening and more resources do not help. 
 
From the interviews, I have gathered the impression that that schools are not 
necessarily investing their economic resources in improving aspects of education related 
with students learning. Instead, I have the perception that principals are buying “things,” 
but not necessarily helping schools with their educational project. For example, another 




I believe the money is relatively poorly invested, because the first money from the SEP 
program was a lot money that arrived to schools and it is easy to spend when you don’t 
have a clear program of improvement. The first thing schools did was to buy TV, 
interactive boards, anything, because the education project was not clear.  
 
As mentioned above, the general perception that I have after finishing my 
interviews is that schools and municipalities do not have the skills to administrate the 
new resources or to orient their spending towards the needs and requirements of their 
educational project and with the final objective of improving the students learning, 
especially those schools with a high number of low-income families, which are the main 
target of the SEP program.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The Preferential Voucher Program (SEP) system was implemented in 2008 as a 
result of the pressure applied by striking students in 2006, who demanded improved 
quality and equity in the educational system (Salinas & Fraser, 2012).The SEP program 
was mainly designed to confront educational inequalities of student outcomes in the 
Chilean education system and for the first time, the Chilean government explicitly 
recognized that it is more expensive to educate students from low-income families. 
Therefore, the SEP program gives a preferential voucher to those schools that enroll 
students from low socioeconomic status. The SEP program also established a high-stakes 
accountability system (Murnane, Page, & Vegas, 2010).  At the school level, one of the 
main objectives of the SEP program is the improvement of teaching methods, principals’ 
leadership, and the overall management of the education system (Weinstein, Fuenzalida, 
& Muñoz, 2009). Following the typology developed by Daniel Koretz, on the possible 
responses of teachers under a high-stakes accountability system, and in light of the goals 
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defined by the SEP program, this chapter analyzes whether or not teachers of SEP 
schools are finding better methods of teaching, teaching more, and working harder 
(academic strategies) as a way to improve student learning. Furthermore, by analyzing 
semi-structured interviews, this chapter provides an overview of the difficulties and 
constraints that the current Chilean educational system faces in encouraging teachers and 
schools administrators to use academic strategies.  
First, one type of response by teachers under the high-stakes accountability 
system is that teachers would work more effectively, finding better methods of teaching, 
for example. My findings show that in terms of feedback and the type of evaluations that 
teachers are using, there are similar patterns for both SEP and non-SEP schools, but that 
SEP schools show a larger increase in the percentage of teachers that “always” give 
feedback to their students on study guides and homework. In term of teaching methods, 
the data shows that after the implementation of the high-stakes accountability system, 
teachers from SEP schools decreased their use of methods that focused on individual and 
group work with students. After 2008, there is not a clear or unique method of teaching 
that SEP schools appear to be using. This could be positive, as it could show that teachers 
are more flexible in using different methods to teach after the implementation of 
accountability system, but it could also mean that there is not a clear guideline as to what 
teaching methods should be used by teachers from SEP schools or how they should be 
focused in order to ensure better and deeper learning among their students. 
A second type of expected response is that teachers from SEP schools would 
simply teach more, spending more time overall with their students. I tested this 
assumption, using data about the average time that teachers spent preparing their classes 
before and after the implementation of SEP program. The data shows that from 2006 to 
2010, teachers from SEP schools increased their preparation time by 1.79 hours, which is 
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in the expected direction, but non-SEP schools also showed an average increase of 1.87 
hours after the implementation the accountability system.   
A third type of academic strategy developed by teachers after the implementation 
of SEP program is that teachers would work harder, giving more homework or harder 
assignments to their students, for example. I used the teacher questionnaire data to 
analyze if the percentage of teachers in SEP that “always” give homework to their 
students had increased, or if the percentage of them who “never” give homework had 
been reduced. The results show that from 2011 to 2013, the percentage of teachers that 
reported to “always” give homework to their students is the same (2.2 %), but that 
teachers from non-SEP schools increased from 3.7 to 5.1 percent in the same period. 
Furthermore, using data from before the implementation of the high-stakes accountability 
system, the percent of teachers from SEP schools that reported to “never” give homework 
to their students increased from 1.9 percent in 2002 to 11.9 percent in 2013, while non-
SEP schools showed an upward trend from 4.2 percent in 2002 to 9.3 percent in 2013.  In 
brief, between the years 2002 and 2013, the percentage of teachers who “never” give 
homework to their students increased for SEP schools by 10 percent and only by 5.1 
percent for non-SEP schools.  
Finally, using 23 semi-structured interviews, I explored the difficulties and 
constraints that schools face in increasing the use of academic strategies as a way to 
improve student learning. The general conclusion, based on the content analysis of the 
interviews, is that the high-stakes accountability system plays a dual function. On one 
hand, the students’ performance on SIMCE tests should be the main source used to 
identify which aspects of schools need to be improved, and to help the Ministry of 
Education to recognize areas in which they need to better support schools. One the other 
hand, standardized tests are at the same time use to rank schools, and if schools do not 
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meet the standards defined by the central government, schools can receive economic 
sanctions or be closed. In this fight between this two antagonist objectives, the pressure to 
produce results and avoid sanctions is stronger than the idea that SIMCE test could be 
used as a source of help or support for schools.  
In this scenario, schools are focused on improving their performance on the 
SIMCE tests and avoiding sanctions from the central government, using a combination of 
non-academic strategies such as exclusion of low-achieving students from the test-taking 
pool as well as shifting resources, including time, to emphasize the subjects and types of 
questions on the test (reallocation), matching the curriculum more closely to the material 
covered on the test (alignment) and teaching to the test (coaching). One of the main 
limitations that SEP schools face in improving their use of academic strategies is the 
quality of the teacher training. For example, around 13 percent of teachers from SEP 
schools have been educated under special programs that have low levels of quality. In 
addition, the frequent rotation of teachers does not allow to schools to develop 
educational projects in the long run while the lack a leadership among principals means 
that resources are not used to promote educational project at their schools. These factors, 
combined with the need to produce results, push teachers and school administrators to 
seek strategies that produce results in the short run and that can be easily implemented; 
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 The Invisible Children: What Standardized Tests Left Behind in Chile 
Advocates of test-based accountability systems argue that the traditional 
educational system does not provide enough checks and incentives to ensure that 
principals and teachers maximize student learning (Cullen & Reback, 2006). Using 
standardized tests to hold schools accountable appears to be a simple idea, students attend 
schools in order to learn and tests show whether or not schools are meeting learning 
standards (Haertel & Herman, 2005).  Schools could be classified according to the level 
of students’ achievement so that parents can make informed decision about quality of 
schools, and the government can reward or punish teachers or school administrators 
based on an objective measurement of students’ learning.   
Advocates believe that the implementation of standardized tests will provide 
students, teachers and administrators an incentive to work harder as well as help identify 
struggling students and schools (Jacob, 2005).  However, accountability systems often set 
objectives for improvement that are “simply impossible to meet by legitimate means” 
(Madaus & Clarke, 2001). Under high-stakes, teachers or school administrators could be 
tempted to make inappropriate actions when there is overstated emphasis on a single 
indicator and their job, salary or future is defined by students’ performance in a 
standardized test (Nichols & Berliner, 2007).  
In this model, test scores are the single most important indicator of student and 
school success. This can be problematic, as Donald Campbell (1979) suggests “the more 
any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making, the more subject it 
will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social 
process it is indented to monitor” (D. Campbell, 1979). This idea, Campbell’s Law, has 
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been applied in education, particularly in the context where there is high stakes attached 
to an indicator, such as test score, to evaluate students, teachers and schools performance.  
According to this law, test scores are likely to show some degree of distortion or 
alteration (Madaus & Clarke, 2001).   
I use Campbell’s law to study the impact of using a standardized test, as a single 
indicator, to measure the quality of education under high-stakes accountability system in 
Chile. It asks the following questions: (1) are schools that participate in the high-stakes 
accountability program more likely to exclude low-performing students from the test-
taking pool in order to improve their overall scores on standardized tests? (2) How do the 
schools’ rankings based on standardized tests change if the students excluded from the 
test-taking pool were able to take the standardized test?  
I use Campbell’s Law to explore whether or not standardized tests show some 
degree of alteration under high-stakes accountability system in Chile and how extensive 
and meaningful could be the exclusion of low-performing students from the test-taking 
pool and what could its impact on schools’ ranking be. This study contributes to literature 
in this area because the majority of studies on Chile that explore the effects of test-based 
accountability systems have been focused on analyzing whether or not parents use 
information provided by standardized tests in their selection of schools (Carrasco & San 
Martin, 2011; F. Gallego & Hernando, 2009; A. Torche & Sapelli, 2002). However, there 
appears to be no academic work examining how schools use non-academic strategies to 
respond to the pressure of continuing improvement established by the standardized test-
based system. Particularly whether or not schools exclude low-performing students from 
test-taking pool and how this has an impact on the schools’ rankings. The findings of this 
study are central for the current debate in Chile about the implementation of high-stake 
accountability system as a way to improve the quality of the Chilean education. 
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Furthermore, the findings of this study are relevant because if use of standardized test 
measures suffer from problems of reliability, validity or fairness, educational policy 
decisions based upon these scores could be misguided (Cullen & Reback, 2006; Neal & 
Schanzenbach, 2010).  
In the Chilean case, I have found that after the implementation of the high-stakes 
accountability system, students with the lowest GPA are more likely to not take reading 
tests in the 4
th











 grades schools reduce their average scores in reading and in math after imputed 
values are used to recalculate schools’ mean scores. In fact, on average schools inflate 




 grade tests in 2012 and this meant 
that 104 schools that were previously classified as “insufficient” were able to move up to 
“intermediate” in 4
th
 grade in 2012.  
ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM IN EDUCATION 
As the introduction of neoliberal policies in education has gained popularity, test-
based accountability systems have been seen as a necessary condition for improving the 
quality of education. In the last decades policy efforts in the United States have been 
focused on implementing these types of programs (Chapman et al., 2000; Cullen & 
Reback, 2006; Figlio & Getzler, 2002; Hamilton et al., 2002; E. Hanushek & Raymond, 
2005; Jacob, 2007; Kim, 2004; Neal & Schanzenbach, 2010; Stecher & Barron, 2001). 
The assumption of advocates of the implementation of standardized-test based 
accountability system is that the mechanism of rewards and sanctions created by test-
based accountability systems will result in encouraging teachers and school 
administrators to improve at their jobs and maximize students learning. In line with this 
perspective, raising expectations and standards should promote better opportunities for 
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students and narrow the academic achievement gap between low and high performing 
students (Haertel & Herman, 2005). 
However, the empirical evidence of the impact of test-based accountability 
system is mixed, some studies have found that students improve their academic 
achievement (E. Hanushek & Raymond, 2005; Jacob, 2005; Neal & Schanzenbach, 
2010). Other research has found no impact or even negative consequences of its 
implementation (Brian & Levitt, 2003; Kane & Staiger, 2002; Stecher & Barron, 2001; 
Vasquez-Heilig & Darling-Hammond, 2008; Volante, 2007). Madaus & Clarke (2001) 
argue that test-based accountability systems could have diverse and even unintended 
negative consequences, but it is hard to evaluate how extensive these negative effects are 
and how they could impact schools and students (Stecher & Barron, 2001). For example, 
teachers and school administrators could have incentives to use non-academics strategies 
to ensure that the test scores give them favorable results (Brian & Levitt, 2003; Nichols & 
Berliner, 2007).  
This study will test Campbell’s law in the context of high-stakes accountability 
system in Chile and explores whether or not it is possible to observe some degrees of 
alterations or distortions under the new accountability system in Chile. Numerous studies 
have shown that high-stakes testing could artificially inflate  students’ academic 
achievement, particularly when the stakes are too high, teachers and school could have 
incentives to generate fraud or cheat (Heckman et al., 2002; Kane & Staiger, 2002). In 
fact, the findings indicate that school administrators and teachers, are inclined to create 
the appearance of the improvement of students’ scores on standardized tests by using a 
collection of non-academic practices and thus they game the system (Dworkin, 2005; 
Wall, 2000).  
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Non-academic strategies involve excluding low achieving students from the test-
pool, reclassifying them as special education students, and suspending or encouraging 
them to stay home during the testing window (Booher-Jennings, 2005; E. Hanushek & 
Raymond, 2005; Kane & Staiger, 2002). Under the test-based accountability system 
schools and teachers face high pressure to raise test scores and therefore it is logical for 
schools to leave some students, especially those who do not perform well, out of the test-
taking pool. And rather than to improve the overall achievement of all students, the main 
objective of the implementation of test-based accountability systems, schools and 
teachers could simply find diverse strategies to exclude the “weak” students from the 
test-taking pool (Hursh, 2007). If a student does not take reading, math or sciences test, 
his or her scores are reported as missing value, and this student’s scores do not count in 
calculating the school’s average. In some cases, if a student does not take either of the 
standardized tests his/her scores will not be reported as missing value; instead this student 
could be excluded entirely from the dataset.  
Figlio (2003) shows that during the testing window, low achieving students are 
most likely to receive longer suspensions than high performing students from similar 
violations, and students who received long suspension are much more likely to miss the 
standardized test (Figlio, 2003). Moreover, studies have shown that schools classify low 
achieving students as special education in order to exclude them from the test-taking pool 
(Figlio & Getzler, 2002; Haney, 2000; Jacob, 2005). Under an accountability-based 
system there are few incentives to advocate placing attention on those students who are 
already proficient or have a lower chance to pass the standardized test (Neal & 
Schanzenbach, 2010), and therefore teachers could pay more attention and spend more 
time on those students who are most likely to pass the standardized test (Booher-
Jennings, 2005; Dworkin, 2005; Hursh, 2007). Furthermore, schools and teachers could 
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react to the pressure to raise test score by decreasing time on subjects that are not part of 
or are less emphasized on the exams. Thus, students could spend more time working on 
math or reading problems  while reducing the time allotted to the sciences, history, arts, 
foreign languages or writing because they are not topics that will be tested. This can lead 
to narrowing and oversimplifying the curriculum (E. Baker et al., 2010; Carnoy et al., 
2000; Hamilton et al., 2002; Stecher & Barron, 2001; Winters et al., 2010).   
From low to high-stakes accountability systems 
The use of standardized tests has become an important part of the debate 
surrounding Chilean education, especially regarding whether teachers and schools 
administrators should be accountable for students’ scores on the SIMCE test. As Mizala 
and Urquiola (2007) point out above, the Chilean accountability system does not hold 
teachers or schools administrators accountable for students’ performance in standardized 
tests. However, the 2006 secondary student movement and 2011 university student strike 
created the conditions to change this. The student movement demanded the regulation of 
the market-driven Chilean educational system and the strengthening of public education. 
The uprising resulted in the resignation of two education ministers and a shift in the 
agenda of the Chilean Congress, which has now had to make educational reform its top 
priority (Goldman, 2012). As a respond to students and civil society to improve the 
quality of education, in 2011 the Chilean congress passed Law #20,529 that created two 
new institutions: Superintendency and Agency of education, the role of the 
superintendence of education is to supervise the administrators of the schools recognized 
by the Ministry of Education Act according to the norms and rules established by law. 
The Agency’s mission is to evaluate and orientate the educational system in order to 
improve its quality and equity. Moreover, the Agency must rank all schools in the system 
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according their students’ learning in standardized tests and other non cognitive indicators 
of quality of education (Mineduc, 2011)  Within this new accountability system those 
schools that cannot achieve the minimum requirements defined by the Agency of Quality 
of Education will face consequences, the most severe one it is the closure of schools. 
Thus, Chile has started a new type of educational reform centered in the use of 
mechanism of pressure and accountability to improve quality and equity of the system, 
which call for a high degree of technical sophistication and ethical consideration to 
implement the new requirements of pressure, control and surveillance (Carrasco & San 
Martin, 2012) 
The implementation of the Superintendency and the Agency of Quality of 
Education has not been without its critics. The strong emphasis that the reforms imposes 
in the use of standardized tests to classify, surveillance and penalize schools has 
particularly not been welcome in many sectors. The argument is that the SIMCE test 
stopped of being a standardized test to measure students’ learning and it became a central 
aspect of the educational system and it has established a harmful rationality (Avalos, 
Leyton, Soto, & Garcia-Huidobro, 2013). Chile shows an imbalance between the strong 
emphasis on standardized tests to make schools accountable, but little effort to use it as a 
learning process for teachers and principals to improve their job (Manzi, 2014). However, 
the director of the Agency of Quality of Education pointed out that the arguments against 
the implementation of the high stakes test were partial and insufficient due to there is not 
evidence regards to the negative impact of use of standardized test in Chile (Izquierdo, 
2013). In this term this study is relevant because shows empirical evidence of unintended 
consequences of the use of standardized test in Chile.   
 
 132 
METHODS AND DATA  
I use two different data sets about on Chile’s educational system to examine these 
questions. Since the data come from different surveys, grades, and years, the following 
section explains in more detail the information and sources contained in the data set: 
 (a) Sistema Nacional de Evaluación de Calidad de la Educación (Educational 
Quality Measurement System, SIMCE). As I explained previously in Chapter 3, SIMCE 
scores report the performance of schools in different subject areas (Math, Spanish, and 
Sciences) in comparison to previous years, other schools, and other grade levels within 
the same school. This research relies on data from the standardized SIMCE test applied to 
2nd, 4th and 8th grades from 2002 to 2013 (see table 5-1); the unit of analysis is student-
level. 
  




2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 
2
nd
        √ √ 
4
th
 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
8
th
    √   √  √ 
b) The second data source comes from the Department of Research of Chilean 
Ministry of Education, this is called student achievement (Rendimiento del Estudiante). 
The unit of analysis is individual, the dataset provides information on the student’s final 
GPA obtained, rate of attendance, and whether or not the student passed or failed his/her 
grade during the period 2002-2013. Furthermore, it provides a student identification 
number that can be use to merge with data from the National Assessment of Mathematics 
and Spanish Achievement  (Mineduc, 2013a). To ensure that the matches were correct, I 
merged SIMCE test and student achievement data using the unique id of school and a 
unique id of student and the student’s gender. Schools with fewer 6 students were 
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excluded because their error estimation is too high to draw a valid conclusions about 
schools (Mineduc, 2008). In addition, students in special education called “integrated 
students” were excluded from the sample because, in Chile, integrated students do not 
take standardized tests, but are recorded as missing values in the dataset for some years.  
Furthermore, for the year 2012 and 2013, the Chilean Ministry of Education 
reports on all students in the system whether or not they took test standardized, but from 
2002-2011 only students who at least take one of the standardized tests are reported, and 
therefore, I have to constrain the analysis only to those students who at least take one test 
in order to make valid estimations from 2002-2013.  
In order to explore whether or not schools use non-academic strategies to improve 
their performance on standardized tests, I used a logistic regression model with fixed 
effects at school levels from 2002 to 2013 for 2nd, 4th and 8th grades.  It is important to 
clarify that there is no data for 2nd grade before 2012, because testing of 2nd graders 
only began in that year.  
The dependent variable in the logistic regression is equal to 1 if the student 
missed the test and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are the student’s final grade in 
his/her class, rate of attendance, family income, father’s education, mother’s educat ion,  a 
lag variable of the school’s classification, and a dummy variable if schools participate in 
SEP program, a dummy variable for years, and a fixed effects at the school level. In Chile 
students with less than 85 percent of attendance or with GPA less than or equal to B- are 
most likely to fail their class. Table 5-2 shows the conversion between the Chilean GPA 





Table 5-2: Conversion from the Chilean GPA to US GPA 
Chilean GPA Grade Description US GPA Notes 
6.50 - 7.00 Very Good A  
6.00 - 6.49  A-  
5.50 - 5.99 Good B+  
5.00 - 5.49  B  
4.50 - 4.99  B-  
4.00 - 4.49 Sufficient C Lowest passing grade 
0.00 - 3.99 Insufficient F  
Source: http://www.classbase.com/Countries/Chile/Grading-System 
I run two different models for math and reading tests in 4th and 8th grade. The 
dependent variable is 1 if a given student within a given school did not take the 
standardized test and is 0 otherwise. Gender is scored as 1 for male students and 0 
otherwise. The student’s scores in reading or math test are separated into three dummy 
variables: “insufficient”, “intermediate”, and “advantaged.” The dummy variable for 
students who obtained “advanced” scores is excluded from the model, this outcome 
serving as the baseline. SEP school is a dummy variable equal 1 if school participates in 
the SEP program and 0 otherwise. The student’s annual attendance rate is divided into 
five dummy variables, and the dummy variable for the lowest annual attendance (less 
than 85 percent) is excluded from the analysis. The students’ GPA are separated into 5 
dummy variables, and the dummy variable for the lowest GPA (equivalent to an B-) is 
excluded from the analysis. The students’ family income is split into five dummy 
variables, and the dummy variable for the lowest family income (less than US $400 
monthly) is excluded from the analysis.  Fathers’ and mothers’ education is divided into 
three dummy variables: primary, secondary and college education. The dummy variable 
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for primary education is excluded from the analysis. The lagged variable of school 
classification is separated into three dummy variables: insufficient, intermediate and 
advanced. The dummy variable for schools ranked as “advanced” is excluded from the 
analysis.  
I created an interaction term between schools that participate in the high-stakes 
program (SEP schools) and low-performing students. In this sense, I evaluate whether 
SEP schools, after participating in the high-stakes accountability program, were more 
likely to exclude low-achievement students from the test-taking pool. Furthermore, I 
created a term to measure the interaction between schools that are classified as 
“insufficient” and low-performing students. Thus, I evaluate whether schools that exhibit 
low performance on SIMCE tests have higher incentives than “advanced” schools to 
exclude low-achievement students from the test-taking pool in order to artificially 
increase their scores on standardized tests. 
Finally, I will work on multiple imputation models in order to estimate the 
missing values present on the reading and math tests. The Chilean government ranks 
schools according to different levels of achievement on reading and math tests and I will 
use the values imputed, previously excluded, to recalculate the classification of schools 
and explore whether or not it is possible to observe any difference after the imputed 
values are included. The missing values on the reading and math tests are assumed to be 
Missing At Random (MAR). This means that the missing values of Y, in this case 
reading and math, is unrelated to the value of Y itself, after controlling for other variables 
in the analysis (Allison, 2002).  As a consequence, this study assumes that the missing 
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values of test scores are not related to the values of test scores by themselves, instead the 
missing values are linked to the final grade obtained by the students in their courses, their 
attendance rate, and family’s and schools’ characteristics. In order to impute the missing 
values on the reading and math tests I used SAS’s Multiple Imputation (MI) routine. 
When this approach is used, it correctly produces estimates that are consistent and 
asymptotically normal when the data are MAR (Allison, 2002).  
Since students are nested within schools, I imputed the data using a panel data set. 
One strategy to impute the missing values at student level is to create dummies variables 
for each school, but since in some cases the number of students per school is small, 
imputing student variables with school dummies can overfit the data. As a consequence, 
since there are no missing values at the school level, I impute student variables with 
school-level variables, including means of student variables. I use separated models to 
impute missing data in the 2nd, 4
th



















Table 5-3: Variables Used in The Multiple Imputation Models 
 Label Measured 
Mathematics  Math Continuous variable 
Reading Reading Continuous variable 
Sciences  Sciences Continuous variable 
Student level    
Gender  Gender 1 = men 0 = woman  
GPA GPA Dummy variables for 5 categories  
Attendance rate Attendance Dummy variables for 5 categories  
Family level   
Family Income Income Dummy variables for 5 categories: 
Monthly income in US dollars 
Less $400 / $401-1,000 / $1,001-2,000 /$ 
2,001-2,300 / More than $2,300 
Father Education fedu Dummy variables for 3 categories: 
Primary, secondary and college education 
Mother Education medu Dummy variables for 3 categories: 
Primary, secondary and college education 
School level    
Average of students’ GPA  avgrades Mean of GPA at school level 
Average of students’ 
attendance 
avattendance Mean of percentages at school level 
Year years Dummy variables for each year  
RESULTS  
In this section, I present the findings of two analyses. The first section explores if 
SEP schools increase the likelihood of excluding low-performing students from the test-
taking pool after the implementation of the high-stakes accountability program. The 
second part examines the significance of the impact of the exclusion of the low-achieving 
students from the test-taking pool on the schools’ ranking.   
Using a logistic regression model with fixed effectss at the school level, and after 
controlling for student attendance rates, as well as their family and school characteristics, 
I found that low-performing students in 4th grade are more likely not to take the reading 
test than their peers who receive a final GPA of A when their school participates in the 
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SEP program. For example, when schools participate in the high-stakes accountability 
program (SEP), students who obtained a GPA of B- or less were 25.2 percent more likely 
to not have taken the reading test in 4th grade when compared to schools that do not 
participate in the SEP program and their peers who had finished the academic year with a 
GPA of A. The interaction term is not statistically significant in 8th grade. Furthermore, 
if a school was classified as “insufficient” during the previous year, 4th grade students 
with GPA of B- or less were more than 8 percent more likely to have not taken the 
reading test in comparison to students from “advanced” schools. Nevertheless, the 
interaction term is not statistically significant. 
As family income increased, 4th grade students became more likely to have taken 
the reading test, but the coefficients are not statistically significant in 8th grade. For 
example, a 4th grade student from a family with a monthly income of $2,300 or higher 
was 18 percent less likely to miss the reading test than a student from a family with the 
lowest level of income.  Furthermore, the overall coefficients for the mother's and father's 
education are not statistically significant in 4th and 8th grade. Table 5-4 shows the results 










Table 5-4: Logistic Regression Model with Fixed Effects at School Level (Odds Ratios) 






Student's attendance rate 
  85-90% 0.7580*** 0.6107*** 
90-95% 0.6316*** 0.4448*** 
95-100% 0.4278*** 0.2774*** 
Student's GPA    
                                    B 0.8206*** 0.7503*** 
 B+ 0.6458*** 0.6714*** 
                                    A- 0.5156*** 0.5844*** 
 A+ 0.4249*** 0.4873*** 
Income of family   
US 401-1,000 0.8988*** 0.955 
US $ 1,001-2,000 0.8464*** 0.8422** 
US $ 2001-2,300 0.7589*** 0.8676 
More than US $ 2,300 0.8202** 0.8386 
Father Education   
Secondary 0.9586 1.0094 
College 0.9772 1.017 
Mother Education   
Secondary 1.0559** 0.9949 
College 1.0497 1.0301 
Year   
2002 Baseline  
2005 0.8964**  
2006 0.8196***  
2007 1.1249** Baseline 
2008* 1.1315**  
2010 1.0111  
2011 1.2187*** 0.8999 
2012 1.6288***  
2013 1.4681*** 1.2031** 
Interaction terms   
Sch. “insufficient” x low-achievement student 1.0818 1.0002 
School classified as “insufficient” 1.0837** 0.8904* 
SEP school x low-achievement student 1.2522*** 1.0104 
SEP school 0.9878 1.0157 
Number of students 1,318,206 304,606 
    Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
   * Implementation of SEP program  
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In relation to the variable year, it is possible to observe an upward trend in the 





grades. For example, in 4
th
 grade, the odds of a student being excluded from the reading 
test-taking pool decreases by 11 percent in 2005 in relation to 2002 (baseline), but the 
odds increase by 46 percent in 2013 in relation to 2002.   
In brief, based on the results of the logistic regression there is evidence that since 
schools participating in the SEP program are more likely to exclude low-achieving 
students from the reading test 4th grade. However, I have not found evidence of a 
relationship between SEP schools and the exclusion of low-performing students in 
reading test in the 8th grade.  
The relationship between low-performing students, SEP schools, and exclusion 
from the test-taking pool on the standardized math test is shown in Table 5-5. Similar to 





 grade were more likely to be excluded from the math test after the implementation of 
the high-stakes accountability program. For example, schools that participate in the SEP 
program increase their likelihood of excluding low-achievement students from the math 
test by 25.2 percent in 4
th
 grade and 53.3 percent in 8
th
 grade. Both coefficients are 













Table 5-5: Logistic Regression Model with Fixed Effects at School Level (Odds Ratios) 
for Missing Values in Math Test 
 4th grade 8th grade 
Student's attendance rate   
85-90% 0.8726*** 0.7970** 
90-95% 0.7500*** 0.6527*** 
95-100% 0.6417*** 0.5124*** 
Student's GPA   
B 0.7521*** 0.8525 
 B+ 0.5279*** 0.7214* 
A- 0.4112*** 0.5898*** 
A+ 0.3025*** 0.4279*** 
Income of family   
US 401-1,000 0.9421 0.8595** 
US $ 1,001-2,000 0.939 0.8872 
US $ 2001-2,300 0.7596** 0.5975** 
More than US $ 2,300 1.0369 0.6307** 
Father Education   
Secondary 0.9944 1.044 
College 1.0102 1.1211 
Mother Education   
Secondary 1.0052 1.0347 
College 1.0383 1.1563 
Year   
2002 Baseline  
2005 0.6863***  
2006 0.4559***  
2007 0.7471*** Baseline 
2008* 0.7838***  
2010 0.7491***  
2011 1.0497 1.4379** 
2012 1.5135***  
2013 0.8943 1.6368*** 
Interaction terms   
Sch. “insufficient” x low-achievement student 1.0845 0.9565 
School classified as “insufficient” 1.1005* 0.8915 
SEP school x low-achievement student 1.3322*** 1.5337*** 
SEP school 0.9343 0.7110* 
Number of students   933,269  131,398 
    Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
   * Implementation of SEP program  
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The analysis shows that as students’ family income increases students reduce the 




 grade, but only 
one of these coefficients is statistically significant at the .05 alpha level in 4
th
 grade.  
Moreover, as father’s education increases, the predicted odds of students do not 
take the math test decrease, but none of the coefficients are statistically significant. The 
same case for mother’s education, as mother increases their education level the predicted 
odds of student missing math test decrease, but none of the coefficients are statistically 




 grade. In sum, there is evidence that schools 
that participate in the high-states accountability program (SEP program) increase the 





 grade.  
Finally, GPA seems to be more relevant during early levels of primary education 
than later ones in determining which students do or do not take the reading test. I 
hypothesize that this is due to the fact that as low-performing students progress, schools 
employ different mechanisms to exclude underperforming students from the test-taking 
pool. For example, schools might classify students in special education programs to 
exempt them from taking the test; they could drop out, or receive disciplinary sanctions 
during the test-taking windows. 
The second research question asks whether or not the schools’ rankings would 
change if the students excluded from the test-taking pool would be able to take the 
standardized test. To address this question, I use multiple imputation models in order to 
estimate the missing values in math and reading and recalculate the schools’ rankings 
based on the SIMCE test. The results shows that in a reading test for 2
nd
 grade, schools’ 
means decline on average 1.42 points in 2012 and 1.32 points in 2013, when imputed 
values are included in the calculation. 
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The national average for reading scores for 2
nd
 graders on the SIMCE exams, 
decreases from 252.7 points to 251.3 in 2012 and from 254.2 to 252.9 in 2013 after 
imputed values are included in the model.  As we observe in figure 5-1, the distribution 
of scores on the reading test move to the left, which means that the overall average of 
schools’ performance on the reading test decreases for the 2
nd
 grade when imputed 
values, most of them low-performing students, are included in the school’s mean. This 
shift to the left has implications in terms of how schools are classified by the government, 
which would impact the funding or technical support that they could receive from the 
Ministry of Education. 
 
Figure 5-1: The Schools’ Average Reading Scores Using Imputed and Non-Imputed 
Values in the 2
nd
 Grade 2012   
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Simce 2012 
 The differences between imputed and non-imputed data increase when schools 
that participate in the SEP program are compared. For example, at the national level, 



























decline 1.3 points and scores go down to 1.6 points when the mean of SEP schools is 
calculated using imputed data. These differences are shown in Figure 5-2. 
 
Figure 5-2: Schools’ Mean on Reading Test Using Imputed and Non-Imputed Data in 2
nd
 
Grade in 2013. 
 
                     Source: Author’s calculation based on Simce 2013 
In contrast to the 2
nd
 grade, in 4th grade schools can be classified into three levels 
based on their average scores, if a school obtains an average score less than 241 points on 
the reading test, it is classified as “insufficient.” If a school falls into the range of 242-280 
points, it is defined as “intermediate,” and if the school’s mean on the reading test is more 
than 281 it is classified as “advanced.” In the case of math scores, schools are defined as 
“insufficient” if their mean score in math is equal to or less than 232 points, 
“intermediate” if their mean falls in the range of 241-283 points and finally schools are 
defined as “advanced” if their mean scores in math is greater or equal to 284 points 
(Mineduc, 2007a). In this sense, a school could be classified as “insufficient” in math and 
“advanced” in reading; this is because reading and math tests have different thresholds to 

























I used the categories elaborated for 4th grade in reading and math scores to 
classify schools, and as table 5-6 shows after imputed values are used to recalculate 
schools’ averages in reading, the percentage of schools classified as “insufficient” 
increases 1.2 percent, those defined as “intermediate” increase 1.4 percent as well as 
school classified as “advanced” declines by 2.4 percent.   
 
Table 5-6: Classification of Schools Based on Reading Scores at the 4
nd
 Grade Level in 
2012 
Type of schools Imputed values Non-Imputed 
Insufficient 17.0% 15.8% 
Intermediate 58.2% 56.8% 
Advanced 24.9% 27.3% 
In fact, in 2012 the number of schools that move down from “intermediate” to 
“insufficient” after using the imputed data was 104 schools, and 83 schools changed their 
classification from “advanced” to “intermediate.” This is a small number compared with 
the total number of the schools in the system in 4
th
 grade, which were 5,689 schools in 
2012. But it shows that if schools are willing to exclude low-performing students from 
reading tests can improve their classification in the Chilean system.   
Figure 5-3 shows the difference between schools’ mean reading scores, between 
non-imputed data and the multiple imputed data, increase when a school is classified the 
previous year as “insufficient” and also when schools are participating in the SEP 
program. For example, in 2013, using all schools (national level), the difference between 
imputed and non-imputed data in relation to the schools’ mean on the reading test was 
0.75 points. For those schools that participate in the high-stakes accountability program, 
the difference increased to 0.85 points, and finally when schools are classified as 
“insufficient” in the previous year, the difference between non-imputed and imputed data 
increased to 1.13 points on the reading test.   
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Figure 5-3: Schools’ Mean Reading Test Using Imputed and Non-Imputed Data in 
4th Grade in 2013. 
 
              Source: Author’s calculation based on Simce 2013 
Math tests follow the same pattern as the reading tests in that the differences 
between imputed and non-imputed data are used to calculate schools’ mean for those 
schools that participate in high-stake accountability program or were classified as 
“insufficient” the previous year. For example, in 2013, at the national level, the 
difference in schools’ mean on the math test was 0.82 points. The difference increased to 
0.97 points for SEP schools and for those schools classified as “insufficient,” the imputed 
data is 1.24 points lower than for non-imputed data.  
The Chilean Ministry of Education classifies schools in 8th grade using similar 
categories to those used in the 4th grade, but different thresholds are used to determine 
the schools’ classification. Thus, if a school obtains on average less than 235 points in 
reading or 276 points in math, this school is classified as “insufficient.”  If a school falls 
in the range of scoring 235-285 points on reading test or 276-320 points on the math test 
it is classified as “intermediate.” Finally, a school is defined as “advanced” if its average 
































I used the categories elaborated for 8th grade in reading and math scores to 
classify schools, and as table 5-7 shows after imputed values are used to recalculate 
schools’ averages in reading. The percentage of schools classified as “insufficient” 
increases 1.1 percent, those defined as “intermediate” decrease 0.9 percent as well as 
school classified as “advanced” declines by 0.3 percent.   
 
Table 5-7: Classification of Schools Based on Reading Scores at the 8
nd
 Grade Level in 
2013 
 
Type of schools Imputed values Non-Imputed 
Insufficient 29.5% 28.4% 
Intermediate 61.4% 62.3% 
Advanced 9.0% 9.3% 
The number of schools that changed their status from “intermediate” to 
“insufficient” was 65 schools, and 15 schools that were “advanced” change to 
“intermediate” after imputed values were used to calculate schools’ mean on the reading 
test.  
Figure 5-4 shows the difference between schools’ mean reading scores between 
the original data and the multiple imputed data. The data for 2013 at the national level on 
the reading test shows that the schools’ mean the reading test decreases 0.6 points when 
imputed data are used. Furthermore, for those schools that participate in the high-stakes 
accountability program, the schools’ mean the reading test declined 0.72 points when 
imputed data was used. And finally, among schools that are classified as “insufficient,” 
their reading scores decline 1 point when the imputed values of students who did take the 




Figure 5-4: Schools’ Mean on Reading Test Using Imputed and Non-Imputed Data in 8
th
 
Grade in 2013. 
 
 
         Source: Author’s calculation based on Simce 2013 
In relation to the math test, when the imputed values of those students who did not 
take the math test are used to recalculate schools’ classification, the results are the 
following. At the national level, the schools’ average on the math test decreased 0.6 
points when imputed data are used. This means that if those students excluded from the 
test-taking pool are included, national scores in math decline. Moreover, for those 
schools that participate in the SEP program, the schools’ mean on the math test was 0.7 
points lower using imputed data. When schools are classified as “insufficient,” their math 






































This research tests Campbell’s law to study the impact of using a standardized 
test, as a single indicator, to measure the quality of education. As Donald Campbell 
(1979) suggests  “the more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-
making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to 
distort and corrupt the social process it is indented to monitor” (D. Campbell, 1979).  
Various studies have explored the negative impact of test-based accountability 
systems under high-stakes accountability systems, and even though the findings are not 
conclusive, their results show that high-stakes testing could have diverse and even 
unintended negative consequences, even though it is hard to evaluate how extensive these 
negative effects are and how they could impact schools and students (Stecher & Barron, 
2001).  I test the Campbell’s law to explore whether or not standardized tests show some 
degree of distortion or alteration after the implementation of the high-stakes 
accountability system in Chile in 2008 and how extensive and meaningful could be these 
unintended consequences for schools and students.  
I have shown that even when standardized tests and their results are mainly 
employed to help inform parents about school quality, and they have no direct 
consequences for teachers or school administrators, it possible to observe some degree of 
alteration or distortion. I found that low-performing students after the implementation of 
the SEP program were more likely to be excluded from taking the reading tests in 4th 
grade and in math tests in 4th and 8th grade. I argue that students’ GPA play a more 
important role as a mechanism for identifying low-performing students at lower grades 
than in higher ones.  I hypothesized that this is due to that as low-performing students’ 
progress through school, there are different mechanisms used by schools to exclude low-
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performing students. For example, low-performing students might be classified in special 
education, they could drop out or receive disciplinary sanctions during the test-taking 
windows, but these strategies are more difficult to use these non-academic strategies 
when students are just starting in the system.  
Furthermore, I found evidence that in 2nd, 4th and 8th grades, schools would 
reduce their average scores in reading and in math after imputed values are used to 
recalculate schools’ mean scores. For example, on the 2013 reading test, on average 
schools inflate their performance by 1.3 points in the 2nd grade, by 0.7 points in the 4th 
grade, and by 0.6 points in the 8th grade. Furthermore, using the imputed values, the 
percentage of schools classified by the Ministry of Education as “advanced” and 
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Chapter 6:  Conclusions  
This dissertation has evaluated the macro-level impacts of market-oriented 
reforms in education in Chile. In particular, it has examined the intended and unintended 
consequences of the introduction of competition and the high-stakes accountability 
system to the Chilean educational system.  
Influenced by Milton Friedman and under the military regime of Augusto 
Pinochet, Chile implemented a universal voucher educational voucher program in 1981. 
The new system was set up under the premise that the role of the state in education 
should be reduced and that the government monopoly would be replaced by free market 
competitors. The democratic government took office in 1990, and even though it was in 
disagreement with a number of military regime’s educational policies, it did not introduce 
any substantive changes to the model. In fact, in 1981 private-voucher schools enrolled 
15.1 percent of total students in primary and secondary education and in 2013, more than 
half of students (55 percent) attended private-voucher schools. Furthermore, as part of the 
neoliberal agenda the Chilean government implemented in 2008, a high-stakes 
accountability program was seen as a way to make schools responsible for student 
performance on standardized tests. It assumed that more pressure would create better 
results and therefore improve the overall quality of education. In this sense, Chile is a 
unique case because it has implemented the full platform of market-oriented reform, 
which includes competition, free choice, and the high-stakes accountability system. The 
question that arises is the following: What are the macro-level outcomes of these 
policies? One of the major problems in studying the impact of market-oriented policy in 
education is the lack of data. In this sense, Chile offers major advantages in studying the 
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impact of neoliberal policies because the government has built an extensive database 
tracking student performance (Carnoy & McEwan, 2000).  
This dissertation studies the impact of competition and the accountability system 
in Chile. I use three objectives to do so. The first objective studies the intended and 
unintended consequences of the introduction of competition on student achievement. The 
second objective is focused on the intended consequences of the implementation of the 
high-stakes program, and in particular whether teachers are responding to the new 
accountability system by increasing their use of academic strategies; for example, how 
teachers are working harder, more, and finding better teaching methods to improve 
student leaning to improve the school’s ranking. The third objective explores the 
unintended consequences of the new accountability program, specifically, it studies how 
teachers are increasing their use of non-academic strategies, such as the exclusion of low-
achievement students, as a way to improve school performance on standardize tests.   
I used qualitative and quantitative methods to explore these objectives. In the next 
section, I present the major findings of this study, summarized by chapters, and then the 
policy implications of this study are laid out. Finally, the limitations of the study and 
future research possibilities are described.  
MAJOR FINDINGS 
Chapter 3 analyzes the impact of competition on student achievement and how 
private-voucher schools can have a different impact depending where they are located. 
One of the main problems in estimating the causal relationship between competition and 
student achievement is endogeneity between these variables. For example, if a 
municipality provides a bad quality of education, private-voucher schools could have 
incentives to open and compete with public schools. Therefore, by using a traditional 
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regression model, researchers could erroneously conclude that an increase in competition 
has a negative effect on students achievement. By contrast, if a municipality has high 
quality education and private-voucher schools open to compete with public schools, 
researchers could find that competition has a positive effect on student achievement. In 
order to address this issue, the most recent studies in Chile have used instrumental 
variables on two-stage least square models (Auguste & Valenzuela, 2004; Gallego, 2002; 
Hsieh & Urquiola, 2003). However, none of these studies have been published in peer 
reviewed journals and the use of the instrumental variable has been criticized by Chilean 
scholars (Bellei, 2007). Instead, by using a longitudinal dataset, I am able to run 
regression models with fixed effects at the municipal level, which means that each 
municipality is compared with itself through time and the endogeneity problem is 
addressed by using this type of model. 
The regression model shows that competition has a negative effect on student 
performance on the standardized test at a national level, but in the metropolitan region – 
where Santiago city is located – competition has a positive impact on student 
performance. Using research questions, I will present in more detail the main findings of 
Chapter 3.  
How does competition affect student achievement? At the national level, the 
relationship between competition and student achievement from 2002 to 2013 is negative. 
For example, for a one percent increase in competition, student achievement decreases by 
0.06 points on the reading test and 0.08 points on the math test. Both coefficients are 
statistically significant, but the effect is small compared with the standard deviation of the 
SIMCE tests, which is 50 points. However, this result is opposite of that which advocates 
of market-oriented policy have argued, which from a neoliberal perspective have 
suggested that the whole system would benefit from increased competition in education, 
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as schools would have incentives to improve their performance in order to attract students 
and, therefore, the quality of education would dramatically improve if parents were 
allowed to choose freely between those schools (Hsieh & Urquiola, 2003). 
Moreover, one of the main assumptions of market-oriented reform in education is 
that if parents could exercise their free choice, they would choose the best schools for 
their children and, therefore, that schools would be forced to improve their quality of 
education in order to enroll students. However, using the information from the 
questionnaires from parents with students in 4
th
 grade, I found that parents identified the 
most relevant variable in choosing a school for their children to be “school proximity” 
rather than “quality of education” or “results on the SIMCE test.” Furthermore, “school 
proximity” becomes more relevant as the socioeconomic status of families decrease. 
Moreover, private-voucher schools have a mechanism by which they select their student 
body according to the socioeconomic status of families, and also based on students’ 
cognitive abilities. In fact, even though it a 2008 prohibited schools that participate in the 
high-stakes accountability from selecting their student body, though information on 
obtained by questionnaires taken by parents with children in 4
th
 grade in 2012 that 34.4 
percent of the parents whose children attend SEP schools indicated that their children 
went through a selection process before they were admitted to their current school.  
One of the most observable outcomes of the introduction of free choice and 
competition in Chile has been socioeconomic segregation of the system: poor students 
attend public schools, while the middle class send their children to privative voucher 
schools and the wealthiest families enroll their children in private paid schools. As 
critical theory has pointed out, if the introduction of competition and free choice could 
have any positive impact in the quality of education, this effect will be “cancelled out” by 
an increase in the socioeconomic segregation of the educational system. 
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The second research question in this chapter asks: Does competition have similar 
effects on those students who are educated in the capital city as those educated outside of 
it? In order to answer this question, I explore the diverse impact of competition on two 
different regions that have experienced a similar degree of competition, but that display 
dissimilar socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. I compare the metropolitan 
region, where the capital city is located and the area that is the wealthiest in Chile, versus 
the Araucanía region, which is the poorest region with the highest percentage of the 
population being indigenous and rural.  
In relation to the metropolitan area of Santiago, competition has had a positive 
impact on student achievement. For example, when the percentage of students enrolled in 
private-voucher schools increases by one percent in 4
th
 grade, student scores on reading 
increase by 0.1 points and by 0.15 points on the math test, with both coefficients being 
statistically significant, in contrast, competition has a negative effect in the Araucanía 
region, where if the percentage of students in 4
th
 grade that enroll in private-voucher 
schools increases by one percent,  reading scores decrease by 0.23 points and by 0.27 
points on the math test. Both coefficients are statistically significant.  
 I argue that the negative impact of competition in the Araucanía region is due to 
the negative externalities generated by the financial system for rural schools, which 
creates incentives for the private sector to open small private-voucher schools in rural 
areas. Their main goal in doing so is to capture additional funding offered by the Chilean 
government to small rural schools. As a result, the number of private-voucher schools, 
and competition, has increased in rural areas. The quality of education, however, has not. 
 Finally, the findings of this chapter provide evidence that in the urban districts, 
where families are economically more advantaged than the rest of the country, 
competition might have a positive effect on student achievement. In contrast, in those 
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regions that are more disadvantaged, such as the Araucanía region, competition and free 
choice do not improve the overall quality of education. In summary, this chapter offers 
empirical evidence that runs contrary to assumptions made by advocates of market-
oriented reform in education, those who hypothesized that the breakdown of the 
government’s educational monopoly and the introduction of competition and free choice 
in the system would improve the overall quality of the system in the long run. Instead, the 
introduction of the private-voucher schools only reproduces the differences already 
existing in the country. 
Chapter 4 analyzes the use of academic strategies after the implementation of the 
high-stakes accountability program. Academic strategies are the expected responses of 
teachers under an accountability program with the goal of improving students learning 
and, as a consequence, student performance on standardized tests. The chapter follows 
the typology developed by Daniel Koretz regarding teacher responses under the high-
stakes accountability system. Academic strategies established by Koretz include (a) 
teachers work more effectively: for example, they find better methods of teaching, (b) 
teachers teach more: teachers spend more time overall in school, and (c) teachers work 
harder: for example, they give more homework or harder assignments to their students 
(Koretz, 2008). Academic strategies are relevant and expected to be implemented by 
teachers and schools because they produce higher levels of achievement on substantive 
areas of the test and an unambiguously meaningful gain in scores (Koretz & McCaffrey, 
2001). In the current literature in Chile, it is not possible to quantify how extensive the 
use of academic strategies is under the high-stakes program implemented in 2008. In this 
sense, the findings of this chapter are relevant.  
I will present the findings of this chapter following the next research questions:  
after the implementation of the high-stakes accountability in Chile in 2008, have teachers 
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increased the use of academic strategies as a way to improve students’ performance on 
standardized tests? The first type of academic strategy that is expected is that teachers 
will work more effectively. The analysis of teacher questionnaires show that  teachers 
working in schools that participate in the high-stakes program (SEP schools) versus those 
that are not participating (non-SEP schools) show a very similar pattern in terms of 
feedback that teachers are giving to their students and the type of evaluations that 
teachers are using. Furthermore, with relation to teaching methods, teacher questionnaires 
show that teachers who work in SEP schools have decreased their use of methods focused 
on individual and group work with their students and that SEP schools are not using clear 
or special teaching methods. I argue that this is because there is no clear guideline in SEP 
schools about which teaching methods should be used by teachers to improve student 
learning. Schools are more focused on improving their performance in SIMCE tests, 
rather than on improving students’ cognitive abilities.  
A second type of expected academic strategy is that teachers from SEP schools 
would simply teach more, spending more overall time with their students. I tested this 
assumption, using data about the average time that teachers spent preparing their classes 
before and after the implementation of SEP program. Teacher questionnaires show that 
from 2006 to 2010, teachers from SEP schools increased their preparation time by 1.79 
hours, which follows the expected direction, but non-SEP schools also showed an 
average increase of 1.87 hours after the implementation the accountability system.  This 
result presents empirical evidence that the expected response of “teaching more” under 
the pressures imposed by high-stakes accountability program is on its own responsible for 
increasing the time that teachers spend with their students or preparing their classes.  
A third type of academic strategy is that teachers would work harder, giving more 
homework or harder assignments to their students under the high-stakes accountability 
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system. The results show that from 2011 to 2013, the percentage of teachers that reported 
to “always” give homework to their students was the same (2.2percent), but responses 
from teachers at non-SEP schools increased from 3.7 to 5.1 percent in the same period. 
Using data gathered before the implementation of the high-stakes accountability system, 
the percent of teachers from SEP schools that reported to “never” give homework to their 
students increased 10 percent from 2002 to 2013, while non-SEP schools showed an 
upward trend of 5.1 percent in the same period. In brief, these findings go against the 
actions expected of teachers under a high-stakes accountability program, as SEP schools 
have not seen an increase in the percentage of teachers that report to “always” give 
homework, while those who reported to “never” give homework to their students 
increased more for SEP school than for non-SEP schools in the period between 2002 and 
2013.  
The second research question of this chapter asks what the difficulties and 
constraints are that the Chilean educational system imposes on teachers and schools 
administrators in order to increase their use of academic strategies under the high-stakes 
accountability system. Based on content analysis of the semi-structured interviews, I 
argue that one of the main limitations that SEP schools face in improving their use of 
academic strategies is the leadership of principals, the quality of teachers, and the 
technical support that SEP schools receive. In relation to teacher training, for example, 
around 13 percent of teachers from SEP schools have been educated under special 
programs that represent the lowest levels of quality in the system (Ruffinelli & Rojas, 
2007). In addition, the frequent rotation of teacher –as reported in the interviews – would 
not allow schools to develop educational projects in the long run while a lack a leadership 
among principals meant that resources were not used to promote educational projects at 
their schools. These factors, combined with the need to produce results, push teachers and 
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school administrators to seek strategies that produce results in the short run and that can 
be easily implemented; academic strategies do not offer these same characteristics. 
In sum, Chapter 4 shows that teachers from SEP schools are not responding in the 
way that advocates of market-oriented policies have argued that teachers would. This 
means that there is empirical evidence that teachers from SEP schools are not increasing 
their use of academic strategies to improve student learning. Instead, the teacher 
questionnaires and the interviews offer evidence that SEP schools are shifting resources, 
including time, to emphasize the subjects and type of questions present on the test 
(reallocation), matching the curriculum more closely to the material covered on the test 
(alignment), or training students to take the standardized tests (coaching). SEP schools 
are under a lot of pressure to produce better results on standardized tests and the use of 
reallocation, alignment, and coaching seems to be more attractive than academic 
strategies while bringing them better results in the short term.  
Chapter 5 explores the unintended consequences of the implementation of the 
high-stakes accountability system in 2008. In particular, I evaluate if teachers who work 
in SEP schools react to pressure intended to produce better results on standardized tests 
by using non-academics strategies – for example, excluding low-achieving students from 
the test-taking pool.  This chapter addresses two main research questions, the first one 
asks: are schools, after participating in the high-stakes accountability program, more 
likely to exclude low-performing students from the test-taking pool in order to improve 
their overall scores on standardized tests? To answer this question I ran a logistic 
regression model with fixed effects at the school level, with an interaction term to 
measure the relationship between schools that participate in the high-stakes program 
(SEP schools) and low-performing students. In 4
th
 grade, the results show that after the 
implementation of the SEP program, low-achievement students are 27.3 percent more 
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likely to be excluded from the reading test and 35.7 percent more likely to be excluded 
from the math test when their schools participate in the high-stakes program. Both 
coefficients are statistically significant. In the case of 8
th
 grade, the logistic regression 
model shows that low-achievement students are 53.3 percent more likely to be excluded 
from the math test after their school begins to participate in the SEP program. The 
coefficient for the reading test is not statistically significant.  
The second research question asks, how would the schools’ rankings based on the 
standardized tests change students excluded from the test-taking pool were able to take 
the standardized test? To address this question, I use multiple imputation models in order 
to estimate the missing values in math and reading and recalculate the schools’ rankings 
based on the SIMCE test. The results shows that in 2012, at the 2nd grade level, the 
schools’ mean decreases on average by 1.42 points on the reading test when imputed 
values are included in the calculation. Furthermore, in 4th grade in 2012, the schools’ 
means declines on average by 1.22 points on reading and 1.36 points on math when the 
imputed values of those students who did not take the standardized tests are included. 





grades, the percentage of schools classified as “insufficient” increased while schools 
ranked as “intermediate” and the percentage of schools classified as “advanced” 
decreased. 
In summary, this chapter shows that after the implementation of the high-stakes 
accountability program, or SEP program, the likelihood that low-performing students 




 grades. Moreover, 
when the missing values from those students who did not take the reading or math tests 
are imputed and used to recalculate schools’ mean in reading and math tests, the overall 
performance of the school goes down, the number of schools classified as “insufficient” 
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increase, and the number of schools ranked as “advanced” decline. There are issues of 
generalization in how standardized tests results are reported that could skew the 
evaluation of certain groups of students. This is the case, for example, with students from 
low-income families or racial minority groups. Chile could be underestimating the needs 
of certain groups because policy-makers are using biased information in the decision 
making process.  
POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
This study has been able to quantify the negative impact that competition has on 
student achievement at the national level: the effect is small but statistically significant, 
while teacher responses under the high-stakes program include a combination of 
academic and non-academic strategies.  Several policy implications can stem from these 
results and they can be summarized as needs in the follow areas:  (a) the strengthening of 
public education (b) improved teacher and principal training, and (c) the use standardized 
tests.  
(a) The strengthening of public education 
The implementation of private-voucher schools introduces competition in the 
system, but the actors don’t compete under the same conditions. On one hand, private-
voucher schools have been able to select their student body using mechanisms such as a 
selection test, interviews with parents, or by increasing school tuition. As a consequence, 
private-voucher schools are in an advantaged position to compete against public schools, 
because they can choose the type of student they want. Instead, public schools must admit 
all students. They cannot select their students and public schools are not able to charge 
additional tuition to parents. As a result, public schools are mostly attended by students 
from low-income families, and they have the reputation of being the worst schools in the 
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system. This has had an important effect on enrollment in public schools; in fact, from 
2000 to 2013, public schools have seen a decrease in the percentage of students enrolling 
for primary and secondary education, from 54.6 percent in 2000 to 37.5 percent in 2013. 
In January, 2015 the government approved an important law that prohibited any 
school that receives public funding from selecting students under any criteria while 
mandating that private-voucher schools be non-profit organizations. This law moves in 
the right direction, attempting to create a more even playing field in which public schools 
would compete against private-voucher schools. But a similar restriction was 
implemented in 2006 after the “penguin revolution,” when schools were banned from 
selected students in elementary school. And as of 2008, schools that voluntary participate 
in the high-stakes program (SEP program) were no longer allowed to select students. 
However, from the questionnaire answered by parents with 4
th
 grade children in 2012, I 
found that 34.3 percent of parents whose children attended SEP schools reported that 
their children went through a selection process before they were admitted to their schools. 
In this sense, the capacity of current institutions to supervise new rules and apply 
sanctions when they are violated is relevant. Otherwise, public schools could continue to 
lose enrollment and eventually they would disappear from the system, despite regulations 
that are intended to protect them from unfair competition with private-voucher schools.  
Moreover, public schools are administrated by municipalities, and there are 
important differences among them in terms of available economic and human resources. 
For example, the departments of education of municipalities located in the capital city or 
in big urban sectors have more money and better human resources than those 
municipalities located in poor or less urban communities. In this sense, public schools 
also face an additional constraint in competing with private-vouchers schools, as they 
don’t receive sufficient technical support from their municipalities that would allow them 
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to improve student learning. Instead, most of the municipalities are focused on the 
financial administration of public schools rather than the technical support offered to 
them. Therefore, it is of central importance that public school administration o does not 
remain a function of municipalities; instead, the government needs to create a 
decentralized institution that can support and give technical assistance to public schools.  
This study offers empirical evidence that competition has a limited impact on 
student standardized test scores, and in contrast to what advocates of the market-oriented 
expected, competition among schools has had a negative impact on student achievement 
and it has also increased socioeconomic segregation of the system. As a consequence, the 
government, rather that creating or modifying rules to increase the competition among 
schools, should be focused on strengthening public schools and creating conditions for 
them to cooperate, reproducing pedagogical methods that have been shown effective in 
improving student learning. As this study has shown, competition by itself is not a 
solution and in the case of Chile, it has created more problems than benefits.  
(b) Teacher and Principal Training 
The main objective of the implementation of the high-stakes accountability 
program stems from the idea that teachers and schools do not face strong sanctions or 
pressure to improve student learning. Therefore, the idea is that if the results of student 
performance on standardized tests are linked with rewards or sanctions, student learning 
would improve because teachers would have incentives to do so.  
This study found that it is not clear that schools participating in the high-stakes 
accountability program have increased the use of academic strategies, such as teachers 
working more effectively, teaching more or working harder, as a means of  improving 
student achievement. One of the main limitations that SEP schools face in implementing 
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academic strategies is the enormous pressure to produce good results on SIMCE tests and 
the quality of teacher training. Many teachers are not prepared to deal with disadvantaged 
students or those with a different cultural background. In this sense, the Chilean 
government must regulate the conditions under which teachers are trained by universities, 
and stipulate the main conditions teachers need to satisfy in order to hold work in the 
public and also private sector.  
Finally, one of the critiques of the implementation of the SEP program is related 
to the lack of connection between school spending and a school’s educational project. In 
this sense, principals do not have a clear notion of how they should use new resources 
received from the SEP program to improve student learning. Therefore, it is important to 
improve the way that principals are selected and the requirements for their job, because 
under the new program, schools will have more flexibility and resources to spend, but if 
principals do not know how to link the new resources to the strengthening of the school's 
educational project, the new resources will have a limited impact on student learning.    
 (c) The use of standardized tests 
In the context of the high-stakes accountability program, test scores have not been 
used to help schools. Instead, standardized tests are being used to sanction or punish 
schools. Schools face pressure and the threat of possible sanctions related to their ability 
to produce good results on the SIMCE test, and one way to improve their performance is 
by manipulating the test-taking pool. For example, Mizala & Torche (2013) estimated 
that schools that participate in the high-stakes accountability program have increased on 
average 4 points on reading and 5 points on math tests in 4
th
 grade. However, this study 
estimates that in 2012 schools that participate in the high-stakes accountability program 
the exclusion of low-performing students explain at least 1 point of the increase in 
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reading and math test in 4
th
 grade. Moreover, I have found schools use non-academic 
strategies such as coaching, alignment or reallocation in order to improve students’ 
performance. In consequence, the high-stakes accountability system probably is 
improving students’ scores in standardized test, but not necessarily students’ learning, 
what is the main objective of this type of educational policy.     
Under the high-stakes accountability system, low-performing students are 
“undesirable” because they reduce average school performance. Students’ academic 
performance is largely explained by a family’s characteristics and, therefore, students 
from rural, indigenous, or poor families are more likely to perform lower than their peers 
from the middle class or those who have parents with a higher level of education. 
However, these students need to stay in the educational system, because they are the most 
disadvantages and education can make a difference for them. 
LIMITATIONS  
There are some limitations of this study and they fall into two broad categories. 
First, the years that were analyzed correspond to the last decade of implementation of the 
private-voucher schools, and this period only covers one third of the total period since 
privatization reform was implemented in 1981. The data available from standardized tests 
during the 1980s and early 1990s is not comparable with data from the 2000s because in 
1996 there was a change in the methodology used to construct the SIMCE tests. 
Moreover, student-level data has only been available since 1999. This is the data that I 
am using to conduct this study. The second limitation is related to omitted variables in the 
models. For example, the logistic and regression models included the most relevant 
information about the student’s family that, according to the literature, influences student 
achievement: family income and parents’ education. However, it would be important 
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have data about whether or not students come from an indigenous family, if the student 
attended preschool,  and to have the schools’ financial information, among other 
variables. Furthermore, information relevant to the study of the use of academic strategies 
following the implementation of the high-stakes accountability system is not available in 
the teacher ‘questionnaire. For example, it would useful to know how much time teachers 
spend working with their students, what their teaching methods are,  to have an 
evaluation used before and after the implementation of the accountability system, and 
information about teachers training – for example, if the teacher attended e-learning, a 
part-time or full-time program.  
FUTURE RESEARCH 
One of the most important aspects of this study is the potential for future research, 
particularly in the area of high-stakes accountability system. In 2011, the Chilean 
Congress established in Law #20,529 that the voluntary high-stakes program 
implemented in 2008 would be mandatory for all schools in 2015 or 2016. What lessons 
can be learned from the SEP program implemented in 2008? How can the 
implementation of the mandatory accountability program, based on the weaknesses and 
strengths identified under the SEP program, improve? A number of questions arise, as do 
opportunities for future research in this area. I have identified three possible areas of 
research, looking at (a) how teachers respond to the high-stakes accountability system (b) 
the use of the standardized test to improve student learning, and (c) public schools: 
finance and support technical  
(a) How teachers respond to the high-stakes accountability system 
One area that is relevant to more deeply understanding this is knowing under what 
conditions schools and teachers decide to use academic or non-academic strategies to 
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improve student performance. Using the data from the SIMCE test, it would be possible 
to identify schools that participate in the program those that have improved their test 
scores since 2008. Then, one could use qualitative methods to explore what type of 
strategies these schools are using to improve student performance on the SIMCE tests. 
This could be an important source of information for the implementation of the 
mandatory high-stakes program, as the government could identify the conditions that 
facilitate teachers and schools choosing academics strategies while avoiding or reducing 
those that promote the use of non-academic strategies.   
(b) The use of standardized test to improve pedagogical methods 
One of the assumptions of the implementation of an accountability system is that 
schools and teachers will use this information to improve their pedagogical methods. 
However, schools are not currently using this information as an input to improve their 
work and if standardized test become more focused on supporting schools rather than 
penalizing them, as the current government has been proposed, it is fundamental to 
understand how this information should be delivered by the Chilean government in order 
to make it useful to schools.  
(c) Public schools: finance and support technical  
An interesting area of research is related to public schools, particularly in learning 
how to strengthen public education. The law approved in January, 2015 was intended to 
regulate the system and restrict the role and the scope of actions taken by private-voucher 
schools. But if the Chilean government does not create conditions or change the rules 
under which public schools are operating, the number of public schools could decrease 
drastically. There is a consensus in Chile that it is necessary to strengthen public schools, 
but the question is how. How can the administration of municipalities be improved? How 
are public schools getting their funding, and how can the quality of education that public 
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schools are offering be improved? How can the technical support that public schools 
receive be improved? These questions, among others, could be addressed by researchers 
in Chile.  
SUMMARY  
This study has evaluated the macro-level impact of two central aspects of market-
oriented education policy: competition and accountability. While neoliberal policies have 
been highly promoted in the arena of education, there is limited evidence about their 
impact on the quality and equity of competition and the high-stakes accountability 
system.   
The Chilean case shows that competition has had a negative impact on quality of 
education at the national level, but that families and students from Santiago (in the 
metropolitan region) have benefited from competition among schools, even though the 
effect is almost irrelevant in terms of public policy. However, one aspect that is 
significant and visible at the national level is the increase of socioeconomic segregation 
of students in the educational system as a result of the addition of private-voucher schools 
to the system. Furthermore, this study has analyzed how teacher responses to the 
implementation of the high-stakes accountability system in 2008, as well as the results, 
show that in those schools that participate in the high-stakes accountability system, in 
contrary to the expected outcome, teachers are not increasing their use of academic 
strategies, such as spending more time with students, finding new learning methods, or 
giving students more homework or assignments as a way to improve student achievement 
on standardized tests. Instead, teachers and schools under pressure to improve their 
performance on the SIMCE tests are increasingly using non-academic strategies, such as 
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excluding low-performing students from the test-taking pool, as a way to improve their 
performance on standardized tests.  
While high-stakes accountability systems in education were developed according 
to the notion that some groups, such as students from low-income families or minority 
groups, typically receive poor service at their schools. As follows, it is also assumed an 
educational system that makes schools and teachers accountable for student learning 
would be especially beneficial to low-income families or minority groups. This is 
because, without explicit sanctions or rewards, advocates of accountability systems argue 
that teachers and principals will be less focused on the central objective of teaching the 
curriculum and improving student achievement. However, under continuing pressure to 
improve, established by an accountability system, schools are forced to use a combination 
of strategies that do not necessarily improve student learning, but rather help schools to 
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Appendix A.  Competition  
Figure A-1. Araucanía Region and Type of Schools in Primary Education 2011 
 








Table A-1. Fixed-Effects Model for 4
th
 Grade Reading and Math Tests Only Including 12 
Capital Cities of Each Region and Excluding Santiago City  
 
Variable Reading  Math 
competition -0.09*** -0.02 
year     
2005 4.04*** 0.25 
2006 1.09*** -0.73* 
2007 3.17*** -1.66*** 
2008 9.17*** -1.31*** 
2009 11.35*** 5.24*** 
2010 19.42*** 5.35*** 
2011 16.22*** 11.97*** 
2012 16.79*** 13.88*** 
2013 12.44*** 7.35*** 
student's gender     
1= Male / 0=Female -3.77*** 9.95*** 
student's grades     
B   16.74*** 18.27*** 
B+ 38.43*** 40.56*** 
A- 64.29*** 68.31*** 
A   90.23*** 97.35*** 
Father education     
High School 3.17*** 3.12*** 
College 7.03*** 6.87*** 
Mother education     
High School 2.63*** 2.95*** 
College 5.84*** 6.10*** 
Income of family (Monthly)     
US $401-1,000 1.41*** 1.49*** 
US $1,001-2,000 1.42*** 2.24*** 
US $2001-2,300 1.46*** 2.63*** 
More than US $2,300 1.12** 4.06*** 
School type     
Private-voucher 5.48*** 5.09*** 
Private-paid 3.96*** 2.71*** 
Urban -1.43*** 0.56 
School's SES     
Medium low 7.46*** 9.52*** 
Medium 17.27*** 20.85*** 
Medium high 24.25*** 28.72*** 
High 29.41*** 38.71*** 
_cons 187.78*** 165.20*** 
N 335,412 336,582 
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Table A-2. Fixed-effects model that include dummy variable for those students who 
attend schools outside to their municipality 
  National  Metropolitan Region Araucania Region 
Variable reading math reading math reading math 
competition -0.07*** -0.09*** 0.14*** 0.15*** -0.14* -0.24*** 
2008 base base base base base base 
2009 1.36*** 6.05*** 0.99*** 5.24*** 0.91 6.79*** 
2010 10.06*** 5.65*** 9.67*** 4.49*** 11.10*** 8.88*** 
2011 6.23*** 11.79*** 5.01*** 8.72*** 9.53*** 16.54*** 
2012 7.32*** 14.75*** 6.36*** 11.67*** 8.26*** 18.01*** 
student's gender -4.46*** 11.29*** -3.94*** 11.98*** -3.70*** 11.95*** 
student's grades             
B   17.37*** 17.81*** 17.92*** 18.44*** 16.44*** 17.08*** 
B+ 39.07*** 40.02*** 40.05*** 41.05*** 38.77*** 40.09*** 
A- 65.25*** 68.34*** 66.28*** 69.41*** 65.54*** 69.48*** 
A   90.12*** 98.18*** 89.81*** 97.99*** 90.41*** 100.54*** 
Study outside              
1=  Outside  0.88*** 0.55*** 0.89*** 0.92*** 0.61 -0.59 
Father education             
High School 2.54*** 2.24*** 2.69*** 1.76*** 2.86*** 3.18*** 
College 5.30*** 5.21*** 4.63*** 4.24*** 6.40*** 6.69*** 
Mother education             
High School 1.60*** 2.51*** 2.08*** 2.39*** 1.55*** 2.89*** 
College 4.14*** 5.21*** 4.52*** 4.75*** 3.31*** 6.16*** 
Income of family 
(Monthly)         
    
US $401-1,000 1.32*** 1.66*** 1.67*** 2.14*** 0.98* 0.56 
US $1,001-2,000 2.09*** 2.90*** 2.55*** 3.70*** 0.89 2.55*** 
US $2001-2,300 2.69*** 4.42*** 3.58*** 6.07*** 0.34 1.93 
More than US 
$2,300 2.95*** 5.84*** 3.99*** 7.85*** 
-0.47 2.54* 
School type             
Private-voucher 4.65*** 3.91*** 6.62*** 6.05*** 0.57 0.53 
Private-paid -0.09 -0.21 0.01 -1.07* 1.35 1.86 
Urban -0.92*** 0.82*** -2.56*** -1.74*** 3.72*** 8.84*** 
School's SES             
Mediun low 5.72*** 7.65*** 8.16*** 9.24*** 8.05*** 10.55*** 
Medium 15.99*** 19.70*** 20.69*** 23.34*** 15.87*** 19.96*** 
Medium high 22.73*** 29.21*** 27.81*** 33.36*** 18.80*** 27.37*** 
High 26.93*** 35.61*** 30.69*** 38.44*** 27.32*** 40.42*** 
_cons 202.44*** 174.55*** 187.24*** 161.78*** 207.98*** 174.69*** 
N    885,113    887,987    349,662   350,684     46,908     47,051  
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Appendix B. Interviews 
B.1. Semi-structured Interview 
B.1.1 Interviews with Teachers  
*Implementación de la Subvención Preferencial Escolar 
Narrativa que justifica el uso del SIMCE para clasificar a las escuelas para las escuelas 
 
¿Por qué medir calidad?  
¿Cómo se justifica el uso de pruebas estandarizadas para medir calidad? 
Efectos negativos y positivos del uso del uso del SIMCE para clasificar a las escuelas 
¿Cuáles son los efectos positivos del uso del SIMCE para clasificar las escuelas? 
¿Se trabaja más tiempo preparando las clases? 
¿Se utilizan nuevas estrategias pedagógicas para mejorar los aprendizajes de los 
alumnos?  
¿Los profesores entregan más y más desafiantes tareas a los estudiantes?  
  
¿Cuáles son los efectos negativos o no deseados del uso del SIMCE para clasificar las 
escuelas? 
 ¿Las escuelas excluyen a los alumnos de bajo rendimiento? 





¿Existe un ambiente de cooperación o competencia entre los docentes al interior de la 
escuela? 
¿Cómo los directores ejercen presión sobre los docentes para obtener mejores resultados 
en el SIMCE? 
¿Se siente apoyada por el director(a) de la escuela donde trabaja? 
Si pudiese cambiarse de escuela a otra de similares características, ¿lo haría? ¿Por qué?  
 
* Rol de Agencia de la Calidad de la Educación  
 
¿Usted cree que la Agencia de la Calidad es una institución que ayudara a mejorar la 
calidad y equidad del sistema? 
¿Cuáles serán los efectos no deseados de la implementación de un sistema de 
clasificación de las escuelas a nivel nacional?  




B.2. Sample of Transcript  
Interviewed: Math teacher of Private-voucher school in Temuco City  
 
Cuéntame fue tu experiencia como examinador del Simce 
Las experiencias como examinador han sido eminentemente rurales,  y estuve en 5 o 6 
oportunidades como examinador en distintos colegios. Uno tiene que visitar los sectores 
rurales previamente, hacer un contacto donde se va a quedar, pues ahí no hay lugares 
donde uno pueda quedarse, están las escuelas no más. En general uno tiene que quedarse 
en la casa del director o algún profesor y cuando los lugares son muy lejanos te van a 
dejar un día antes  y debe quedarse en la casa del director o profesores. En la mayoría de 
los casos ellos intentan conocer algo del proceso, pero el material viene sellado, a mí me 
han pedido en todos estos lugares si le pueden “echar una miradita” a la prueba, no se 
puede pues esta todo sellado” 
En otro lugar un sostenedor,  me dice que él tiene un conocido que era dueño de una 
escuela y que le ofreció una cantidad de dinero al examinador y a cambio de eso el 
examinador permitió que le ayudaran un poquito en la prueba. Insinuando indirectamente 
que podríamos llegar al mismo arreglo 
En otra parte, la directora también directamente si yo pudiera ayudarles a los chicos, 
sabiendo que yo era profesor.  Ella no pedía mucho, que uno le ayudara para que subieran 
10 puntitos, 20 puntitos,  directamente “usted podría por favor ayudarle a los chiquillos” 
así como de buena voluntad  
En otro colegio, la experiencia que tuve fue que el primer día de aplicación, llegando a la 
sala, en un 4to básico, había un listado de alumnos en el pizarrón, eran 7 u 8. Y como 
había poco asistencia, yo les pregunte y que pasa chicos que no llegan los demás y estos 
que están anotados aquí quiénes son. Me dijeron “esos son los porros, esos son los que no 
saben na tío y ellos vinieron en la mañana y el tío (profesor) se los llevo a Pucón en un 
furgón”. Los niños fueron a la escuela, pero el profesor los saco a pasear y eran como 7 u 
8, era un porcentaje importante del curso  
¿Y cuál ha sido su experiencia como profesor en donde ha tenido que ser evaluado por el 
Simce?  
Mi experiencia como profesor, yo estoy siempre rotando pues en el sistema particular no 
te contratan por más de un año, entonces lo que hacen todos los colegios es focalizar 
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todos los esfuerzos en preparar a los estudiantes, con el tipo de formato del SIMCE, con 
el formato de ejercicio y como contestar la preguntas. Ocupando horas de clases que para 
ellos no son tan relevantes, que no sean matemáticas y lenguaje. Todo lo que es ciencias 
sociales, artes, música, tecnología, todos esos espacios de clases de esas asignaturas le 
hacen ensayos  
¿Y qué pasa con el profesor de esa asignatura?  
Él está ahí, pero hacen otra cosa o a veces también esta solo pero llevan ensayos. 
Entonces le dicen “ya profe, aplique este ensayo de matemáticas” y el profesor de música 
tiene que ir y aplicar el ensayo.  Y eso es lo más recurrente en términos de la focalización 
del esfuerzo. 
¿Y en tu caso como profesor de matemáticas tu sientes que hay presión por parte de los 
directivos o sostenedores hacia ti para que los niños obtengan buenos resultados en 
matemáticas?  
Claro, no solo en matemáticas,  se amplió el abanico de asignaturas. Ahora se rinde 
Simce en educación física, en ingles.  Pero ellos están siempre más focalizado en 
lenguaje y matemáticas, y nos hacen presión en termino de resultados, pero no hay 
ningún cambio, siendo siempre lo mismo. Lo único que hacen ellos –directivos- es 
ocupar tiempo de otras asignaturas para ensayos, pero en tu asignatura no hay apoyo, no 
hay material extra con más tiempo, con más horas.  Con lo mismo quieren que mejores 
los resultados 
Te dicen esperemos que el próximo año el resultado sea mejor, pues usted tiene que 
preparar sus clases, tiene que mejorar. Porque si no hay mejora, usted sabe hay que 
buscar una nueva posibilidad de traer a otro tipo de profesional. Ósea, si usted no rinde 
usted no sirve 
De  hecho hace poco yo tuve un conflicto serio con la jefa de UTP, pues yo le dije que 
me sentía agredido, estaba un poco cansado con la Cantinela del Simce,  porque todo los 
anos es la misma reunión, independiente en el colegio en que tu estés.  Se reunen con los 
profesores de matemáticas y lenguaje y te dicen colegas en que estamos fallando, que 
estamos haciendo mal, que usted es el profesional, que está pasando no está haciendo su 
clase. Cambie su metodología, hágase una autocrítica... O sea  somos los responsables, y 
yo le dije a la jefa de UTP, todos los años es la misma cantinela, que mejoren, que usted 
es el profesional, como si el resultado dependiera exclusivamente de la variable profesor 
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¿Y esto es generalizado o es una experiencia más bien personal? 
Esto pasa en todos los colegios, uno se siente presionado, porque finalmente a ellos lo 
único que les interesa el índice que obtuvieron en el Simce 
¿Y en las escuelas en que has trabajado cual es el nivel socioeconómico de los 
estudiantes?  
Todos tienen un NSE deprivado (bajo),  de hecho el año pasado el colegio tenía como el 
90- 92 % de vulnerabilidad, y ahora por sobre el 80%.  Pero es bien raro, porque los 
papas con los ingresos que declaran, porque declaran mayores ingresos,  pero en realidad 
viven con mucho más que eso  
¿Te han solicitado algún directivo de excluir a los alumnos de bajo rendimiento del 
Simce?  
No, nunca así directamente no. Nunca me han pedido siendo yo profesor jefe de que yo 
trate que un estudiante no venga, pero siempre lo comentan igual informalmente “Ojala 
que estos cabros no vengan ese día”  ese es un comentario del jefe de UTP o del director. 
Te sugieren que “ojala que estos cabros –así bien personalizado- no vinieran ese día 
porque nos van a echar a perder el Simce”.  Ese es un comentario bien común, pero 
nunca me han pedido así directamente como que hay que pedirle al papá o a la mamá que 
no los traiga ese día. 
Este año  el sostenedor para intentar cambiar un poquito la amenaza con un estímulo. Di 
ya, colegas si el próximo año subimos 10 puntos va a existir un bono, pero para el 
próximo ano, pero uno nunca sabe si el próximo año va a estar o no. 
Cuéntame, ¿por qué es tan importante el SIMCE para las escuelas? 
Por el ranking que se hace de establecimientos de la misma categoría,  con los mismo 
ingresos,  con el mismo tipo de dependencia.  Se comparan entre ellos,  y ahora también 
por los recursos SEP son extras tienen que ver con el rendimiento del Simce igual. Toda 
esa cantidad importante de recursos está en juego, entonces ellos te transmiten eso 
“colegas si nos va mal, no vamos a recibir este otro fondo”  porque ellos se comprometen 
con los proyectos SEP a mejorar ese índice.  Hay una presión económica 
Entre los profesores y los directivos,  como es la relación dado la presión que surge por 
mejorar en Simce?  
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Se genera una tensión permanente,  en todos los colegios que he estado yo sucede 
exactamente lo mismo. O sea, de hecho los profesores no reunimos con los directivos 
después de la entrega del Simce y es siempre lo mismo, los profesores son los culpables 
del Simce. Porque tampoco asumen la responsabilidad como directivos, la dirección 
académica estuvo fallando 
Muchos están presionados, genera angustia y estrés esta cosa del Simce. Es enfermiza 
esta cuestión dentro del colegio, pues produce  división del equipo; tú tienes al cuerpo de 
profesores por aquí y los directivos  acá. Uno atacando a los otros,  y nosotros 
defendiéndonos y nosotros atacándonos. No hay espíritu de unidad de trabajar todos para 
el mismo lado 
¿Y existe espacio de cooperación entre los profesores? 
No hay espacio para eso, nosotros estamos abiertos a la posibilidad del trabajo en equipo 
y siempre buscando la instancia donde pudiese comentar con tu colega de matemática,  
yo creo que dentro de los profesores no hay problema con eso. Lo que sucede es que no 
hay tiempo o espacio para generar el departamento de matemáticas,  te exigen pero no te 
dan espacio para coordinarte con los demás 
Si invierten todo en reforzamiento, gente que venga de afuera, que trabaje con los 
estudiantes después de clases, que vengan los sábados, hasta para vacaciones de invierno 
se tomó un par de días para reforzamiento de Simce con profesores externos.  Pero  el 
profesor que trabaja en el aula, no hay ni un minuto más extra de tiempo, ni de pago 
Y en relación al tipo de establecimientos, entre los municipales y los particulares 
subvencionados, ¿cuál de estos tendría mayor presión por mostrar avances en el Simce?  
Yo no he trabajado en escuelas municipales, no tengo la experiencia. Pero creo que la 
presión siempre está en las particulares, ellas son el foco crítico ahora, pues se supone 
que debieran tener mejores resultados que los municipales. Y  los municipales no se 
hacen mucho cargo, pues depende de  toda una institucionalidad que hay en la comuna , 
el rendimiento tiene que ver con el conjunto de las escuelas municipales de la comunas, 
que con esa escuela en particular 
¿Existe inestabilidad laboral para los profesores de escuelas particulares subvencionadas?  
Absoluta,  una cosa más que te agobia. Tu sabes que  en Marzo tu tienes que comenzar a 
buscar trabajo de nuevo,  entonces tampoco se genera un compromiso con el 
establecimiento donde uno vaya a decir voy a hacer un esfuerzo extra para este colegio le 
 183 
vaya bien en el Simce porque el próximo año yo voy a seguir aquí, de hecho no hay 
ninguna seguridad, lo más seguro es que no sigas. 
Yo he estado hasta dos años en un colegio, pero al segundo año si o si no te recontratan 
porque al segundo año por ley generas contrato indefinido. Y el contrato indefinido no le 
da la libertad al sostenedor de despedirte, porque te tienen que indemnizar y ya son tres 
años. Esta inestabilidad es transversal para todos los profesores que trabajan en el sistema 
particular subvencionado 
Finalmente, ¿cuál crees tú que será el papel de la Agencia de la Calidad?  
Yo creo que en ese escenario va a ser más complejo el tema,  van a tener la amenaza no 
solo de subir sino también la amenaza del cierre. Entonces, van a intentar buscar los 
resultados independiente si los estudiantes son o no capaces de hacerlo, que el sistema 
logre hacerlo solamente por la vía formal y legal.  Como hablar con el examinador, se 







SIMCE : Educational Quality Measurement System (Sistema Nacional de 
Evaluación de Calidad de la Educación) 
SEP  :   Preferential Voucher Program (Subvención Escolar Preferencial) 
MINEDUC :   Ministry of Education (Ministerio de Educación)  
CASEN : Chilean National Household Survey (Encuesta de Caracterización       
Socioeconómica Nacional). 
OLS  : Ordinary Least Square  
MAR : Missing At Random  
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